PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

JANUARY
FEBRUARY | 1966

Soviet Economic Reforms
Michel Tatu

Report on Rumania
George Gross

A Traveler in China
Michael Futrell

EVOLUTION IN THE USSR: TWO PATHS
Zbigniew Brzezinski

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JAN-FEB 1966
VOL. XV
1

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20547.

How to Subscribe: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $2.50.

Editor: ***Abraham Brumberg***
Managing Editor: ***Marie Thompson House***
Associate Editors: ***Clarke H. Kawakami,***
Cary O. Fisher

THE SOVIET UNION

1 The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?, *by Zbigniew Brzezinski*

EAST EUROPE

16 Rumania: The Fruits of Autonomy, *by George Gross*

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

28 Economics and Politics
Soviet Reforms: The Debate Goes On, *by Michel Tatu*

BOOKS

35 Mao and Maoism, *by James Townsend*
40 Cuba and Latin American Communism, *by Daniel Tretiak*
44 Reviews in Brief, *by D. Barendsen, J. F. Brown, David Morison, Philip Altbach*

HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

49 Zimmerwald: Some Contemporary Echoes, *by William Korey*

NOTES AND VIEWS

54 A Traveler in China, *by Michael Futrell*
62 Correspondence

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

EDITORS' NOTE: The essay below by Prof. Brzezinski represents a fundamental inquiry into the essential evolutionary processes of the Soviet political system. In our opinion, it deserves careful reading and discussion. Accordingly, we have asked a number of prominent scholars—historians, philosophers, sociologists, political analysts—to submit brief comments on Prof. Brzezinski's essay, as well as on the articles in our recent symposium, "Progress and Ideology in the USSR" (November-December 1965). Replies will appear in forthcoming issues of this journal.

The Soviet Union will soon celebrate its 50th anniversary. In this turbulent and rapidly changing world, for any political system to survive half a century is an accomplishment in its own right and obvious testimony to its durability. There are not many major political structures in the world today that can boast of such longevity. The approaching anniversary, however, provides an appropriate moment for a critical review of the changes that have taken place in the Soviet system, particularly in regard to such critical matters as the character of its top leadership, the methods by which its leaders acquire power, and the relationship of the Communist Party to society. Furthermore, the time is also ripe to inquire into the implications of these changes, especially in regard to the stability and vitality of the system.

Mr. Brzezinski is Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University. His books include The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict *(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960) and* Alternative to Partition *(New York, McGraw Hill, 1965).*

The Leaders

Today Soviet spokesmen would have us believe that the quality of the top Communist leadership in the USSR has been abysmal. Of the 45 years since Lenin, according to official Soviet history, power was exercised for ap-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proximately five years by leaders subsequently unmasked as traitors (although later the charge of treason was retroactively reduced to that of deviation); for almost 20 years it was wielded by a paranoiac mass-murderer who irrationally slew his best comrades and ignorantly guided Soviet war strategy by pointing his finger at a globe; and, most recently, for almost ten years, by a "harebrained" schemer given to tantrums and with a propensity for wild organizational experimentation. On the basis of that record, the present leadership lays claim to representing a remarkable departure from a historical pattern of singular depravity.

While Soviet criticism of former party leaders is now abundant, little intellectual effort is expended on analyzing the implications of the changes in leadership. Yet that, clearly, is the important question insofar as the political system is concerned.

Lenin was a rare type of political leader, fusing in his person several functions of key importance to the working of a political system: he acted as the chief ideologist of the system, the principal organizer of the party (indeed, the founder of the movement), and the top administrator of the state. It may be added that such personal fusion is typical of early revolutionary leaderships, and today it is exemplified by Mao Tse-tung. To his followers, Lenin was clearly a charismatic leader, and his power (like Hitler's or Mao Tse-tung's) depended less on institutions than on the force of his personality and intellect. Even after the Revolution, it was his personal authority that gave him enormous power, while the progressive institutionalization of Lenin's rule (the Cheka, the appearance of the *apparat,* etc.) reflected more the transformation of a revolutionary party into a ruling one than any significant change in the character of his leadership.

Lenin's biographers [1] agree that here was a man characterized by total political commitment, by self-righteous conviction, by tenacious determination and by an outstanding ability to formulate intellectually appealing principles of political action as well as popular slogans suitable for mass consumption. He was a typically revolutionary figure, a man whose genius can be consummated only at that critical juncture in history when the new breaks off—and not just evolves—from the old. Had he lived a generation earlier, he probably would have died in a Siberian *taiga;* a generation later, he probably would have been shot by Stalin.

Under Stalin, the fusion of leadership functions was continued, but this was due less to his personal qualities as such than to the fact that, with the passage of time and the growing toll of victims, his power became nearly total and was gradually translated also into personal authority. Only a mediocre ideologist—and certainly inferior in that respect to his chief rivals for power—Stalin became institutionally the ideologue of the system. A dull speaker, he eventually acquired the "routinized charisma" [2] which, after Lenin's death, became invested in the Communist Party as a whole (much as the Pope at one time acquired the infallibility that for a long time had rested in the collective church). But his power was increasingly institutionalized bureaucratically, with decision-making centralized at the apex within his own secretariat, and its exercise involved a subtle balancing of the principal institutions of the political system: the secret police, the party, the state, and the army (roughly in that order of importance). Even the ostensibly principal organ of power, the Politburo, was split into minor groups, "the sextets," the "quartets," etc., with Stalin personally deciding who should participate in which subgroup and personally providing (and monopolizing) the function of integration.

If historical parallels for Lenin are to be found among the revolutionary tribunes, for Stalin they are to be sought among the Oriental despots.[3] Thriving on intrigue, shielded in mystery,

[1] Angelica Balabanoff, *Impressions of Lenin,* Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1964. Louis Fischer, *Life of Lenin,* New York, Harper, 1964. S. Possony, *Lenin, the Compulsive Revolutionary,* Chicago, Regnery, 1964. Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution,* New York, Dial Press, 1948.

[2] For a discussion of "routinized charisma," see Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations,* Glencoe, Ill., Glencoe Free Press, 1961, pp. 26 ff.

[3] Compare the types discussed by J. L. Talmon in his *Political Messianism: the Romantic Phase,* New York, Praeger, 1960, with Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, especially Chapter 2 on "Totalitarian Elements in Pre-Industrial Societies," or Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and isolated from society, his immense power reflected the immense tasks he succeeded in imposing on his followers and subjects. Capitalizing on the revolutionary momentum and the ideological impetus inherited from Leninism, and wedding it to a systematic institutionalization of bureaucratic rule, he could set in motion a social and political revolution which weakened all existing institutions save Stalin's own secretariat and his chief executive arm, the secret police. His power grew in proportion to the degree to which the major established institutions declined in vitality and homogeneity.[4]

The war, however, as well as the postwar reconstruction, produced a paradox. While Stalin's personal prestige and authority were further enhanced, his institutional supremacy relatively declined. The military establishment naturally grew in importance; the enormous effort to transfer, reinstall, and later reconstruct the industrial economy invigorated the state machinery; the party apparat began to perform again the key functions of social mobilization and political integration. But the aging tyrant was neither unaware of this development nor apparently resigned to it. The Byzantine intrigues resulting in the liquidation of the Leningrad leadership and Voznesenski, the "doctors' plot" with its ominous implications for some top party, military and police chiefs, clearly augured an effort to weaken any institutional limits on Stalin's personal supremacy.

Khrushchev came to power ostensibly to save Stalinism, which he defined as safeguarding the traditional priority of heavy industry and restoring the primacy of the party. In fact, he presided over the dismantling of Stalinism. He rode to power by restoring the predominant position of the party apparat. But the complexities of governing (as contrasted to the priorities of the power struggle) caused him to dilute the party's position. While initially he succeeded in diminishing the political role of the secret police and in weakening the state machinery, the military establishment grew in importance with the continuing tensions of the cold war.[5] By the time Khrushchev was removed, the economic priorities had become blurred because of pressures in agriculture and the consumer sector, while his own reorganization of the party into two separate industrial and rural hierarchies in November 1962 went far toward undermining the party's homogeneity of outlook, apart from splitting it institutionally. Consequently, the state bureaucracy recouped, almost by default, some of its

How to Deal with a Minor Aberration

Historical experience shows that the strategy of the Marxist-Leninist parties, worked out through the theoretical analysis of the principal social laws, corresponds most fully and exactly to the needs of world development. . . . The whole question is one of the nature and seriousness of the various mistakes and the timely exposure and correction of them.

For example, our party exposed and criticized the Stalin personality cult boldly and in the Leninist manner. Undoubtedly, the personality cult wrought considerable harm upon the cause of socialist construction in individual spheres of society's life. Yet neither the personality cult itself nor its consequences were in any measure a logical outcome of the nature of the socialist system and did not and could not alter its character. Therefore, it is neither theoretically nor factually correct to portray life . . . only from the angle of phenomena of the personality cult, thereby obscuring the heroic efforts of the Soviet people in building socialism.

—From "Marxism - Leninism — Firm Foundation of Development of the Social Sciences," by S. Trapeznikov, Head of the CPSU CC Department of Science and Educational Institutions, Pravda, Oct. 8, 1965.

[4] It seems that these considerations are as important to the understanding of the Stalinist system as the psychopathological traits of Stalin that Robert C. Tucker rightly emphasizes in his "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, July 1965.

[5] For a good treatment of Soviet military debates, see Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

integrative and administrative functions. Khrushchev thus, perhaps inadvertently, restored much of the institutional balance that had existed under Stalin, but without ever acquiring the full powers of the balancer.

Khrushchev lacked the authority of Lenin to generate personal power, or the power of Stalin to create personal authority—and the Soviet leadership under him became increasingly differentiated. The top leader was no longer the top ideologist, in spite of occasional efforts to present Khrushchev's elaborations as "a creative contribution to Marxism-Leninism." The ruling body now contained at least one professional specialist in ideological matters, and it was no secret that the presence of the professional ideologue was required because someone had to give professional ideological advice to the party's top leader. Similarly, technical-administrative specialization differentiated some top leaders from others. Increasingly Khrushchev's function—and presumably the primary source of his still considerable power—was that of providing political integration and impetus for new domestic or foreign initiatives in a political system otherwise too complex to be directed and administered by one man.

The differentiation of functions also made it more difficult for the top leader to inherit even the "routinized charisma" that Stalin had eventually transferred to himself from the party as a whole. Acquiring charisma was more difficult for a leader who (even apart from a personal style and vulgar appearance that did not lend themselves to "image building") had neither the great "theoretical" flare valued by a movement that still prided itself on being the embodiment of a messianic ideology, nor the technical expertise highly regarded in a state which equated technological advance with human progress. Moreover, occupying the posts of First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers was not enough to develop a charismatic appeal since neither post has been sufficiently institutionalized to endow its occupant with the special prestige and aura that, for example, the President of the United States automatically gains on assuming office.

Trying to cope with this lack of charismatic appeal, Khrushchev replaced Stalin's former colleagues. In the process, he gradually came to rely on a younger generation of bureaucratic leaders to whom orderliness of procedure was instinctively preferable to crash campaigns. Administratively, however, Khrushchev was a true product of the Stalinist school, with its marked proclivity for just such campaigns at the cost of all other considerations. In striving to develop his own style of leadership, Khrushchev tried to emulate Lenin in stimulating new fervor, and Stalin in mobilizing energies, but without the personal and institutional assets that each had commanded. By the time he was removed, Khrushchev had become an anachronism in the new political context he himself had helped to create.

Brezhnev and Kosygin mark the coming to power of a new generation of leaders, irrespective of whether they will for long retain their present positions.[6] Lenin's, Stalin's, and Khrushchev's formative experience was the unsettled period of conspiratorial activity, revolution, and —in Khrushchev's case—civil war and the early phase of communism. The new leaders, beneficiaries of the revolution but no longer revolutionaries themselves, have matured in an established political setting in which the truly large issues of policy and leadership have been decided. Aspiring young bureaucrats, initially promoted during the purges, they could observe —but not suffer from—the debilitating consequences of political extremism and unpredictable personal rule. To this new generation of clerks, bureaucratic stability—indeed, bureaucratic dictatorship—must seem to be the only solid foundation for effective government.

Differentiation of functions to these bureaucrats is a norm, while personal charisma is ground for suspicion. The new Soviet leadership, therefore, is both bureaucratic in style and essentially impersonal in form. The curious emphasis on *kollektivnost rukovodstva* (collectivity of leadership) instead of the traditional *kollektivnoe rukovodstvo* (collective leadership)—a change in formulation used immediately after Khrushchev's fall—suggests a deliberate effort at achieving not only a personal but also an institutional collective leadership, designed to prevent any one leader from using a particular institution as a vehicle for obtaining political supremacy.

[6] See S. Bialer, "An Unstable Leadership," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The question arises, however, whether this kind of leadership can prove effective in guiding the destiny of a major state. The Soviet system is now led by a bureaucratic leadership from the very top to the bottom. In that respect, it is unique. Even political systems with highly developed and skillful professional political bureaucracies, such as the British, the French, or that of the Catholic Church, have reserved some top policy-making and hence power-wielding positions for non-bureaucratic professional politicians, presumably on the assumption that a free-wheeling, generalizing and competitive political experience is of decisive importance in shaping effective national leadership.

To be sure, some top Soviet leaders do acquire such experience, even in the course of rising up the bureaucratic party ladder, especially when assigned to provincial or republican executive responsibilities. There they acquire the skills of initiative, direction, integration, as well as accommodation, compromise, and delegation of authority, which are the basic prerequisites for executive management of any complex organization.

Nonetheless, even when occupying territorial positions of responsibility, the *apparatchiki* are still part of an extremely centralized and rigidly hierarchical bureaucratic organization, increasingly set in its ways, politically corrupted by years of unchallenged power, and made even more confined in its outlook than is normally the case with a ruling body by its lingering and increasingly ritualized doctrinaire tradition. It is relevant to note here (from observations made in Soviet universities) that the young men who become active in the Komsomol organization and are presumably embarking on a professional political career are generally the dull conformists. Clearly, in a highly bureaucratized political setting, conformity, caution and currying favor with superiors count for more in advancing a political career than personal courage and individual initiative.[7]

Such a condition poses a long-range danger to the vitality of any political system. Social evolution, it has been noted, depends not only on the availability of creative individuals, but on the existence of clusters of creators who collectively promote social innovation. "The ability of any gifted individual to exert leverage within a society . . . is partly a function of the exact composition of the group of those on whom he depends for day-to-day interaction and for the execution of his plans."[8] The revolutionary milieu of the 1920's and even the fanatical Stalinist commitment of the 1930's fostered such clusters of intellectual and political talent. It is doubtful that the CPSU party schools and the Central Committee personnel department encourage, in Margaret Mead's terms, the growth of clusters of creativity, and that is why the transition from Lenin to Stalin to Khrushchev to Brezhnev probably cannot be charted by an ascending line.

This has serious implications for the Soviet system as a whole. It is doubtful that any organization can long remain vital if it is so structured that in its personnel policy it becomes, almost unknowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation. Decay is bound to set in, while the stability of the political system may be endangered, if other social institutions succeed in attracting the society's talent and begin to chafe under the restraints imposed by the ruling but increasingly mediocre *apparatchiki.*

The Struggle for Power

The struggle for power in the Soviet political system has certainly become less violent. The question is, however: Has it become less debilitating for the political system? Has it become a more regularized process, capable of infusing the leadership with fresh blood? A closer look at the changes in the character of the competition for power may guide us to the answer.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev rode to power by skillfully manipulating issues as well as by taking full advantage of the organizational opportunities arising from their tenure of the post of party First Secretary. It must be stressed that the manipulation of issues was at least as im-

[7] Writing about modern bureaucracy, V. A. Thompson (*Modern Organization,* New York, 1961, p. 91) observed: "In the formally structured group, the idea man is doubly dangerous. He endangers the established distribution of power and status, and he is a competitive threat to his peers. Consequently, he has to be suppressed." For a breezy treatment of some analogous experience, see also E. G. Hegarty, *How to Succeed in Company Politics,* New York, 1963.

[8] Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 181. See also the introduction, especially p. xx.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portant to their success as the organizational factor, which generally tends to receive priority in Western historical treatments. In Stalin's time, the issues facing the party were, indeed, on a grand scale: world revolution *vs.* socialism in one country; domestic evolution *vs.* social revolution; a factionalized *vs.* a monolithic party. Stalin succeeded because he instinctively perceived that the new *apparatchiki* were not prepared to sacrifice themselves in futile efforts to promote foreign revolutions but—being for the most part genuinely committed to revolutionary ideals—were becoming eager to get on with the job of creating a socialist society. (Moreover, had the NEP endured another ten years, would the Soviet Union be a Communist dictatorship today?)

Stalin's choice of socialism in one country was a brilliant solution. It captivated, at least in part, the revolutionaries; and it satisfied, at least partially, the accommodators. It split the opposition, polarized it, and prepared the ground for the eventual liquidation of each segment with the other's support. The violence, the terror, and finally the Great Purges of 1936-1938 followed logically. Imbued with the Leninist tradition of intolerance for dissent, engaged in a vast undertaking of social revolution that taxed both the resources and the nerves of party members, guided by an unscrupulous and paranoiac but also reassuringly calm leader, governing a backward country surrounded by neighbors that were generally hostile to the Soviet experiment, and increasingly deriving its own membership strength from first-generation proletarians with all their susceptibility to simple explanations and dogmatic truths, the ruling party easily plunged down the path of increasing brutality. The leader both rode the crest of that violence and controlled it. The terror never degenerated into simple anarchy, and Stalin's power grew immeasurably because he effectively practiced the art of leadership according to his own definition:

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But neither must one rush ahead, for to rush ahead is to lose contact with the masses. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and those who run ahead.[9]

Khrushchev, too, succeeded in becoming the top leader because he perceived the elite's predominant interests. Restoration of the primary position of the party, decapitation of the secret police, reduction of the privileges of the state bureaucrats while maintaining the traditional emphasis on heavy industrial development (which pleased both the industrial elite and the military establishment)—these were the issues which Khrushchev successfully utilized in the mid-1950's to mobilize the support of officials and accomplish the gradual isolation and eventual defeat of Malenkov.

But the analogy ends right there. The social and even the political system in which Khrushchev came to rule was relatively settled. Indeed, in some respects, it was stagnating, and Khrushchev's key problem, once he reached the political apex (but before he had had time to consolidate his position there) was how to get the country moving again. The effort to infuse new social and political dynamism into Soviet society, even while consolidating his power, led him to a public repudiation of Stalinism which certainly shocked some officials; to sweeping economic reforms which disgruntled many administrators; to a dramatic reorganization of the party which appalled the *apparatchiki;* and even to an attempt to circumvent the policy-making authority of the party Presidium by means of direct appeals to interested groups, which must have both outraged and frightened his colleagues. The elimination of violence as the decisive instrumentality of political competition—a move that was perhaps prompted by the greater institutional maturity of Soviet society, and which was in any case made inevitable by the downgrading of the secret police and the public disavowals of Stalinism—meant that Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, could not achieve both social dynamism and the stability of his power. Stalin magnified his power as he strove to change society; to change society Khrushchev had to risk his power.

The range of domestic disagreement involved in the post-Stalin struggles has also narrowed with the maturing of social commitments made earlier. For the moment, the era of grand

[9] J. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* Moscow, 1940, p. 338.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alternatives is over in Soviet society. Even though any struggle tends to exaggerate differences, the issues that divided Khrushchev from his opponents, though of great import, appear pedestrian in comparison to those over which Stalin and his enemies crossed swords. In Khrushchev's case, they pertained primarily to policy alternatives; in the case of Stalin, they involved basic conceptions of historical development. Compare the post-Stalin debates about the allocation of resources among different branches of the economy, for example, with the debates of the 1920's about the character and pace of Soviet industrialization; or Khrushchev's homilies on the merits of corn—and even his undeniably bold and controversial virgin lands campaign—with the dilemma of whether to collectivize a hundred million reticent peasants, at what pace, and with what intensity in terms of resort to violence.

It is only in the realm of foreign affairs that one can perhaps argue that grand dilemmas still impose themselves on the Soviet political scene. The nuclear-war-or-peace debate of the 1950's and early 1960's is comparable in many respects to the earlier conflict over "permanent revolution" or "socialism in one country." Molotov's removal and Kozlov's political demise were to a large extent related to disagreements concerning foreign affairs; nonetheless, in spite of such occasional rumblings, it would appear that on the peace-or-war issue there is today more of a consensus among the Soviet elite than there was on the issue of permanent revolution in the 1920's. Although a wide spectrum of opinion does indeed exist in the international Communist movement on the crucial questions of war and peace, this situation, as far as one can judge, obtains to a considerably lesser degree in the USSR itself. Bukharin *vs.* Trotsky can be compared to Togliatti *vs.* Mao Tse-tung, but hardly to Khrushchev *vs.* Kozlov.

The narrowing of the range of disagreement is reflected in the changed character of the cast. In the earlier part of this discussion, some comparative comments were made about Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. It is even more revealing, however, to examine their principal rivals. Take the men who opposed Stalin: Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin. What a range of political, historical, economic, and intellectual creativity, what talent, what a diversity of personal characteristics and backgrounds! Compare this diversity with the strikingly uniform personal training, narrowness of perspective, and poverty of intellect of Malenkov, Kozlov and Suslov.[10] A regime of the clerks cannot help but clash over clerical issues.

The narrowing of the range of disagreement and the cooling of ideological passions mean also the wane of political violence. The struggle tends to become less a matter of life or death, and more one in which the price of defeat is simply retirement and some personal disgrace. In turn, with the routinization of conflict, the political system develops even a body of precedents for handling fallen leaders. By now there must be a regular procedure, probably even some office, for handling pensions and apartments for former Presidium members, as well as a developing social etiquette for dealing with them publicly and privately.[11]

More important is the apparent development in the Soviet system of something which might be described as a regularly available "counter-elite." After Khrushchev's fall, his successors moved quickly to restore to important positions a number of individuals whom Khrushchev had purged,[12] while some of Khrushchev's supporters were demoted and transferred. Already for a number of years now, it has been fairly common practice to appoint party officials demoted from high office either to diplomatic posts abroad or to some obscure, out-of-the-way assignments at home. The total effect of this has been to create a growing body of offi-

[10] One could hardly expect a historian to work up any enthusiasm for undertaking to write, say, Malenkov's biography: *The Apparatchik Promoted, The Apparatchik Triumphant, The Apparatchik Pensioned!*

[11] Can Mikoyan, for example, invite Khrushchev to lunch? This is not a trivial question, for social mores and political style are interwoven. After all, Voroshilov, who had been publicly branded as a military idiot and a political sycophant, was subsequently invited to a Kremlin reception. Zhukov, against whom the Bonapartist charge still stands, appeared in full regalia at the 20th anniversary celebration of the Soviet victory in World War II.

[12] F. D. Kulakov, apparently blamed by Khrushchev in 1960 for agricultural failings in the RSFSR, was appointed in 1965 to direct the Soviet Union's new agricultural programs; V. V. Matskevich was restored as Minister of Agriculture and appointed Deputy Premier of the RSFSR in charge of agriculture; Marshal M. V. Zakharov was reappointed as Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces; even L. G. Melnikov reemerged from total obscurity as chairman of the industrial work safety committee of the RSFSR.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cial "outs" who are biding their time on the sidelines and presumably hoping someday to become the "ins" again. Moreover, they may not only hope; if sufficiently numerous, young, and vigorous, they may gradually begin to resemble something of a political alternative to those in power, and eventually to think and even act as such. This could be the starting point of informal factional activity, of intrigues and conspiracies when things go badly for those in power, and of organized efforts to seduce some part of the ruling elite in order to stage an internal change of guard.[13] In addition, the availability of an increasingly secure "counter-elite" is likely to make it more difficult for a leader to consolidate his power. This in turn might tend to promote more frequent changes in the top leadership, with policy failures affecting the power of incumbents instead of affecting—only retroactively—the reputation of former leaders, as has hitherto been the case.

The cumulative effect of these developments has been wide-ranging. First of all, the reduced importance of both ideological issues and personalities and the increasing weight of institutional interests in the periodic struggles for power—a phenomenon which reflects the more structured quality of present-day Soviet life as compared with the situation under Stalin—tends to depersonalize political conflict and to make it a protracted bureaucratic struggle. Secondly, the curbing of violence makes it more likely that conflicts will be resolved by patched-up compromises rather than by drastic institutional redistributions of power and the reappearance of personal tyranny. Finally, the increasingly bureaucratic character of the struggle for power tends to transform it into a contest among high-level clerks and is therefore not conducive to attracting creative and innovating talent into the top leadership.

Khrushchev's fall provides a good illustration of the points made above, as well as an important precedent for the future. For the first time in Soviet history, the First Secretary has been toppled from power by his associates. This was done not in order to replace him with an alternative personal leader or to pursue genuinely alternative goals, but in order to depersonalize the leadership and to pursue more effectively many of the previous policies. In a word, the objectives were impersonal leadership and higher bureaucratic efficiency. Khrushchev's removal, however, also means that personal intrigues and cabals can work, that subordinate members of the leadership—or possibly, someday, a group of ex-leaders—can effectively conspire against a principal leader, with the result that any future First Secretary is bound to feel far less secure than Khrushchev must have felt at the beginning of October 1964.

The absence of an institutionalized top executive officer in the Soviet political system, in conjunction with the increased difficulties in the way of achieving personal dictatorship and the decreased personal cost of defeat in a political conflict, create a ready-made situation for group pressures and institutional clashes. In fact, although the range of disagreement may have narrowed, the scope of elite participation in power conflicts has already widened. Much of Khrushchev's exercise of power was preoccupied with mediating the demands of key institutions such as the army, or with overcoming the opposition of others, such as the objections of the administrators to economic decentralization or of the heavy industrial managers to non-industrial priorities. These interests were heavily involved in the Khrushchev-Malenkov conflict and in the "anti-party" episode of 1957.

At the present time, these pressures and clashes take place in an almost entirely amorphous context, without constitutional definition and established procedures. The somewhat greater role played by the Central Committee in recent years still does not suffice to give this process of bureaucratic conflict a stable institutional expression. As far as we know from existing evidence, the Central Committee still acted during the 1957 and 1964 crises primarily as a ratifying body, giving formal sanction to decisions already fought out in the Kremlin's corridors of power.[14] It did not act as either the arbiter or the supreme legislative body.

The competition for power, then, is changing from a death struggle among the few into a contest played by many more. But the decline of violence does not, as is often assumed, automati-

[13] Molotov's letter to the Central Committee on the eve of the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961, which bluntly and directly charged Khrushchev's program with revisionism, was presumably designed to stir up the *apparatchiki* against the First Secretary. It may be a portent of things to come.

[14] Roger Pethybridge, *A Key to Soviet Politics,* New York, Praeger, 1962. See also Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev,* Washington, DC, Public Affairs Press, 1958.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cally benefit the Soviet political system; something more effective and stable has to take the place of violence. The "game" of politics that has replaced the former mafia-style struggles for power is no longer murderous, but it is still not a stable game played within an established arena, according to accepted rules, and involving more or less formal teams. It resembles more the anarchistic free-for-all of the playground and therefore could become, in some respects, even more debilitating to the system. Stalin encouraged institutional conflict below him so that he could wield his power with less restraint. Institutional conflict combined with mediocre and unstable personal leadership makes for ineffective and precarious power.

Party and Group Interests

In a stimulating study of political development and decay, Samuel Huntington has argued that stable political growth requires a balance between political "institutionalization" and political "participation": that merely increasing popular mobilization and participation in politics without achieving a corresponding degree of "institutionalization of political organization and procedures" results not in political development but in political decay.[15] Commenting in passing on the Soviet system, he therefore noted that "a strong party is in the Soviet public interest" because it provides a stable institutional framework.[16]

The Soviet political system has certainly achieved a high index of institutionalization. For almost five decades the ruling party has maintained unquestioned supremacy over the society, imposing its ideology at will. Traditionally, the Communist system has combined its high institutionalization with high pseudo-participation of individuals.[17] But a difficulty could arise if division within the top leadership of the political system weakened political "institutionalization" while simultaneously stimulating genuine public participation by groups and institutions. Could this new condition be given an effective and stable institutional framework and, if so, with what implications for the "strong" party?

Today the Soviet political system is again oligarchic, but its socio-economic setting is now quite different. Soviet society is far more developed and stable, far less *malleable* and atomized. In the past, the key groups that had to be considered as potential political participants were relatively few. Today, in addition to the vastly more entrenched institutional interests, such as the police, the military, and the state bureaucracy, the youth could become a source of ferment, the consumers could become more restless, the collective farmers more recalcitrant, the scientists more outspoken, the non-Russian nationalities more demanding. Prolonged competition among the oligarchs would certainly accelerate the assertiveness of such groups.

By now some of these groups have a degree of institutional cohesion, and occasionally they act in concert on some issues.[18] They certainly can lobby and, in turn, be courted by ambitious and opportunistic oligarchs. Some groups, because of institutional cohesion, advantageous location, easy access to the top leadership, and ability to articulate their goals and interests, can be quite

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* (Princeton, N. J.) April 1965.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[17] The massive campaigns launching "public discussions" that involve millions of people, the periodic "elections" that decide nothing, were designed to develop participation without threat to the institutionalized political organization and procedures. The official theory held that as Communist consciousness developed and new forms of social and public relations took root, political participation would become more meaningful and the public would come to govern itself.

[18] A schematic distribution of these groups is indicated by the following approximate figures: (A) amorphous social forces that in the main express passively broad social aspirations: workers and peasants, about 88 million; white collar and technical intelligentsia, about 21 million. (B) specific interest groups that promote their own particular interests: the literary and artistic community, about 75 thousand; higher-level scientists, about 150 thousand; physicians, about 380 thousand. (C) policy groups whose interests necessarily spill over into broad matters of national policy: industrial managers, about 200 thousand; state and collective farm chairmen, about 45 thousand; commanding military personnel, about 80 thousand; higher-level state bureaucrats, about 250 thousand. These groups are integrated by the professional *apparatchiki,* who number about 150-200 thousand. All of these groups in turn could be broken down into sub-units; *e.g.,* the literary community, institutionally built around several journals, can be divided into hard-liners, the centrists, and the progressives, etc. Similarly, the military. On some issues, there may be cross-interlocking of sub-groups, as well as more-or-less temporary coalitions of groups. See Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA-USSR,* New York, Viking Press, 1964, Ch. 4, for further discussion.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

influential.[19] Taken together they represent a wide spectrum of opinion, and in the setting of oligarchical rule there is bound to be some correspondence between their respective stances and those of the top leaders. This spectrum is represented in simplified fashion by the chart on this page, which takes cumulative account of the principal divisions, both on external and on domestic issues, that have perplexed Soviet political life during the last decade or so.[20] Obviously, the table is somewhat arbitrary and also highly speculative. Individuals and groups cannot be categorized so simply, and some, clearly, could be shifted left or right with equal cause, as indeed they often shift themselves. Nonetheless, the chart illustrates the range of opinion that exists in the Soviet system and suggests the kind of alliances, group competition, and political courtship that probably prevail, cutting vertically through the party organization.

Not just Western but also Communist (although not as yet Soviet) political thinkers are coming to recognize more and more openly the existence of group conflict even in a Communist-dominated society. A Slovak jurist recently observed:

The social interest in our society can be democratically formed only by the integration of group interests; in the process of this integration, the interest groups protect their own economic and other social interests; this is in no way altered by the fact that everything appears on the surface as a unity of interests.[21]

The author went on to stress that the key political problem facing the Communist system is

[19] An obvious example is the military command, bureaucratically cohesive and with a specific esprit de corps, located in Moscow, necessarily in frequent contact with the top leaders, and possessing its own journals of opinion (where strategic and hence also—indirectly—budgetary, foreign, and other issues can be discussed).

[20] The categories "systemic left," etc., are adapted from R. R. Levine's book, *The Arms Debate* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), which contains a suggestive chart of American opinion on international issues. By "systemic left" is meant here a radical reformist outlook, challenging the predominant values of the existing system; by "systemic right" is meant an almost reactionary return to past values; the other three categories designate differences of degree within a dominant "mainstream."

In the chart below (unlike Levine's), the center position serves as a dividing line, and hence no one is listed directly under it. Malenkov is listed as "systemic left" because his proposals represented at the time a drastic departure from established positions. Molotov is labeled "systemic right" because of his inclination to defend the essentials of the Stalinist system in a setting which had changed profoundly since Stalin's death.

[21] M. Lakatos, "On Some Problems of the Structure of Our Political System," *Pravny obzor* (Bratislava), No. 1, 1965, as quoted in Gordon Skilling's illuminating paper, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," read to the Canadian Political Science Association in June 1965.

Policy Spectrum USSR



PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that of achieving integration of group interests.

Traditionally, this function of integration has been monopolized by the party, resorting—since the discard of terror—to the means of *bureaucratic arbitration.* In the words of the author just cited, "the party as the leading and directing political force fulfills its functions by resolving intra-class and inter-class interests." In doing so, the party generally has preferred to deal with each group bilaterally, thereby preventing the formation of coalitions and informal group consensus. In this way the unity of political direction as well as the political supremacy of the ruling party have been maintained. The party has always been very jealous of its "integrative" prerogative, and the intrusion on the political scene of any other group has been strongly resented. The party's institutional primacy has thus depended on limiting the real participation of other groups.

If, for one reason or another, the party were to weaken in the performance of this function, the only alternative to anarchy would be some *institutionalized process of mediation,* replacing the party's bureaucratic arbitration. Since, as noted, group participation has become more widespread, while the party's effectiveness in achieving integration has been lessened by the decline in the vigor of Soviet leadership and by the persistent divisions in the top echelon, the creation and eventual formal institutionalization of some such process of mediation is gaining in urgency. Otherwise participation could outrun institutionalization and result in a challenge to the party's integrative function.

Khrushchev's practice of holding enlarged Central Committee plenums, with representatives of other groups present, seems to have been a step towards formalizing a more regular consultative procedure. (It also had the politically expedient effect of bypassing Khrushchev's opponents in the central leadership.) Such enlarged plenums provided a consultative forum, where policies could be debated, views articulated, and even some contradictory interests resolved. Although the device still remained essentially non-institutionalized and only *ad hoc,* consultative and not legislative, still subject to domination by the party *apparat,* it was nonetheless a response to the new quest for real participation that Soviet society has manifested and which the Soviet system badly needs. It was also a compromise solution, attempting to wed the party's primacy to a procedure allowing group articulation.

However, the problem has become much more complex and fundamental because of the organizational and ideological crisis in the party over its relevance to the evolving Soviet system. For many years the party's monopoly of power and hence its active intervention in all spheres of Soviet life could indeed be said to be "in the Soviet public interest." The party provided social mobilization, leadership, and a dominant outlook for a rapidly changing and developing society. But, in the main, that society has now taken shape. It is no longer malleable, subject to simple mobilization, or susceptible to doctrinaire ideological manipulation.

As a result, Soviet history in the last few years has been dominated by the spectacle of a party in search of a role. What is to be the function of an ideocratic party in a relatively complex and industrialized society, in which the structure of social relationships generally reflects the party's ideological preferences? To be sure, like any large sociopolitical system, the Soviet system needs an integrative organ. But the question is, What is the most socially desirable way of achieving such integration? Is a "strong" party one that dominates and interferes in everything, and is this interference conducive to continued Soviet economic, political and intellectual growth?

In 1962 Khrushchev tried to provide a solution. The division of the party into two vertically parallel, functional organs was an attempt to make the party directly relevant to the economy and to wed the party's operations to production processes. It was a bold, dramatic and radical innovation, reflecting a recognition of the need to adapt the party's role to a new state of Soviet social development. But it was also a dangerous initiative; it carried within itself the potential of political disunity as well as the possibility that the party would become so absorbed in economic affairs that it would lose its political and ideological identity. That it was rapidly repudiated by Khrushchev's successors is testimony to the repugnance that the reorganization must have stimulated among the professional party bureaucrats.

His successors, having rejected Khrushchev's reorganization of the party, have been attempting a compromise solution—in effect, a policy of

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"muddling through." On the one hand, they recognize that the party can no longer direct the entire Soviet economy from the Kremlin and that major institutional reforms in the economic sphere, pointing towards more local autonomy and decision-making, are indispensable.[22] (Similar tendencies are apparent elsewhere—*e.g.*, the stress on professional self-management in the military establishment.) This constitutes a partial and implicit acknowledgment that in some respects a party of total control is today incompatible with the Soviet public interest.

On the other hand, since obviously inherent in the trend towards decentralization is the danger that the party will be gradually transformed from a directing, ideologically-oriented organization to a merely instrumental and pragmatic body specializing in adjustment and compromise of social group aspirations, the party functionaries, out of a sense of vested interest, have been attempting simultaneously to revive the ideological vitality of the CPSU. Hence the renewed stress on ideology and ideological training; hence the new importance attached to the work of the ideological commissions; and hence the categorical reminders that "Marxist education, Marxist-Leninist training, and the ideological tempering of CPSU members and candidate members is the primary concern of every party organization and committee." [23]

However, it is far from certain that economic decentralization and ideological "retempering" can be pushed forward hand in hand. The present leadership appears oblivious to the fact that established ideology remains vital only when ideologically motivated power is applied to achieve ideological goals. A gradual reduction in the directing role of the party cannot be compensated for by an increased emphasis on ideological semantics. Economic decentralization inescapably reduces the scope of the political-ideological and increases the realm of the pragmatic-instrumental. It strengthens the trend, publicly bemoaned by Soviet ideologists, toward depolitization of the Soviet elite.[24] A massive indoctrination campaign directed at the elite cannot operate in a "de-ideologized" socio-economic context, and major efforts to promote such a campaign could, indeed, prompt the social isolation of the party, making its dogmas even more irrelevant to the daily concerns of a Soviet scientist, factory director, or army general. That in turn would further reduce the ability of the party to provide effective integration in Soviet society, while underscoring the party *apparatchik*'s functional irrelevance to the workings of Soviet administration and technology.

If the party rejects a return to ideological dogmas and renewed dogmatic indoctrination, it unavoidably faces the prospect of further internal change. It will gradually become a loose body, combining a vast variety of specialists, engineers, scientists, administrators, professional bureaucrats, agronomists, etc. Without a common dogma and without an active program, what will hold these people together? The party at this stage will face the same dilemma that the fascist and falange parties faced, and that currently confronts the Yugoslav and Polish Communists: in the absence of a large-scale domestic program of change, in the execution of which other groups and institutions become subordinated to the party, the party's domestic primacy declines and its ability to provide social-political integration is negated.

Moreover, the Soviet party leaders would be wrong to assume complacently that the narrowed range of disagreement over domestic policy alternatives could not again widen. Persistent difficulties in agriculture could some day prompt a political aspirant to question the value of collectivization; or the dissatisfaction of some

[22] See the report delivered by A. Kosygin to the CC Plenum on Sept. 27, 1965, proposing the reorganization of the Soviet economy. Also his speech at a meeting of the USSR State Planning Committee, *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow) April 1965; and the frank discussion by A. E. Lunev, "Democratic Centralism in Soviet State Administration," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1965.

[23] "Ideological Hardening of Communists" (editorial), *Pravda,* June 28, 1965. There have been a whole series of articles in this vein, stressing the inseparability of ideological and organizational work. For details of a proposed large-scale indoctrination campaign, see V. Stepakov, head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "Master the Great Teaching of Marxism-Leninism," *Pravda,* Aug. 4, 1965.

[24] Stepakov, *ibid.*, explicitly states that in recent years "many comrades" who have assumed leading posts in the "directive aktivs" of the party have inadequate ideological knowledge, even though they have excellent technical backgrounds; and he urges steps against the "replacement" of party training "by professional-technical education."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalities could impose a major strain on the Soviet constitutional structure; or foreign affairs could again become the source of bitter internal conflicts. The ability of the system to withstand the combined impact of such divisive issues and of greater group intrusion into politics would much depend on the adaptations that it makes in its organization of leadership and in its processes of decision-making. Unless alternative mechanisms of integration are created, a situation could arise in which some group other than the top *apparat*—a group that had continued to attract talent into its top ranks and had not been beset by bureaucratically debilitating conflict at the top—could step forth to seek power; invoking the Soviet public interest in the name of established Communist ideals, and offering itself (probably in coalition with some section of the party leadership) as the only alternative to chaos, it would attempt to provide a new balance between institutionalization and participation.

The Threat of Degeneration

The Soviet leaders have recognized the need of institutional reforms in the economic sector in order to revitalize the national economy. The fact is that institutional reforms are just as

Socialism in Russia and the World Revolution

The socialist countries' course of building socialism and communism, far from retarding the revolutionary initiative of the working people of the capitalist countries, is the most effective means for its all-round development.

It is no easy task for the socialist countries to achieve superiority over the countries of capital in material production, considering that the latter have long-established experience in industrial and technical development. But it is nonetheless being steadily solved. The "economic challenge" of socialism to capitalism is becoming ever more powerful. Industrial production in the world of socialism has increased approximately ninefold as compared to the prewar level, and in the world of capitalism only 3.2 times. Solution of the task of the outstripping of the capitalist countries by the socialist ones, when the latter begin to produce more than half the world's output, will still require a certain amount of time. But even our political adversaries are obliged to admit that such a prospect is becoming increasingly evident.

The Soviet people, having achieved the construction and consolidation of socialism, have only one course—toward communism. The existence of imperialism cannot stop the creation of communism in the USSR, as it did not at the time stop the victories of socialism in our country. This is all the more true now that there exists a world socialist system, which is successfully countering the plots of imperialism. Just as socialism was built in the USSR against the will of imperialism, so will communism be built in our country despite wishes to the contrary. . . .

The socialist countries' course of building socialism and communism has been tested in the 20 years of practical experience of postwar development. The successes of the socialist countries in building socialism and communism are in themselves an irrefutable confirmation of the correctness of this course. At the same time, the great revolutionary changes that have taken place in the world in the past 20 years are to an enormous degree the result of the influence of the socialist system, which is becoming the decisive force of present-day world development. Further successes in the construction of socialism and communism in the socialist countries will create even more favorable conditions for all the revolutionary detachments of the present day, for their closest unification into a powerful, victorious anti-imperialist alliance, for the struggle of the working people of all countries for the abolition of the obsolete system of capitalism, for the victory of world socialism.

—*From "The Supreme Internationalist Duty of the Socialist Country," Pravda, October 27, 1965. English text from* The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, *New York, November 17, 1965, pp. 8-9.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

badly needed—and even more overdue—in the political sector. Indeed, the effort to maintain a doctrinaire dictatorship over an increasingly modern and industrial society has already contributed to a reopening of the gap that existed in prerevolutionary Russia between the political system and the society, thereby posing the threat of the degeneration of the Soviet system.

A political system can be said to degenerate when there is a perceptible decline in the quality of the social talent that the political leadership attracts to itself in competition with other groups; when there is persistent division within the ruling elite, accompanied by a decline in its commitment to shared beliefs; when there is protracted instability in the top leadership; when there is a decline in the capacity of the ruling elite to define the purposes of the political system in relationship to society and to express them in effective institutional terms; when there is a fuzzing of institutional and hierarchical lines of command, resulting in the uncontrolled and unchanneled intrusion into politics of hitherto politically uninvolved groupings.[25] All of these indicators were discernible in the political systems of Tsarist Russia, the French Third Republic, Chiang Kai-Shek's China and Rakosi's Hungary. Today, as already noted, at least several are apparent in the Soviet political system.

This is not to say, however, that the evolution of the Soviet system has inevitably turned into degeneration. Much still depends on how the ruling Soviet elite reacts. Policies of retrenchment, increasing dogmatism, and even violence, which—if now applied—would follow almost a decade of loosening up, could bring about a grave situation of tension, and the possibility of revolutionary outbreaks could not be discounted entirely. "Terror is indispensable to any dictatorship, but it cannot compensate for incompetent leaders and a defective organization of authority," observed a historian of the French revolution, writing of the Second Directory.[26] It is equally true of the Soviet political scene.

The threat of degeneration could be lessened through several adaptations designed to adjust the Soviet political system to the changes that have taken place in the now more mature society. First of all, the top policy-making organ of the Soviet system has been traditionally the exclusive preserve of the professional politician, and in many respects this has assured the Soviet political system of able and experienced leadership. However, since a professional bureaucracy is not prone to produce broad "generalizing" talents, and since the inherent differentiation of functions within it increases the likelihood of leaders with relatively much narrower specialization than hitherto was the case, the need for somewhat broader representation of social talent within the top political leadership, and not merely on secondary levels as hitherto, is becoming urgent. If several outstanding scientists, professional economists, industrial managers, and others were to be co-opted by lateral entry into the ruling Presidium, the progressive transformation of the leadership into a regime of clerks could thereby be averted, and the alienation of other groups from the political system perhaps halted.

Secondly, the Soviet leaders would have to institutionalize a chief executive office and strive to endow it with legitimacy and stability. This would eventually require the creation of a formal and open process of leadership selection, as well—probably—as a time limit on the tenure of the chief executive position. The time limit, if honored, would depersonalize power, while an institutionalized process of selection geared to a specific date—and therefore also limited in time—would reduce the debilitating effects of unchecked and protracted conflict in the top echelons of power.

The CPSU continues to be an ideocratic party with a strong tradition of dogmatic intolerance and organizational discipline. Today less militant and more bureaucratic in outlook, it still requires a top catalyst, though no longer a personal tyrant, for effective operations. The example of the papacy, or perhaps of Mexico, where a ruling party has created a reasonably effective system of presidential succession, offers a demonstration of how one-man rule can be combined with a formal office of the chief executive, endowed with legitimacy, tenure and a formally established pattern of selection.

Any real institutionalization of power would have significant implications for the party. If its

[25] For a general discussion and a somewhat different formulation, see S. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," pp. 415-17.

[26] G. Lefebvre, *The French Revolution,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1965, Vol. II, p. 205.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Central Committee were to become in effect an electoral college, selecting a ruler whom no one could threaten during his tenure, the process of selection would have to be endowed with considerable respectability. It would have to be much more than a mere ratification of an *a priori* decision reached by some bureaucratic cabal. The process would require tolerance for the expression of diverse opinions in a spirit free of dogmatism, a certain amount of open competition among rivals for power, and perhaps even the formation of informal coalitions—at least temporary ones. In a word, it would mean a break with the Leninist past, with consequences that would unavoidably spill over from the party into the entire system and society.

Thirdly, increased social participation in politics unavoidably creates the need for an institutionalized arena for the mediation of group interests, if tensions and conflicts, and eventually perhaps even anarchy, are to be avoided. The enlarged plenums of the Central Committee were a right beginning, but if the Committee is to mediate effectively among the variety of institutional and group interests that now exist in Soviet society, its membership will have to be made much more representative and the predominance of party bureaucrats watered down. Alternatively, the Soviet leaders might consider following the Yugoslav course of creating a new institution for the explicit purpose of providing group representation and reconciling different interests. In either case, an effective organ of mediation could not be merely a front for the party's continued bureaucratic arbitration of social interests, as that would simply perpetuate the present dilemmas.

Obviously, the implementation of such institutional reforms would eventually lead to a profound transformation of the Soviet system. But it is the absence of basic institutional development in the Soviet political system that has posed the danger of the system's degeneration. It is noteworthy that the Yugoslavs have been experimenting with political reforms, including new institutions, designed to meet precisely the problems and dangers discussed here. Indeed, in the long run, perhaps the ultimate contribution to Soviet political and social development that the CPSU can make is to adjust gracefully to the desirability, and perhaps even inevitability, of its own gradual withering away. In the meantime, the progressive transformation of the bureaucratic Communist dictatorship into a more pluralistic and institutionalized political system—even though still a system of one-party rule—seems essential if its degeneration is to be averted.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rumania: The Fruits of Autonomy

By George Gross

A future Toynbee, looking at the 1960's, may well conclude that the central event of the current decade was the disintegration of the Soviet empire. This historic development is already well under way, deriving its principal momentum from the great schism between Moscow and Peking. But Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe is also fragmenting, though less abruptly, and this process is bound to continue.

Stalin's concept of a monolithic bloc, with Moscow as its Third Rome, was already thoroughly shaken by the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary during the preceding decade. In the case of Yugoslavia, this challenge was successful, and the first "National Communist" state was born. Next came Albania, which made a decisive break in 1961, although it chose not to look westward because of its traditional antipathy toward Yugoslavia.

George Gross is the pseudonym of an eminent student of Rumanian affairs who has recently returned from an extended visit to Rumania. He has chosen to remain anonymous in order to protect some of his contacts in that country.

More recently, Rumania has gradually but surely asserted its independence from Moscow. When, on April 22, 1964, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party (RCP)[1] adopted its declaration on party and state relations, and when the Soviet Union failed either to prevent or to respond effectively to this act, a new form of independent national communism came into being. What follows is an account of how and why this has been accomplished, and what this accomplishment means.

The Roots of Alienation

When reports of Rumania's controversy with the Soviet Union over economic problems first appeared in the Western press in 1963, many observers were surprised, if not skeptical. Ru-

[1] Until July 1965 the party was officially known as the Rumanian Workers' Party (RWP) but, for the sake of convenience, will hereafter be referred to throughout, except in source references, as RCP.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mania had long been regarded as one of Moscow's most docile "satellites." After all, it was noted, most of its leaders had occupied influential posts ever since communism gained power in Rumania and had long been identified with Soviet interests.

Actually, unmistakable signs of friction between Bucharest and Moscow had appeared earlier. The clearest instance was the plenum of the RCP Central Committee in November-December 1961. The plenum's main purpose was to review—and rewrite—the history of the RCP in a manner which was strongly nationalistic and, implicitly, anti-Soviet. The tone of the debate suggested that the speakers were concerned not just with past grudges against the USSR, but with current disputes.

In his speech to the plenum, the then Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Gheorge Gaston Marin, put his finger on a specific source of discord: he criticized certain "erroneous theories" which would deny each socialized country the right to build its own heavy industry and which "present in a distorted fashion the principles of specialization and cooperation within the framework of the socialist international division of labor."[2] This was a clear attack on Soviet proposals, then under consideration, for the economic integration of the countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (usually referred to in the West as Comecon), the Communist counterpart of the West European Common Market.

In trying to work out the precise order and interrelation of Rumania's early moves away from Moscow, a Western observer has few hard facts to go on. Essentially he is faced with a choice between two theories. The most common explanation holds that a conflict of economic interests was at the root of it all, and that the other facets of Rumania's independent stand were added on, willy-nilly, as the economic controversy progressed. In point of time, this would place the beginning of Rumanian-Soviet differences as far back as 1961, or perhaps even the late 1950's when Rumania evidently encountered some opposition from Moscow in drawing up its national economic plan for 1960-65.

However, there is weighter evidence that the roots go deeper, and that the defiance of Moscow on economic matters was but the opening shot in a more ambitious campaign. The events which will be reviewed strongly indicate a coordinated and preconceived effort to gain independence of action on a broad front—political as well as economic. This conclusion also finds some support in the history of the RCP.

Although their regime was a creature of the Soviet postwar occupation, and though they shared in this creation, the RCP leaders grouped around Gheorghiu-Dej, the late party First Secretary and President of Rumania, were not "Moscow men" but home-grown Communists, veterans of the Communist underground inside the country. As the Soviet Army approached Rumania, Dej and his closest associates were serving political sentences in Rumanian jails, and unlike the Rumanian Communist émigrés in Moscow headed by Ana Pauker, who were little more than stooges of Stalin, Dej's group had slight contact with or guidance from Moscow. In fact, they soon found themselves in a political struggle with the Moscovites. In April 1944, they succeeded in ousting the then leader of the RCP, Stefan Foris, who by their account was "a traitor" "imposed" on the party by Stalin. (Rumanian officials claim that the purge of Foris was carried out without Moscow's knowledge.) The next round, however, went to the Pauker group of Moscovites. With the backing of Stalin, these "foreign elements" succeeded in "usurping" dominant posts in the party leadership in September 1944.[3] Even though Dej became and remained leader of the party in the period that followed, it was only in 1952, when Pauker and her associates were purged, that the native Rumanian group gained full control.

If this official Rumanian account of the early postwar struggle for the party leadership is accurate—and it probably is substantially so—Dej and his associates must have long harbored a sense of resentment and even alienation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The bitterness of subsequent attacks (in 1964) by Rumanian leaders on Soviet economic exploitation of Rumania in the 1940's and 1950's suggests that this, too, was an early source of alienation. Thus, it seems entirely possible that, at some time during the latter half of the 1950's, after they had consoli-

[2] Agerpres Supplement, December 1961.

[3] Declaration of the RWP Central Committee Plenum, November-December 1961. *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dated their internal position by expelling the Moscovites, the Dej group gradually came to the conclusion that they should strike out on their own once certain preconditions were met and a suitable opportunity arose.

Such circumstances were not long in coming. The most important precondition was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, which occurred in 1958. Secondly, the Rumanian leaders needed to establish a firm economic base elsewhere in order to lessen their material dependence on the Soviet Union. They proceeded to do just that—though other purely economic conditions were also involved—by rapidly expanding Rumania's trade with Western Europe. Finally, the opportunity came when the simmering differences between Moscow and Peking evolved, in the early 1960's, into a deep and irrevocable split. This was indeed a windfall for Bucharest, as it afforded ideal terrain for political maneuver against the weakened center of world communism.

The Economic Issues

Perhaps the basic and most conspicuous expression of Rumania's resurgent nationalism has been Bucharest's insistence on pursuing an independent economic policy involving full industrial exploitation of the country's raw materials, development of a diversified modern industry, and heavy reliance on Western technology and trade to accomplish these goals. This policy has conflicted with the Soviet campaign, launched in 1961-62, to strengthen Comecon organizationally and to deepen the "socialist international division of labor." Moscow conceived of these schemes as a means of strengthening its political control over the East European members of Comecon by binding them to the USSR economically. The "have" countries of Comecon, such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, have nevertheless favored the Soviet plans as a means of raising industrial efficiency and meeting their agricultural deficits. Rumania, on the other hand, regards them as an encroachment on national sovereignty and as a device to make Rumania a permanent food and raw material base for the more developed Comecon countries.

The concrete issues over which Moscow and Bucharest have disagreed can be briefly put as follows:

(1) Rumania has rejected Soviet proposals that it cut back plans for developing industries which Moscow thought were inefficient or duplicated industries elsewhere in Comecon. It has also rejected the related Soviet proposal that Rumania concentrate its resources in agriculture and in industries which fit in with bloc-wide needs.

(2) Rumania has refused to alter its "food-for-industries" trade pattern with the West in order to bail out the food and raw-material deficits of the industrialized members of Comecon.

(3) Given these substantive differences with the majority of Comecon members, Rumania has understandably opposed schemes to empower Comecon central organs (such as the supranational planning agency proposed by Khrushchev) to prescribe the economic policies of individual members by majority rule. It has likewise rejected other forms of cooperation between two or more Comecon members—such as jointly-owned enterprises or interstate economic complexes—which would infringe on national ownership or control.

After bubbling near the surface for a year or so, these divergencies came to a head at a session of the Comecon Executive Committee which met in Moscow in February 1963. Rumania's permanent representative, Vice-Premier Alexandru Birladeanu, flatly affirmed Rumania's opposition to Moscow's integration schemes and refused to budge from this position. The RCP Central Committee promptly convened a plenum on March 5-8 to throw its weight behind the policy voiced by Birladeanu. It pointedly declared that the principal means of developing the division of labor was "the coordination of *national* economic plans" based on *"respect for national independence and sovereignty, complete equal rights, comradely mutual aid and reciprocal advantage."* [4] (Emphasis added.)

By this act, Rumania passed the first significant milestone of its campaign to gain national independence. To drive the point home, the RCP leaders held a series of closed meetings throughout the country to explain their new

[4] *Scintea* (Bucharest), March 9, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy. The discussions at these meetings, as at the plenum, were emotionally nationalistic and pointedly critical of Soviet policies.

There followed several months of diplomatic exchanges in which Moscow attempted to pressure the Rumanians into line, but without success. When a second denouement was reached at the summit meeting of Comecon party and government heads in Moscow on July 24-26, 1963, it was Khrushchev, not Gheorghiu-Dej, who backed down. Khrushchev's plan for a central planning agency was quietly buried, and the Rumanians were told that Comecon would take no steps affecting the Rumanian economy without their consent. However, the *modus vivendi* was little more than an agreement to disagree. Gheorghiu-Dej restated Rumania's determination to stick by its economic policies, while Khrushchev, Ulbricht, and others cautioned that Comecon would proceed to carry out various forms of bilateral and multilateral economic integration —without Rumania, if need be.

Although the controversy over Comecon integration has since undergone little change, the showdown at the July 1963 conference had significant and far-reaching consequences. For the Soviet Union, it meant the collapse of its scheme for a closely integrated economic structure in the Comecon area. Moscow's political hold, both present and potential, over Eastern Europe was weakened accordingly.

For the other Comecon members (excluding Rumania), the Rumanian monkey wrench meant that they would have to look for alternative solutions of their economic problems. Some of them, inspired no doubt by Rumania's successful formula, have already shown signs of seeking increased economic ties with the West as a long-term remedy.

As for Rumania, the conference has led to its increasing alienation from Comecon in a practical as well as formal sense. In 1963-64, the USSR set up a new network of bilateral economic cooperation commissions with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria (a similar agreement had been concluded earlier with East Germany). A parallel accord between the USSR and Rumania was not signed until September 1965, and its practical significance remains in doubt. Moreover, the idea of bilateral and multilateral specialization and joint-ownership ventures has been gaining increasing currency among the other East European members of Comecon. Several such groupings have been formed for the metallurgical, ball-bearing, and fertilizer industries, but Rumania is not a participant.

Perhaps more importantly, the victory the Rumanians won at the Moscow conference undoubtedly encouraged them to become even bolder in their quest for national identity. Their independent attitude rapidly infected other facets of their relations with the Soviet Union in the months that followed.

Finally, the issues left unresolved by the 1963 *modus vivendi* continued to exacerbate Rumania's relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries. During the latter half of 1963, the Rumanian press published a series of thinly veiled polemics against the Soviet position. By the spring of 1964, these jibes escalated into open and direct attacks.

Bucharest Vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking

While the controversy within Comecon gathered steam in early 1963, Bucharest began unfolding a policy of non-involvement, or quasi-neutrality, in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This neutral posture is "quasi" in the sense that the Rumanian policy of positive coexistence with the West is diametrically opposed to the militant views of the Chinese Communists. However, it is very real as regards the dispute itself, which is basically a power contest between Communist Rumania's traditional master and the new Communist center in Asia.

Rumania has manifested its neutral posture in several ways. For one thing it has doggedly refrained from any sweeping public condemnation of Communist China. Since the beginning of 1963, it is true, Rumanian spokesman have voiced some criticisms of Peking, but these have been perfunctory and concerned with specific Chinese policies (*e.g.*, towards the test-ban treaty and general disarmament, which the Rumanians favor). In contrast to the torrent of condemnation which has poured forth from Moscow and its supporters, there have been no Rumanian speeches, editorials, or Central Committee resolutions directed against the Chinese. Also, Rumania has generally ignored the polemical broadsides issuing from both Moscow and Peking or, when it has chosen to acknowl-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edge them, has given them equal space in the Rumanian press.

Actions as well as words have underscored Rumania's policy of neutrality. The first such action was an indirect rebuff to Soviet efforts to isolate the Chinese and their friends: the Rumanian Ambassador to Albania, who had been withdrawn along with other East European chiefs of mission in late 1961 following the break between Moscow and Tirana, was returned to his post in March 1963. Next, Gheorghiu-Dej studiously avoided attending a series of informal meetings at which Moscow sought to rally bloc support against Communist China. Dej neglected to put in an appearance at the SED (East German) Party Congress in January 1963; he boycotted the meeting of Comecon party chiefs held on the occasion of Ulbricht's 70th birthday in June 1963; he deliberately scheduled the April 1964 plenum of the RCP Central Committee so as to underscore his absence from a similar gathering for Khrushchev's 70th birthday festivities; and he failed to show up at the first meeting of Comecon party leaders with the new Soviet leadership in November 1964, shortly following Khrushchev's removal.

Finally, Rumania has on two occasions intervened on its own initiative in the Sino-Soviet dispute in an apparent effort to mediate. The first attempt was made by Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer in March 1964 when he held talks with Mao in Peking and then met with Khrushchev on his way home. This intervention was reportedly prompted by Moscow's decision (postponed for six weeks because of the Rumanian intervention) to publish the February 14 report of CPSU Secretary Mikhail Suslov violently attacking Peking. The second effort was an equally futile proposal that the Soviet, Chinese and Rumanian parties issue a tripartite appeal for Communist unity (drafted by the Rumanians).

Rumania's course vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking is a classic example of a small country exploiting a power conflict between two large rivals to serve its own interests. Indeed, the Sino-Soviet conflict has been the key factor in Rumania's assertion of independence from Moscow. With consummate timing and political sense, the Rumanian leaders have successfully exploited the conflict to show that they need not dance to the Soviet tune and to proclaim their right to act independently in pursuit of their own rather than Soviet national interests.

A Plague on Both Your Houses

It is inconceivable that, in relations between Communist states, reciprocal and deeply offensive accusations are levelled against the leaders of fraternal parties, calling them the "biggest revisionists of our time" in "collusion with US imperialism" . . . or "Trotskyites" who "furiously attack world socialism."

—From April 1964 Declaration of the RCP Central Committee, Agerpres Supplement, April 1964.

Declaration of Independence

The decisive step in Rumania's drive for independence was the issuance of the April 22, 1964, Declaration of the RCP Central Committee.[5] Adopted at the conclusion of an expanded plenum of unprecedented duration (April 15-22), this document was—and is—in fact a proclamation of Rumania's right to national autonomy and equality in the Communist world.

On Comecon, the declaration amplified the standard Rumanian arguments against economic integration, explicitly rejecting measures "such as a joint plan and a single planning body for all member states, interstate technical-production mergers of branches of industry," and other joint ventures. Such "suprastate" schemes, it maintained, "would turn sovereignty into a notion devoid of any content." As a counter to integration, the declaration elaborated upon Maurer's proposal of November 1963 to expand Comecon to include all 14 socialist states[6] and asserted Rumania's "steadfast" determination to strengthen cooperation with "all socialist countries"—an implicit but clear defiance of Moscow's excommunication of

[5] "Declaration on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-class Movement, Endorsed by the Enlarged Plenum of the RWP Central Committee, April 1964," Agerpres Supplement, April 1964.

[6] *Scintea*, Nov. 4, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Albania. It also justified Rumanian policies and initiatives for developing trade relations with the West.

Turning to the Sino-Soviet conflict, the declaration condemned Moscow and Peking with equal force for carrying on public polemics and for dragging "almost all" other parties into the quarrel. It appealed to the Soviet and Chinese parties to make "all efforts to bar the road to schism," and called on all Communist parties to cease polemics and begin consultations looking to a new world Communist conference to reestablish unity. The conference must include "all" parties, since the inclusion of only "a part" of the parties would be "against the cause of unity and would lead to the aggravation of the situation, to the isolation of some fraternal parties, and to the consecration of a schism in the world Communist and workers' movement." Moscow was clearly the target of this sally as the declaration's point of departure was the Soviet proposal to organize a conference as a "collective rebuff by Marxist-Leninist parties" to Communist China.

By far the most significant and novel feature of the declaration—indeed, its primary message—was the repeated affirmation of the need, in all—and not just economic—relations between Communist states, to respect the "basic principles" of equality and national sovereignty, and the explicit denial of the right of any party or state to be the center of communism. This thesis was developed as follows:

Basic Principles. The principles of "national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, socialist internationalism . . . form the immutable law . . . of the entire world socialist system" and the "only" basis of unity.

Joint Formulation of General Line. Concerning "fundamental" problems common to all socialist states, joint positions should be reached, but only through mutual consultations and joint formulation of statements and "not by the stipulation of no-alternative solutions by some sort of superstate [*i.e.,* Soviet] authority." When agreement cannot be reached on basic matters of common interest, they should be put aside, and such differences should not be allowed to lead to "discriminatory" measures.

Polycentrism and Self-Determination. The "general laws" of building socialism are applied to "concrete conditions of great diversity, in keeping with the level or stage of development of each socialist country and its historical peculiarities." Strict observance of equal rights, of non-interference, and of "each party's exclusive right to solve its own political problems" is essential to unity and the resolution of disputes. "It is the exclusive right of each party independently to work out its political line, its concrete objectives, and the ways and means of achieving them."

Rejection of Central Soviet Authority. Given this "diversity . . ., there are not and cannot be any no-alternative pattern and recipes; no one can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties." There are not and cannot be a "parent" party and a "son" party, a "superior" and a "subordinate" party. No party has a "privileged position, or can impose its line and opinions on other parties."

All in all, the Rumanian party's declaration probably represents the most forthright and thoroughly reasoned rejection of Soviet supremacy ever made by an ostensible supporter of the USSR. By this act, Rumania has in fact staked out a claim to have its cake and eat it, too. It has served notice that whatever the outcome of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Rumania will take its own independent course. If the unity of the socialist camp is restored, it must be based on a "diverse" association of equal Communist states, with no supreme "center." If Moscow and Peking irrevocably split, Rumania will stick to its policy of good relations with all Communist states and will not be obligated to join either side.

Aftermath of the Declaration

Khrushchev's reaction to the Rumanian declaration must have been seething rage. But he probably received an even greater shock when, several weeks later, the Rumanian Communist leaders launched a campaign to explain the document to the Rumanian people. Though never publicized in the Rumanian press, indoctrination meetings were held at virtually every place of work. Speakers at these meetings condemned Soviet domination and economic exploitation in explicit and outspoken terms. Moscow was accused of draining Rumania of its resources through the SOVROM joint stock companies, of exacting twenty times too much for war rep-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arations, and of selling goods to Rumania at inflated prices. The Soviet proposals in regard to Comecon were of course another object of attack. Khrushchev himself was criticized in the strongest terms. According to an account given this writer by a participant, one speaker accused the Soviet leader of having attempted to overthrow the Dej regime by soliciting—unsuccessfully—the support of malcontents within the RWP. Another speaker charged that Soviet agents had tried to penetrate the Rumanian police and army.

The obvious purpose of the indoctrination campaign was to drive home the fact that Rumania had cut its ties of dependence on the Soviet Union and to rally public support for this new course. There is no question that the campaign was successful. Participants in the meetings (which sometimes lasted as long as ten hours) were stunned at the revelations they heard, but the general public response was strongly enthusiastic.

How Moscow reacted to all this is not entirely clear. For one thing, however, it apparently sought to pressure Rumania indirectly through neighboring Hungary. The Hungarian Government had for some time been conducting a quiet diplomatic and propaganda campaign accusing Rumania of suppressing the Hungarian minority of Transylvania. Then, in the late spring and early summer of 1964, scattered demonstrations against the Rumanian Government were staged by Hungarians in northern Transylvania. According to some Rumanian sources, supported by other collateral evidence, the demonstrations were instigated by Budapest with Moscow's secret connivance.

Meanwhile, Bucharest and Moscow engaged in a short but extremely sharp exchange of polemics. A culminating point was reached in mid-June when the Rumanian journal *Viata Economica* (Economic Life) published a violent diatribe against Soviet proposals for the establishment of "interstate economic complexes," in particular, a proposal advanced by a Soviet economist (E. B. Valev) to establish such a complex on the lower Danube.[7] Intimating that this scheme was inspired by the Soviet government, the journal charged that it was nothing less than a "plan for the violation of the territorial integrity of Rumania, for the dismemberment of its national and state unity." At this point, following an apparent warning from Khrushchev conveyed to Dej through Tito (the latter two met hurriedly on June 22), the Rumanians decided to seek a cooling-off period, and Maurer was sent to Moscow to confer with Khrushchev in early July. The meeting was not entirely amicable because Maurer reportedly told the Soviet leaders that while Rumania did not wish to worsen its relations with the Soviet Union, it insisted on Soviet acceptance of the fact of its independence. However, the two leaders did agree to bring an end to open polemics between the two countries. Rumania also resumed publication of the Moscow-controlled international Communist journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* which it had suspended in May.

This easing of tensions did not last long, however. After months of vacillation, Moscow formally proposed on July 30, 1964, that a preliminary conference of 26 Communist parties meet in Moscow on December 15 to prepare the way for a world conference with the obvious purpose of excommunicating Communist China. Three days earlier, Moscow's trouble shooter, CPSU Secretary Nikolai Podgorny, had paid a hurried call to Gheorghiu-Dej at the latter's summer home on the Black Sea in an effort to persuade the Rumanians to go along with the proposal. At some point—whether during Dej's meeting with Podgorny or at a later time is not clear—the Rumanians formally rejected the invitation.

Partly because of this action, the Soviet leaders postponed the preparatory conference until March 1, 1965, and renewed their efforts to persuade the Rumanians and other racalcitrants to attend by calling the conference a "consultative" meeting and limiting its scope of action. But this did not sway the Rumanians. Publicly they continued their purposeful silence on the Sino-Soviet dispute and on the March 1 conference itself. Privately they reiterated their opposition to any conference designed to excommunicate the Chinese (knowing that they themselves could also become the eventual target of a Moscow-directed campaign against nationalism) and their refusal to be bound by the decisions of such a conference. Thus, when the "consultative" meeting finally convened last March, Rumania alone among the countries of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon was conspicuously absent.

[7] *Viata economica,* June 13, 1964.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Spread of Discord

In the meantime, Rumanian opposition to Soviet domination of the international Communist movement had been spreading to other areas. In September 1964 Rumania reneged on a promise it had made just two months before and again suspended publication of the Rumanian-language version of *Problems of Peace and Socialism.* (This publication has since been permitted to reappear but is subject to Rumanian censorship.) Next, at a conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Budapest on October 19-24, 1964, the Rumanian delegate openly opposed Soviet control of this front organization. The performance was repeated shortly thereafter at meetings of two other front organizations—the International Students' Union (IUS) and the International Federation of Democratic Women. Rumanian spokesmen charged that the Soviet-dominated leaderships of both these organizations had violated the "equal rights—sovereignty and autonomy of member organizations," and they argued that the practice of imposing decisions on all members by majority vote should give way to unanimity rule.[8]

There have even been signs that Bucharest's independent attitude has touched on the most sensitive nerve of all in its relations with Moscow—its commitment to the Warsaw Pact. By a decree of October 31, 1964, Rumania reduced the term of service of army conscripts from 24 to 16 months, the shortest term of service in any Warsaw Pact country. This action was almost certainly taken unilaterally, and whether or not it had an important effect on bloc military capabilities, it was a breach of discipline which Moscow must have found intolerable. At about this time (from October 23 to November 3) the Soviet Commander of Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal A. A. Grechko, was on an official visit to Rumania, and the atmosphere between him and his hosts was reported as distinctly cool, apparently because of Rumania's unilateral action.

Discord was also reported to have developed between the Rumanian and Soviet representatives at the Warsaw Pact conference held in January 1965. Though lacking confirmation, these reports were lent substance by certain facts: the Bucharest press made no comment on the meeting; the Rumanian representatives, headed by Gheorghiu-Dej, left Warsaw immediately after the conference closed; and they made the pointed gesture of inviting the ambassadors of Albania, Communist China, and North Korea to greet them both on their departure from Bucharest and on their return home from Warsaw.

There is no reason to believe that Rumania would contemplate so drastic a step as a sudden withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact since this could well trigger a dangerous Soviet response. It is, however, quite likely that the Rumanians, like the French in NATO (but under quite different circumstances), have balked at accepting certain organizational arrangements which they maintain would be an infringement on their country's sovereignty.

Bridges to the West

Rumania's drive for independence has, of course, had its greatest impact on relations with the USSR, but it has also involved the development of closer ties with the West. This is indeed almost an automatic corollary in view of Rumania's need for moral and material support against pressures from the ex-imperial power to the East, as well as the country's traditional ties with the West, particularly Western Europe.

The development of closer economic relations has been by far the more important component of this gradual shift to the West. Indeed, as observed earlier, it was an important precondition for the reorientation of Rumania's foreign relations. The dynamics of this development can be seen in the following figures:

Geographic Distribution Of Rumanian Foreign Trade [9]

	Free World	"Sino-Soviet Bloc" *	USSR
1955	20%	80%	69%
1958	25%	75%	50%
1964	33%	67%	41%

* Excludes Yugoslavia

[8] *Scintea tineretului,* Dec. 3, 1964.

[9] Statistics taken from various volumes of *Rumanian People's Republic Statistical Handbook.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An even more telling indicator is the fact that whereas, in 1957, 84 percent of Rumania's imports of industrial equipment came from Communist countries, particularly the USSR, the larger part of these imports now comes from the West.

West European countries—*i.e.*, West Germany, Italy, England, and France, in that order —claim the bulk of Rumania's trade with the non-Communist world. West European exports to Rumania consist almost entirely of industrial plant and equipment essential to Rumania's industrialization. In exchange, Rumania sends food and raw materials, particularly petroleum and wood products.

This policy has led to sharp disagreement between Rumania and the already industrialized countries of Eastern Europe—particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary —which would like to dispose of more of their industrial output on the Rumanian market in exchange for food and raw material, in which they have deficits. Rumania has successfully resisted pressures from these countries by arguing that their industrial goods are of inferior quality, and that this trade pattern would retard Rumania's industrialization.

The RCP's April 1964 Declaration defended Rumania's trade ties with the West by saying that they are "an extremely important means of advancing peaceful coexistence." Premier Maurer reportedly put the case more bluntly when he was said to have asked: "Why should we send corn to Poland so that Poland can fatten its pigs to buy machinery from the West, when we can sell our corn to the West and buy the machinery we need ourselves?"

Because of its earlier, more restrictive policies toward trade with Eastern Europe, the United States has been slow in entering the picture. However, a development of potentially great importance occurred when United States Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman and Vice-Premier Gheorghe Gaston Marin held talks in Washington in May-June 1964 on economic and other matters. The principal economic results of these discussions were as follows:

1) The United States agreed to establish a general licensing procedure under which most commodities may be exported to Rumania without requiring individual export licenses.

2) The United States agreed to grant export licenses for a number of particular industrial facilities in which the Rumanian delegation expressed special interest.

3) Under a presidential decision made in June 1964, the United States agreed that its Export-Import Bank could grant guarantees for medium-term commercial credits used to finance the purchase of industrial goods.

4) Rumania agreed to guarantees guarding against the re-export of United States goods and technology without the prior consent of the U.S. Government and providing for the protection of industrial property rights.

All of the provisions listed above have since been acted upon.

In addition, the Washington talks produced two principal results of political rather than economic significance. The two countries agreed to elevate their diplomatic missions from legations to embassies, and Rumania reaffirmed its intention to permit the emigration of Rumanians with close relatives living in the United States. According to Washington sources, some hundreds of such persons, including dual nationals and their families, have come to the United States over the past two years.

Rumania's independent course has in fact had an ever-widening effect on its political relations with the West. One evidence of this is the fact that the Rumanian interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" has generally been much more positive than the Soviet, as well as largely devoid of the strident anti-Western formulas and threats which Moscow uses to balance its peaceful protestations.

A particularly striking example is the statement by Premier Maurer quoted in a box on the page opposite. This statement illustrates, in doctrinal language, the basic Rumanian attitude toward relations with the West and the relative position of this attitude in the Communist policy spectrum. It differs from the Soviet position on coexistence in rejecting the contention that there can be no coexistence of ideas. It stands still farther apart from the militant Chinese position which denies the possibility of any form of positive cooperation with the Western "imperialist" powers.

Rumania's moderate viewpoint has made itself manifest in the stance taken by Bucharest on specific East-West issues. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 provides a critical

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coexistence à la Bucharest

Peaceful coexistence is not, in our opinion, a reciprocal tolerance, an indifferent and passive juxtaposition. We give this notion an essentially active meaning. . . . This live content implies the use of all resources, all opportunities, available to states to agree and to cooperate. It implies an unending circulation of material and spiritual values.

—Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, in interview with Agence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1964.

example. In its public posture, Rumania echoed the Soviet Union initially in condemning the US naval blockade, but in much less strident tones and with considerable hesitancy and caution The main emphasis of its official pronouncements was placed on the need for "wisdom" and "negotiations" in resolving the crisis. Rumanian-Cuban relations, moreover, have since cooled. Trade between the two countries dropped from $20 million in 1963 to $6 million (all Rumanian exports) in 1964.[10] And in 1965 Cuba angrily withdrew all its students from Rumania when the authorities did not let them stage anti-American demonstrations.

Vietnam offers a more current example. While the Rumanian government does not approve of US military actions against North Vietnam and has made this position clear, there have been a number of indications that its only real concern is that the cold-war atmosphere generated by the crisis will limit its maneuverability both within the Communist world and in its relations with the West. On many counts —*e.g.*, relatively mild press reaction, less frequent official criticism, and containment of threatened student demonstrations against the US Embassy—Rumania's reaction to Vietnam has been the most restrained among all the Communist countries. Bucharest has also refrained from material support to North Vietnam: trade between the two countries amounted to only $3.6 million in 1964, a considerable drop from the 1963 level of $10.8 million.[11] Rumania seems torn between keeping the way clear for expanding economic and other relations with the US and fulfilling an obligation to North Viet-Nam, a fellow Communist state with which, however, it has few common interests. Its restraint suggests that the first consideration is perhaps uppermost in Bucharest's mind.

Since 1963, Rumania has also taken several actions within the United Nations demonstrating its intent to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Rumanian delegation has broken ranks with the Soviet Union in three resolutions presented to the General Assembly. At the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, the Rumanians voted against the Soviet bloc on a number of resolutions.

Perhaps most significant are the numerous steps Rumania has taken to strengthen its bilateral political ties with Western powers. These include the Gaston Marin mission to the United States in May-June 1964, the visit of Premier Maurer to France in July 1964, and to Austria in November 1965, First Vice-Premier Gheorghe Apostol's tour of Austria in the same month, several trips by Vice-Premier Gogo Radulescu to Italy, and delegations headed by Vice-Premier Birladeanu to Japan in 1963 and France in late 1964. Though most of these missions were primarily of an economic nature, the Rumanian leaders were undoubtedly aware of the political and psychological importance of establishing high-level contacts with the leaders of the West.

Impact on the Home Front

A review of Rumania's independent course would be incomplete without a brief look at its impact on the domestic scene. Most directly, it has given rise to a wide-ranging campaign to de-emphasize Soviet cultural and political influence and refurbish Rumanian traditions.

The first step was to purge Rumanian historiography of pro-Soviet distortions of the recent past. The initial guidelines were set by the November-December 1961 plenum of the RCP Central Committee, which rewrote the party's history so as to stress the leading role of the Rumanian Communists—as opposed to

[10] *Ibid.*, 1964 and 1965.

[11] *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Army—in overthrowing the pro-Nazi Antonescu regime in August 1944. More recently, Rumanian historians have rehabilitated a number of past political leaders who championed Rumanian national interests. They have also rebuffed Hungarian claims regarding Transylvania and have even made tentative moves to resurrect Rumania's historical claim to Bessarabia, occupied by the USSR in 1939.

Another important step was the abolition of compulsory Russian-language studies in the elementary-secondary school system, beginning with the 1963-64 school year. Simultaneously, the influential "Maxim Gorki" Russian Language Institute was abolished, and Bucharest's sole Russian-language bookstore was closed.

Rumania also has sharply curtailed Soviet cultural and informational activities. *Timpuri noi,* the Rumanian-language version of the Soviet foreign affairs journal *Novoe vremia,* was abolished in the fall of 1963 and replaced by *Lumea,* a largely Westward-looking Rumanian foreign affairs weekly. The Institute of Rumanian-Soviet Studies was closed shortly thereafter, and the Rumania-USSR Friendship Society, ARLUS, which was once a dominant force in Rumanian cultural life, has gradually been reduced to a mere shred of its former influence. Soviet movies, plays, and musical offerings run a poor second to Western performances in Bucharest. Cultural presentations officially sponsored by Western countries frequently receive top billing over Soviet events. And "Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Month," which for 16 years was celebrated with lavish demonstrations of cultural solidarity, was abolished in 1964.

At the same time, there has been a remarkable new emphasis on Rumanian national traditions, often with anti-Soviet overtones. This applies to the widest variety of fields: history, social sciences, literature, the Rumanian alphabet, even names of streets and commercial establishments. In all of this, the party leaders have sought to rally popular support and reinforce their independent activities abroad by showing that they are Rumanians first, Communists second, and definitely not Soviet pawns.

Iconoclasm in Artistic Policy

We believe that a diversity of styles in art is necessary. . . . Diversity in literary-artistic creation, the expression of reality in different forms, serves the great aims of socialism and peace.

—From speech by RCP Secretary-General Nicolae Ceausescu, *Scintea,* May 20, 1965.

While Bucharest's new independence in foreign policy has been duly noted abroad, many Western observers cling to an image of the Rumanian leaders as unyielding practitioners of Stalinism at home. This image oversimplifies the present situation in Rumania and obscures significant changes in the direction of internal reform over the past several years.

To begin with, there have been important changes in the party leadership in keeping with Rumania's increasing independence and stress on economic growth. A significant development has been the rise to key positions of a group of "technocrats," valued more for their skills than for their party lineage. Similarly, on the mass level, the party has made vigorous efforts to broaden its base of support. Searching for a national consensus, the party has adopted a line which in effect recognizes that "those who aren't against us are with us."

The pattern of change appears with particular clarity in the key domain of state security policy. In 1964 the regime completed the release of virtually all political prisoners, numbering more than 11,000. This dramatic action has been reinforced by a decrease in the arbitrary use of police powers, a relaxation of other security controls, and a purge of top-level officials of the *Securitate,* the secret police.

Nowhere, perhaps, has the change been greater—yet so little appreciated abroad—than in Rumanian intellectual life. In literature, this transformation has proceeded along several interlocking fronts: the rehabilitation of Rumanian writers of the monarchist period who once were blacklisted; an energetic campaign to reopen the doors to modern Western literature, including the works of authors diametrically opposed to socialist realism; and a direct and concentrated attack on socialist-realist restrictions as applied to living Rumanian authors. Directed largely by the party itself,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these efforts reached a climax at a conference of the Writers' Union in February 1965, when the reactionary leadership of the Union was ousted.

There have been related developments in other areas of Rumanian intellectual life—in music, art, science and scholarship. Perhaps most important, news from Western sources has become far more accessible to the Rumanian public. Jamming of foreign radio broadcasts has ceased, non-Communist newspapers are available to the public (though still in limited quantities), and the press has adopted a policy of more objective and extensive reporting of events in the non-Communist world.

These and other reforms have been prompted by good and compelling internal reasons, for they represent a policy more closely attuned to the wishes and needs of the people. But they are also closely related to Rumanian foreign policy moves. By "standing up to the Russians," the Rumanian leaders have won greatly increased respect and support from the public. Thus armed, they doubtless feel more confident of their ability to introduce domestic reforms without running undue risks. Furthermore, having cast off the protective mantle of the USSR, which in years past was the essence of the regime's power, the Rumanian leaders must now base their power increasingly on popular support. This in turn means that they are under greater pressure to meet popular aspirations for a freer and more affluent life.

The Road Ahead

The death last March of Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej marked the end of one era in Rumanian politics and the beginning of another. All subsequent signs, however, point to the continuation and further development of the policies of independence and gradual liberalization charted during the last several years of Dej's leadership. Dej's successors—Party Secretary-General Nicolae Ceausescu, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and President Chivu Stoica—were all closely associated with him and his policies. Their activities and statements since Dej's death have clearly attested to their support of these policies and their determination to carry them forward. This was fully demonstrated at the Ninth Congress of the RCP last July, which squarely reaffirmed Rumania's intent to adhere to its independent course. Other recent indications—to cite just a few—have been Bucharest's continued nonalignment with Moscow in the dispute with Peking, open Rumanian opposition to Soviet pressure at a meeting of the WFTU last October, and relative forbearance on Viet-Nam. As recently as November 7, Secretary-General Ceausescu and President Maurer took the unprecedented step of deliberately boycotting the October Revolution anniversary festivities at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest.

There are also compelling reasons for the new leadership to hew to Rumania's charted course. The independence drive has progressed so far that it would be virtually impossible—even if the new leaders were so inclined—to turn back the clock without causing deep divisions within the party and the public at large. And there are strong motives, as pointed out above, for continuing the process of internal reform.

Rumania's independent course has already produced significant results in the world arena. It has directly weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in a geopolitical sense. It has blocked economic integration within Comecon, which from Moscow's viewpoint was a device to shore up Soviet political control of Eastern Europe. And it has given a powerful positive impetus to the spread of polycentrism elsewhere in the Communist world, especially in Eastern Europe.

In elaboration of this last point, we must recall the earlier outbreaks of independent nationalism in this region. Yugoslavia and Albania successfully broke away from Soviet domination, but only at the cost of violent economic retribution and with the aid of geography. Hungary tried it, only to be crushed by Soviet armed force, while the Polish October soon lost its vigor. Rumania, on the other hand, has shown that it is possible to gain independence under unfavorable geographic conditions without provoking either ruinous intervention or economic blockade. Deft maneuvering, courageous diplomacy, and skillful timing have been the essential ingredients of this achievement. At no point has the provocation been so great as to bring an overwhelming response from the great power to the East; at no point has Moscow's response been sufficiently strong to alter Rumania's course. The lesson this holds for other East European countries is abundantly clear.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economics and Politics

EDITORS' NOTE: In the September-October 1965 issue of this journal, we presented two articles dealing with the "New Economic Model" in Czechoslovakia ("Out of Stalinism," by Harry G. Shaffer; and "Problems and Prospects," by Vaclav Holesovsky). Mr. Tatu's background report on the first steps towards a reform of economic management in the USSR, offered below, follows up these articles as part of a comprehensive series on economic transformations in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Future issues will present articles on economic reforms in East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. In particular, the series will focus attention on the political implications of the various economic changes, not only within each country but also for the Communist bloc as a whole.

Soviet Reforms: The Debate Goes On

By Michel Tatu

At the end of September 1965, the CPSU Central Committee approved a reform in economic management which had been debated in the Soviet Union for close to three years. No one, not even in Moscow, would pretend that the measures adopted in the reform represent a definitive solution to the problems of the Soviet industrial establishment: rather, they reflect an effort to do what was possible or desirable under the political circumstances of the moment. The Central Committee decision is thus the product of a compromise; yet, to appreciate the importance of the new reform, it is necessary to place it in proper context and to reexamine the great debate that preceded its adoption.

Mr. Tatu was for many years Moscow correspondent of Le Monde *(Paris). He recently spent several months at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, where he prepared a study of Soviet history in the last years of the Khrushchev interregnum.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There had long been general agreement that "something had to be done" in order to remedy the serious administrative difficulties which had afflicted the Soviet economy ever since the 1930's. At the same time, however, whenever the question of serious reform had arisen, two sources of conservative opposition to any effort at reform had immediately become apparent: one obstacle was the economic administrators themselves; the other sprang from the special relationship between the latter and the Communist Party.

The men who run the Soviet economy have traditionally been divided between those who favor centralized management and administrative planning and those who advocate increased responsibility and autonomy at the enterprise level. This formula simplifies the terms of the debate, but it refers only to broad principles. For the economic planners in Moscow, however, the question was not just one of renouncing certain important positions—the reform of 1957 had already changed a great many things in this respect—but of giving up methods bequeathed by a quarter century of Stalinist administration. In any case, any move to replace the relatively simple administrative procedures of a command economy with the infinitely less "dependable" indirect levers of the market system (prices, interest, profits) is bound to be a long drawn-out process.

Some more strictly political aspects of economic management have also hindered change. For example, one of the prerequisites of a more efficient planning system in the USSR is a rationalization of industrial prices—an extremely difficult task not only because of its complexity but also because it inevitably calls into question such well-established priorities as the preferential treatment accorded to heavy metallurgy, machine-building and coal production.

The serious obstacles to the reform became readily apparent during the debate provoked in the fall of 1962 by the theses of Professor Ye. Liberman. Even when the discussion remained restricted to economic circles (as was the case with the debate launched toward the end of October 1962 by *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*), the arguments of the centralizers—mainly representatives of the large economic agencies of the state as well as certain economists—seemed to prevail. The more liberal tendencies were displayed by a minority of until then relatively unknown economists, a few professors from Moscow and the provinces, and several enterprise managers; and even these—suffering from a complete lack of experience in planning under market conditions and believing that significant progress in that direction could not be expected anyway—were really more concerned with simplifying the existing bureaucratic tutelage rather than liquidating it completely. In this sense, the return to ministerial responsibility in national economic management could hardly be expected to displease anyone.

The attitude of the top planners has been more variegated. Thus, ever since the end of 1964, Premier Kosygin has given the impression of lending an attentive ear to the suggestions of the younger economists, while carefully assuring everyone that he supported centralized planning. He has favored the natural tendency of Gosplan to maintain maximum control over industry, but unlike the planning agency, he has also been critical of the methods of management practiced under the Soviet command system. Centralized but rationalized management, depending more strictly on the laws of the market, seems to have been his objective. Furthermore, having long advocated an expansion of the consumer goods industries, Kosygin has fewer reservations than others about reforming the price system. In his speech of March 19, 1965, he showed himself quite strict vis-à-vis his questioners, very hostile towards all dogmatism, but at the same time uncommitted on the subject of enterprise autonomy.[1] Nevertheless, his clear support (expressed earlier at the December 1964 session of the Supreme Soviet) of a system of direct links between enterprises, even in heavy industry, represented a significant blow to the administrative totalitarianism of the planners of the old school.

The resistance to the reform emanating from the party requires a more complex analysis. In principle, the party functionaries are not directly concerned with the dispute, while in fact they busily propagate the slogan "initiative from below." Also, they can afford to be less "centralist" than the top planners in Moscow since a certain degree of local autonomy enables the regional party apparatus to exercise closer

[1] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control over the economy; only thus can one explain the support for the sovnarkhozes expressed as late as December 1964 by such regional officials as G. I. Popov, the Leningrad party secretary, and N. G. Yegorychev, his counterpart in Moscow.[2] They are, however, determined not to allow the *khoziaistvenniki* (economic managers) to take upon themselves the role of leaders. This preoccupation is apparent at all levels of the party apparatus.

The problem, in its essence, is the question of the extent to which the party functionaries should become involved in the practical affairs (*konkretnost*) of Soviet economic life. Theoretically, the problem does not exist: the party does not inject itself into the work of the economic cadres, it merely lends its "assistance"; it does not give orders, only "recommendations"; it does not impose personnel changes, it merely "proposes" them. But if one remembers that precisely the same formulas presumably govern the role of the party in other domains of public life from politics to literature, one soon realizes that in practice these subtle distinctions are of little effect.

[2] *Izvestia*, Dec. 11, 1964.

Рисунок И. СЕМЕНОВА

Caption upper left: "From now on one of the basic plan-indicators of enterprises will be the task regarding the volume of production to be realized by them." *Sign reads:* "The Textile-Factory Needs: . . . ." *Man covers the former list with a placard reading* "Customers."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Oct. 10, 1965.

An effort has thus been made recently to define more closely the desirable equilibrium. In contrast to Khrushchevian practice, which had pushed the confusion of powers almost to the point of a complete takeover of economic functions by the party, one now encounters denunciations of attempts by party authorities to encroach upon the work of economic organs (*podmena*) or engage in "detailed supervision" (*malochnaia opeka*)—terms with which the Soviet public has been familiar for many years. Along with these exhortations, however, the press continues to reassert the old nostrums of Soviet management policy, which inevitably lead to the very excesses that are being so assiduously denounced. A striking example of this occurred last year. On January 4, 1965, *Pravda* gleefully announced that kolkhozes had been given the authority to determine their own sowing plans, but at the same time it complained that "very important crops had been arbitrarily and without serious motive" reduced in acreage. Unabashedly the party paper continued:

Organs of the party, the soviets and agriculture are called upon to direct this work (agricultural planning). Their immediate task is to help *rural workers in examining,* from the point of view of the state, *their activity and elaborating the plan. (Emphasis added.)*

On June 29, 1965, *Pravda* returned to the attack. It was necessary, said the paper in an editorial, "to trust the specialists," but such "confidence does not mean that one must allow things to go to ruin." The "new" line was set forth as follows:

Naturally, it is not a question of interfering at every turn in the daily work of the specialist or of replacing him. Such practices have been definitively condemned and will not be taken up again. What is necessary, however, is concrete help, daily and profound control *of the implementation of decisions. (Emphasis added.)*

In other words, the party has not given up its

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chronic tendency to say, in effect: You are free and on your own as long as you do as we please. Supplemented by the Khrushchevian motto, "Trust but verify" (*dovierat no provierat*), this attitude leaves agricultural producers very little freedom of action, and the same applies in the industrial sector. What, indeed, would happen if industrial managers were subjected to no direct administrative controls and were to be guided only by the economic indicators of the market system? And does the concept of party "assistance," which may be justified under the system of command planning, have any application when only economic criteria govern economic decision-making? Would not the managerial class then be tempted to ignore the leading role of the party not only in economic matters but also in the spheres of ideology and politics? And would not other strata of the population be justified in demanding similar enfranchisement?

Within the party leadership, these same questions were discussed, albeit in somewhat more formal doctrinal terms. In the official view, of course, economic problems are only a part of the vast undertaking the party has assumed for the sake of "building communism," and it would not do therefore to "lose sight of the forest for the trees," or succumb—to cite a particularly revealing *Pravda* article by V. P. Stepanov—"to a narrow-minded practicism disregarding the large horizons of the future."[3] In other words, the economists and the managers are expected to remain in a role strictly subordinate to the party leadership. Even the apparently irreproachable rule—enunciated on March 19, 1965, by Kosygin—that economic plans must be formulated exclusively on the basis of economic realities and in consonance with economic aims is not unobjectionable according to Stepanov's doctrine, since the large task is not just to develop an economy but to build communism. For communism "has not yet been accomplished and it still remains to a considerable degree in *the realm of theory rather than reality*." One must therefore be concerned not only with the question of how to produce more and better, but also *"by what means"*: "not by capitalist methods, but by the conscientious, voluntary and heroic labor of the workers."[4] (Emphasis added.)

All this shows that party officials as a group have shown themselves even less concerned with the need to change the methods of economic management than those charged with strictly economic responsibilities. Among the top leaders, the only exception appears to be Podgorny, who in some of his speeches has taken a strong position in favor of far-reaching reforms. Brezhnev has always been much more vague and appears to have dedicated himself mainly to preaching the "strengthening of the party role in all spheres." Suslov, who even more clearly represents the traditional party apparatus, has not uttered a word on the subject of economic reforms, not even in his wide-ranging speech of June 2, 1965, in Sophia, in which he discussed most of the current problems before the Soviet leadership.[5]

This double obstacle—the attachment of many planners to the prevailing administrative methods and the fears within the party over a possible weakening of its prerogatives—explains why it has been so difficult to launch a "liberal" reform of economic management and why it required so much discussion before the compromise of last September could be reached. It is therefore justifiable to conclude that, partial and insufficient as the latest decisions are, they do represent a handsome victory for the reformers. The results achieved are about all that could be hoped for in the existing political circumstances.

As a result of the September Plenum's decisions, the advocates of managerial autonomy at the enterprise level have scored several gains. Certain centrally-planned indicators in the labor field (number of employees, average wages and productivity) are being abandoned, which may, among other things, make it easier in the future to discharge unproductive workers. Another change involves the replacement of global production indicators by indices relating to output actually sold; this measure is of course designed to improve quality. It should be pointed out, however, that enterprise managers have not won control over the disposition of their products,

[3] *Pravda*, May 17, 1965.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Pravda*, June 5, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which will continue to be distributed by the administrative network of "sales and supply centers" (*snabsbyty*), now once again functioning under the central ministries in Moscow. Kosygin has thus been unable to realize his preference for "direct ties" (see his speech of December 1964), and it is most probable that the highly bureaucratized *snabsbyt* system will cause serious difficulties in the future.

In another sector, advances have been achieved in the financial management of enterprises: interest will be charged on state investment funds and loans; the tax on profits is being replaced by a capital stock tax; and, above all, the portion of profit left for free disposal by the enterprise is being increased. On the other hand, the reorganization of the price system—a key step toward rationalization of economic management—has been put off until "1967-68."

As far as central administrative planning is concerned, it remains in force mainly for the purpose of determining the "principal nomenclature" of production, planning new productive capacity, and controlling technological innovation—three areas that involve most of the major decision-making in any economic system. In sum, economic reform in the Soviet Union is still far short not only of establishing a market economy, but even of coming close to the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak economic models, which in principle renounce command planning.

One of the subordinate issues in the Soviet debate on reform was the argument between partisans of administrative recentralization of the economy under reconstituted economic ministries in Moscow and those who continued to support the Khrushchevian sovnarkhoz system under which important authority rested with administrative bodies at the regional level. This argument was clearly won by the centralizers, even though the decision to liquidate the sovnarkhozes, which enjoyed strong favor with the regional bodies of the party, must have been politically difficult. On the other hand, the change was surely facilitated by the current general hostility toward all Khrushchevian institutions, as well as by the natural desire of the former high officials displaced by Khrushchev to regain their jobs (the appointment of N. K. Baibakov as chief of the new Gosplan is significant in this respect).

Finally, certain practical considerations also favored the decision to eliminate the sovnarkhozes. Once it was decided to retain a centralized system of command planning, the logical thing to do was to revert to the three-tiered Stalinist administrative hierarchy—Gosplan, ministries, enterprises—which, given the basic choice, represents the simplest structure from the functional standpoint. It had been Khrushchev's mistake to cut up this apparatus without seriously dealing with the real problem—*i.e.*, the question of managerial autonomy at the enterprise level. In the main, the sovnarkhozes represented a superfluous bureaucratic addition to an already cumbersome administrative apparatus, and, to make things worse, they gave rise to the much maligned "localism" (*mestnichestvo*) without putting an end to the old evil of "bureaucratic compartmentalism" (*vedomstvennost*). It has now been apparently decided, and not without reason, to live with the latter disease rather than with both.

A corollary effect of this administrative reorganization is the loss on the part of the union republics of certain rights that had been delegated to them by Khrushchev. In spite of all the soothing words spoken at the last Central Committee session by Kosygin and Brezhnev, it is hard to imagine how this result could be avoided. To begin with, the union republics are certain to lose control over the machine-building industry within their territories. Moreover, there are indications that it will not be "recommended" to them to establish union-republican ministries for any other major branches of industry. It appears therefore that all that will be left under their control are the so-called "local" industries which Khrushchev in 1957 did not even transfer under sovnarkhoz authority, leaving them rather under the supervision of the local soviets.

As to the apprehensions felt within the party that its role might be diminished as a result of the reforms, these should by now have been attenuated, particularly insofar as the party's position in the enterprises is concerned; moreover, the "narrow-minded practicism" feared by some party officials is not all-pervasive reality. It is true, to be sure, that the liquidation of the sovnarkhozes eliminates a useful instrument of control over the economy by the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regional apparatus of the party, but it should be noted that this mechanism in fact ceased to be very effective in 1963, when the economic regions, with a few exceptions, were enlarged to cover several oblasts, which not only deprived the obkoms of parallel economic institutions but in fact submerged them, in the economic sphere, within vast new administrative structures. Moreover, the Stalinist system of economic ministries, which is now being revived, is sufficiently familiar to everyone so as not to cause any alarm. And finally, at the September Plenum the party received new assurances from Kosygin that the new system of economic administration would "further enhance the guiding role of the party in the economy. The responsibility of the republican central committees, of the kraikoms and of the obkoms will increase considerably."

True, it is still hard to see how the party's role can be reinforced at the regional level, but an article published in the October 4, 1965, issue of *Pravda* suggests that this could be achieved by officially delegating to the regional party committees the horizontal coordinating role which the sovnarkhozes once exercised. The fact is that there are no other bodies today that would be capable of combatting "bureaucratic compartmentalism" (*vedomstvennost*).

At the top echelons of party and state power, the situation is a little more delicate because the reconstitution of numerous and in some instances enormous ministries equipped with vast powers comes on the heels of the suppression—actually effected a year earlier—of the party "bureaus" through which the CPSU Central Committee and Secretariat supervised industry over the preceding years. A formidable army of captains of industry, this time enjoying effective command, is thus about to confront a political apparatus that lacks a recognized leader as well, probably, as solid unity. How many in the party are likely to enjoy this prospect? Reacting to the problem, Brezhnev in his speech before the Central Committee Plenum stressed the role of partkoms in the new ministries; he expects these party bodies to "inform the Central Committee of the CPSU periodically on the progress of work" in the new administrations.[6] Yegorychev, in his *Pravda* article mentioned above, made a similar suggestion. But will such a safeguard be sufficient to assure respect for party authority at this level, especially in view of the fact that complaints are already being heard—from Brezhnev himself among others—that the party decisions of March 1965 on aid to agriculture have been ignored by the planning apparatus?



ПО ПРИВЫЧКЕ

— Уже прошло полчаса, а оттуда не поступило ни одного указания!

Рисунок Е. ГУРОВА

Above: "The September Plenum of the CPSU showed that leaders should decide on many production problems themselves, without signs from above."
Below: "According to Custom" . . . "—Half an hour has passed already, and not a single signal has come from there!"

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), Oct. 20, 1965.*

[6] *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In sum, then, the reform measures announced last September do not entirely resolve the political problems that have dominated the economic debate of the past months, nor do they even begin to eliminate the fundamental deficiencies of Soviet economic management. Rather, the reformers have had to satisfy themselves with a certain streamlining of the existing system by eliminating superfluous administrative echelons and establishing a clearer division of functions. But the drawbacks of the system remain—even those which drove Khrushchev in 1957 to introduce *his* reform—and they may soon assume an aggravated form, since the Soviet economy has now reached a new and higher level of development and complexity. Under these circumstances, "bureaucratic compartmentalism" is bound to have even more serious effects than before, particularly on the introduction of new technology. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the new Gosplan will be able to avoid the errors, paralysis, and competing influences of various pressure groups which were so vigorously deplored in the past.

It remains to be seen whether the enterprise managers will learn to utilize those limited rights that they have been granted; many have noticed and criticized the fact (see Kosygin's speech of December 1964) that certain past measures liberalizing management procedures in both agriculture and industry have never been put into effect. This state of affairs can be traced to the equivocal role of the party, to its "guidance" and the resulting politization of economic administration, and also to the attitude of the managers themselves, who under the present system equate prudence with the line of least resistance. To break this inertia, to make people truly believe in the possibility of change and the need for individual initiative, much more radical measures are required. What is needed is an "administrative destalinization" in fact and in spirit. Perhaps the next reform will bring such a breakthrough.

Economics and Politics

Politics is not the passive result of economics. It exerts an active counteraction on economics. Marxism-Leninism teaches that politics can act either in the direction of the economic development of society, accelerating it, or can set up definite obstacles to this development. The strength and vitality of the policy of the Communist Party, of our state lie in the fact that it is the concentrated expression of the socialist economy, its generalization and completion.

The active influence of policy on economics conditions a political approach to economic phenomena. It proves correct only if it is based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and reflects the vital interests of the working people, the fundamental needs of the development of society. A correct political approach presupposes a solution to economic questions that conforms to the Program of the Party, to its general line.

The volume, content and forms of the economic and political activity of the party and the state and the weapons, methods and ways of solving economic and political tasks naturally do not remain unchanged. During the period of the full-scale construction of communism the chief economic task, the foundation of the general line of our party, is the building of the material and technical base of the Communist society. . . .

The growth in the scale of transformations in all spheres of social production and life is raising even higher the Communist Party's role as the guiding and directing force of Soviet society.

The fundamental requirements of Communist construction dictate the need for a rise in the scientific level of guidance of all sectors of the national economy. This level depends on the degree of mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory on the part of our cadres and on their ability to apply its tenets creatively to practical reality. . . .

—From "Economics and Politics," Ekonomicheskaia gazeta (Moscow) No. 46, November 11, pp. 2-3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mao and Maoism

ARTHUR A. COHEN: *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung.*
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964.
STUART R. SCHRAM: *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung.*
New York, Praeger, 1963.
JEROME CH'EN: *Mao and the Chinese Revolution.*
London, Oxford University Press, 1965.
JOHN W. LEWIS: *Major Doctrines of Communist China.*
New York, Norton, 1964.
GUY WINT: *Communist China's Crusade: Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution.*
New York, Praeger, 1965.

Reviewed by James R. Townsend

THE FIVE BOOKS under review are a small sample of the increasing flow of publications about the Communist revolution in China. Until a few years ago, the student of Communist China had at his disposal only a handful of scholarly monographs, supplemented by numerous journalistic reports of very uneven quality. Like the Soviet field in the postwar years, however, the Chinese Communist field is now experiencing a publication explosion that will soon transform the situation of scarcity into one of relative abundance.

This development is entirely natural and welcome, for the Chinese Communist revolution is rich in themes that should engage the attention of scholars and writers for decades to come. It has an individual leader whose activities span the whole course of the revolution, and whose successes may rival those of the greatest figures in history. It is a movement of unparalleled scope embracing over three decades of struggle against the old political order and linking up with a series of social, economic, and cultural changes that have made all of modern Chinese history a revolutionary process. And it now seems, in the light of the Sino-Soviet conflict, to have a mission that may profoundly affect world politics in the second half of the 20th century. These are the themes to which the books under review address themselves.

What sort of man is Mao Tse-tung and how will history assess him? This challenging question has spurred Messrs. Cohen, Schram and Ch'en to engage in intensive explorations of Mao's life and work. Mr. Cohen's book is the most limited in scope. His purpose, as stated in the introduction, is to delineate Mao's view of communism and to ascertain in what ways Mao is an innovator in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. In his analysis of Mao's originality as a political theorist, Cohen moves systematically through Mao's major writings on dialectical ma-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terialism, revolution, the state, the "transition to socialism," contradictions in socialist society, and the "transition to communism," quoting liberally from the texts in question and constantly comparing what Mao has said with what other Marxist-Leninists said before him. The book is heavy going, but it is well-documented and generally offers persuasive evidence in support of the author's viewpoint.

Mr. Cohen concludes that Mao is neither a philosopher nor an original political theorist, but rather a skillful political and military leader who has revised, improved, and on occasion departed from various Marxist-Leninist tenets in his adaptation of the original doctrine to Chinese conditions. Most Maoist innovations, he contends, are on "practical matters" and turn out, on closer examination (pp. 190-91), to be "additions" rather than "complete reinterpretations," or innovations from which Mao has since retreated. Mao's genuinely creative contributions, in Mr. Cohen's view, lie in the realm of political strategy and leadership, principally his idea of protracted guerrilla warfare waged from self-sustaining rural bases, and the "political style" of tight control and indoctrination within the party. The acknowledged importance of these contributions, however, does not alter the author's conclusion that Mao lacks great theoretical originality or insight.

IN ARRIVING at his negativistic assessment of Mao's contribution to Communist doctrine, Mr. Cohen tries to draw a line between the Chinese leader's talent as a practical revolutionary and his capacity as a political theorist. As the author himself acknowledges (p. 192), however, the distinction between theory and practice is sometimes blurred. For example, did Mao's strategy of a peasant-based revolution in China constitute a creative addition to Marxist-Leninist theory, or was it simply an adaptation of an established Leninist concept? Cohen seeks to resolve this hoary controversy by a rigorous examination of what various Communist theorists have said about the peasant's revolutionary role. By and large, he succeeds in demonstrating that Mao produced no basic ideas that had not been propounded earlier, chiefly by Lenin or Stalin; nevertheless, one wonders whether the problem here is not, rather, one of emphasis and intent. In their efforts to anticipate the course of world revolutionary developments and thus protect themselves against future criticism, Communist theoreticians have said a great many things that ought not to be regarded as integral parts of the doctrine. Did Lenin and Stalin really believe that their own doctrinal formulations prescribed a peasant-based revolution in China? Lenin died too soon to provide a definitive answer, but Stalin's actions in China in 1926-27 indicate that *he* did not. Viewed in this light, Stalin's statements about the priority of the peasant movement (*e.g.*, the one cited by Cohen on p. 45) cannot be interpreted as a theoretical conviction, and it would seem historically naive to contend that his or Lenin's views on the peasant question were the decisive sources of Mao's conception of the peasant's revolutionary role.

Mr. Cohen also makes some questionable assertions about Mao as a person. We are told that Mao pretends to semidivine insight and *total* genius (p. 7); that personal vanity was his main motive in claiming that his treatises

Reviewers in This Issue

JAMES R. TOWNSEND—Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, specializing in Communist China.

DANIEL TRETIAK—Ph.D candidate in the field of Communist bloc relations at Stanford University, California.

ROBERT D. BARENDSEN—Specialist for Far Eastern countries in the US Office of Education, with emphasis on research on education in Communist China.

J. F. BROWN—Former Research Fellow at the University of Michigan, now lives in Munich. His book on Eastern Europe will be published in December by Frederick Praeger, New York.

DAVID L. MORISON—Editor of *The Mizan Newsletter,* a monthly review of Soviet writings on the Middle East and Africa, published in London.

PHILIP G. ALTBACH—Ford Foundation Fellow at the University of Chicago. Contributor to *Problems of Communism, New Leader* (New York) and *Peace News* (British pacifist paper).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On Practice and *On Contradictions* were written in 1937, whereas Cohen maintains that they were actually written in 1950 and 1952, respectively (p. 28);[1] that Mao is a "fanatic" whose views of reality are sometimes blinded by conceit (pp. 29, 162-3); and that his "craving for adulation" is responsible for the "cult of Mao" (p. 202). These characterizations may possibly be accurate, but Mr. Cohen presents little if any hard evidence to corroborate them. They may, of course, be inferred simply from the existence of the cult of Mao; however, if we are to speculate about the causes of the cult, it might be well to ponder also on the psychological as well as the solid political benefits that the Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly derives from picturing China's national leader as an infallible figure who has won his place among the immortals of Communist history. In sum, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* is a well-documented analysis of Mao's doctrinal output which nevertheless leaves many questions about the man and his character unanswered.

MR. SCHRAM'S STUDY of Mao's political thought consists, for the most part, of extracts from Mao's writings arranged under ten topical headings, with one brief selection on his "pre-Marxist" thought. Inevitably, this sort of treatment creates a certain amount of confusion, since extracts from the same work may appear under more than one topic and there is no index permitting quick location of all references to and extracts from a particular title. Nevertheless, the documentary materials selected by Mr. Schram provide an excellent introduction to Mao's writings and include several items previously untranslated or difficult to locate. These materials are accompanied by brief introductory comments and by bibliographical notes designed to assist those who wish to study Mao's works in greater depth.

Mr. Schram's general introduction (pp. 3-89) is of particular interest since it invites a comparison with Cohen's book. Whereas the latter emphasizes the face value of Mao's consciously doctrinal statements, Schram concentrates on the implications of all of Mao's writings from the standpoint of determining the basic nature and sources of the Chinese leader's political thought. Schram might well agree that Mao is not impressive as a Marxist theoretician in Cohen's use of that term (see Schram's comments on pp. 111-12); however, he makes it clear (pp. 80-81) that he is not overly concerned with the precise degree of Mao's dependence on Marxist-Leninist doctrine as he is convinced that Mao is much more than a conscientious follower of his European Communist predecessors. He states at the outset that Mao's thought is the composite product of the historical situation in which he grew up, the intellectual currents to which he was exposed, and his own strong personality (p. 3). The product embraces Marxism-Leninism but also goes beyond it.

Much of Mr. Schram's introduction is a roughly chronological discussion of Mao's life and writings designed to show how the Chinese leader's personality and experiences led him to a course of action which could be justified within a loose Leninist framework, but which also represented his independent convictions. Specifically, Mao's great reliance on the peasants, his nationalistic ambitions for the regeneration of China, his populism, and his romantic belief in the power of the human will (or as Schram calls it, his "voluntarism") derived from experiential rather than doctrinal influences. To the extent that these characteristics of his thinking are compatible with Leninism, they represent a form of "natural Leninism" rather than conscious imitation. Mr. Schram skirts the question of whether or not they amount to creative additions to Marxism-Leninism, but he does express the view that Mao carried these ideas far beyond their doctrinal antecedents. That they have had a profound impact on Chinese communism is certainly indisputable.

Mr. Schram's failure to resolve the question of Mao's "originality" does not detract from the value of his study. The *Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* is not a definitive analysis and evaluation, but rather an immensely useful and suggestive interpretation of a complex man's political ideas. Whether Mao is "original" or not, his brand of Marxism-Leninism, with its nationalistic, populistic and voluntaristic features, has succeeded in projecting the influence of communism into non-European revolutionary situations in a way that could not have been anticipated forty years ago. Through his exami-

[1] Schram disputes Cohen's contention that these two essays were written in 1950 and 1952 rather than in 1937. See *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 43-44.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation of the intellectual and political currents that shaped Mao's thought, Mr. Schram has made a notable contribution to our understanding of this fact.

THE DEBATE over Mao's contribution to Communist doctrine has tended to obscure somewhat his political activities as the virtually unchallenged leader, since 1935, of the Chinese Communist movement. Although both Cohen and Schram are keenly aware of Mao's stature in this respect, it is Professor Ch'en's book that best reveals the drama and significance of Mao's role in modern Chinese history. Ch'en's thesis, as stated in his foreword, is that the study of "Maoism" must be related to "Mao's personal experiences, the nature of Chinese society in the twenties and thirties, and the Chinese revolutionary wars." He disclaims any attempt to judge Mao's achievements or his place in history on the ground that the Chinese leader's career is not yet ended. He further states that his study is meant to be not just a straight biography, since Mao's career cannot be separated from Chinese politics, but rather a "dispassionate analysis of Mao's life and times." This the author has accomplished superbly in what is undoubtedly the best available account of the Chinese Communist movement up to 1949 as well as the best synthesis of what is now known about Mao's life. Despite his disclaimer, he has also said a great deal about Mao's contribution and role in the Chinese revolution.

Professor Ch'en's thoroughness in depicting the political background of Mao's career may at first be somewhat irritating to his readers. The attention he gives to the details of the warlord struggles in the 1910's, for example, tends to hinder rather than help the reader's grasp of the general situation, as does the later citation of the individual commanders and designations of every army unit. Nevertheless, the realization gradually grows that the course of the Chinese Communist movement is in itself a significant affirmation of Mao's leadership and importance. This is certainly not to say that Mao alone can claim credit for the success of the Chinese Communist revolution; Ch'en observes only that no one else can claim greater credit (p. 213).

The author shows that Mao's policies from 1928 on, and especially during 1937-45, were instrumental in bringing victory within the grasp of the CCP. He shows, too, that Mao's determination and superior political insight contributed vitally to his success in establishing and maintaining his party leadership, although his command of the loyalties of the Red Army and the existence of divisions within the party in the 1930's also were important factors. Perhaps the Chinese Communists could not have won final victory without the Japanese invasion and the deficiencies of Kuomintang rule. Nevertheless, their survival of the disasters of 1927-37 and their effective exploitation of the opportunities of 1937-45 revealed exceptional qualities which stemmed in no small part from the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.

IT IS WORTH remembering that Mao's span of dominance in his party already exceeds that of Stalin by several years, and that the time elapsed since 1937, when the CCP first began to administer significant areas of China and to develop its characteristic policies and political style, is the same as that from the October Revolution to the end of World War II. The Chinese Communist movement may thus be approaching middle, if not old, age and may soon cease to be a "movement" in the sense that the word connotes youthful dynamism and adaptability.

The volume edited by Professor Lewis affords considerable insight into this process of maturation. It consists almost entirely of translated Chinese materials touching on all major doctrines and policies of the CCP from 1949 through 1963, with several pre-1949 selections thrown in. The editor has written a brief background statement for each of the ten chapters, plus a short introduction pointing up the uses and limitations of Chinese documentary materials. The selected materials of course include many excerpts from the works of Mao and other top Chinese Communist leaders as well as various basic laws and regulations. More importantly, they also draw on the vast store of middle-range articles and reports which not only mirror official policy but often fill it out with details and make it more meaningful. The collection is, perhaps, the most informative and up-to-date introductory text presently available on Communist China.

The maturity of the CCP comes through strongly in a reading of the documents. Above all, they impress the reader with the party's

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consciousness of its past record and its confidence in its ability to meet the challenges both of its Chinese environment and of its political opponents. There is, however, another side to this maturity, and that is the limitations which the party's established methods and characteristics, shaped by revolutionary experience, may impose on its effectiveness in coping with vastly altered problems and conditions. The "mass line," the habit of total reliance on the wisdom of a few aging leaders, the use of agitation and indoctrination to rally the people in support of national causes, and faith in the invincibility of a mobilized population—these have virtually become fixed attributes of the movement. It is not at all certain, however, that they are the most appropriate attributes for a party which now must focus its attention on the mundane tasks of development. A movement relies on a sense of mission, but the CCP's initial mission of national independence, unification and reconstruction under a socialist system has been substantially fulfilled. One of the critical questions of our time is whether the CCP has embarked on a new mission or whether its current actions in the international arena simply represent the final phase of its drive to fulfill the old one.

ALTHOUGH ALL of the books under review except Ch'en's deal, in some way, with China's international ambitions, it is Mr. Wint's that attacks the question most directly. *Communist China's Crusade* is a new version of the author's *Dragon and Sickle* (1959), expanded to cover the development and implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The brevity of the book and the breadth of the subject (the CCP's origins, road to power, and present international role) preclude detailed or exhaustive analysis. The book is actually a series of short, interpretive essays that range rather loosely over the entire history of the CCP. There are a few minor errors and some very sweeping generalizations, but the treatment as a whole is sound and suggestive.

Wint believes that the CCP has a new mission which derives, consciously or unconsciously, from the old universalism of Chinese culture (p. 110). He sees Communist China as a base for expansion (p. 67), and the only question is whether it is to be expansion of Chinese or of Communist power. The question, however, proves to be an intractable one, as Wint concedes when he says (p. 67) that China has "double aims, a double foreign policy, a double ambition." The Chinese Communists look to the Sinification of Asia, Africa and Latin America just as the Hans looked to the Sinification of large areas of Asia, he remarks (p. 110), but "Sinification" in the modern context means "the adoption of the Chinese version of communism."

Notwithstanding the difficulty of resolving the question, Wint does a good job of explaining the complex motives that underlie the present phase of China's foreign policy. One only wishes, given the author's talent for generalization, that he had said more about China's prospects for expansion. Whatever China's ambitions may be, and whatever the motivation of those ambitions, the material bases of Chinese power and the reaction of China's neighbors will necessarily affect the extent to which they can be fulfilled.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuba and Latin American Communism

THEODORE DRAPER: *Castroism: Theory and Practice.*
New York, Praeger, 1965.
JULES DUBOIS: *Operation America.*
New York, Walker, 1963.
ADOLFO GILLY: *Inside the Cuban Revolution.*
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1964.
BORIS GOLDENBERG: *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America.*
New York, Praeger, 1965.
ROLLIE POPPINO: *International Communism in Latin America, 1917-1963.*
Toronto, Collier-Macmillan, 1964.
MANUEL URRUTIA LLEO: *Fidel Castro and Company, Inc.*
New York, Praeger, 1964.

Reviewed by Daniel Tretiak

DURING THE PAST few years, several new books dealing with Cuba have appeared in print. Of these Theodore Draper's second study of the Castro Revolution, *Castroism: Theory and Practice,* and Boris Goldenberg's long work, *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America,* are particularly valuable. Professor Draper's book is a collection of three essays on various aspects of the Cuban revolution. Mr. Goldenberg's volume is a historical exposition of major developments in Cuban internal and external policy during the time of Castro's struggle against the Batista regime as well as during the years following the victory of the revolution.

While he was in Moscow in mid-November 1964, Ernesto Guevara remarked that Cuba was already a socialist country: ". . . we represent a socialist country, we officially feel that we are socialists. . . ." Indeed, Cuba *is* a member of the Communist world system, pledging fealty to Marxism-Leninism—but with a difference. For while all the other Communist states are more or less closely allied with one or the other of the two great antagonists in the world Communist movement, Cuba has so far avoided exclusive commitment to either China or the Soviet Union. It has had better relations with the USSR than any pro-Chinese party state, and better relations with China than any pro-Soviet party state. Moreover, it has been more independent politically of Moscow than could normally be expected, given Cuba's strong economic reliance on the Soviet Union. On many issues that have divided China and the USSR, the Cubans have avoided taking a clearcut position, on some questions they have lined up with Moscow, on others, albeit less often, with Peking.

This stance of independence within the Communist world has been conditioned by develop-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments within Cuba as well as by the international environment. With respect to the relation between internal Cuban politics and the Cuban attitude toward China on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, Professor Draper's and Mr. Goldenberg's books are very illuminating. Señor Gilly's pamphlet is also useful in this sense, despite its unsystematic organization. Señor Urrutia, however, provides little material about his native country's political problems after 1959. While Mr. Dubois and Professor Poppino are concerned with Latin America as a whole, they also devote attention to Cuba specifically.

MR. DRAPER'S BOOK is divided into three chapters. The first, entitled "What is Castroism?," is less an essay dealing with Castro's ideology than a description of the relations between Fidel Castro and various Cuban political groups, especially the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular, the old Cuban Communist Party). Chapter Two, besides focusing on some of Ché Guevara's writings, particularly on guerilla warfare, is a stimulating attempt to describe the class origins of the Castro revolution. Draper notes the multi-class character of the revolution, as well as Castro's manipulation of the various classes of the Cuban society. This is an extremely well-written essay, and most helpful toward an understanding of the intellectual history of the Castro regime.

Chapter Three, "Castro's Economics," deals with the Soviet-Cuban dispute over the direction of Cuba's economic development. The Cubans, especially Guevara, wanted the Communist states, and especially the USSR, to underwrite the rapid industrialization of Cuba's economy, naively believing that all that was needed to accomplish that goal was a rapid infusion of foreign assistance.

However, since Cuba lacks both the raw-material base and an adequately trained labor force for purposes of rapid and extensive industrialization, the Russians after 1961 began to encourage, then pressure, the Cubans into decelerating plans for any such conversion of the economy. Only after much acrimony did the Cubans tentatively accept Moscow's advice. Thus in 1964, after much initial opposition, the industrialization drive was slowed in favor of increased concentration on sugar production. From all indications, this effort has proven reasonably successful: the Cubans claim that the *zafra* of 1965 has yielded more than 6 million tons of sugar, and with improved mechanization further increases are expected in the future.

But, is the debate about "monoculture"—so brilliantly described by Draper—really over? Have the Soviets succeeded in imposing their will on Cuba's economic development, causing the Castro regime to shelve indefinitely all industrialization plans for the sake of a "socialist division of labor" that would turn Cuba into little more than the main sugar plantation of the Communist world? This reviewer would respond in the negative to both questions.

As Draper notes, an increased flow of the Cuban population to the cities had begun even before 1959, and no Cuban leader with any pretense of revolutionary aspirations can disregard now the necessity of urban economic development. The recent emphasis on sugar production has already demonstrated the scarcity of rural labor as well as a surplus of urban workers who cannot find jobs.

MR. GOLDENBERG'S volume represents an effort, partly successful, to write a comprehensive history of the Castro revolution. Castro's rise to power and his regime are discussed in the context of Latin-American revolutionary tradition and against the background of Cuban-American relations since the beginning of this century. It is in these broad settings that Mr. Goldenberg demonstrates his best understanding of Cuban problems. Unfortunately, certain more specific questions, such as the important relationship between the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and former President Batista (1952-58), he handles rather unsatisfactorily; the issue is treated disjointedly by only sporadic references scattered throughout the book (pp. 113-119; 145; 160-162 and 165-170).

One learns that during the 1950's the PSP had developed a working relationship with Batista not unlike that which existed in the early 1940's, though eventually, presumably by mid-1958, this cooperation "became impossible." In any case, however, the Communists were "much less active in the fight against Batista than many other groups" (pp. 119 and 165). Mr. Goldenberg also calls attention to the failure of the Castro-called general strike of March 1958—a strike that failed in spite of the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable strength of the PSP in the urban labor unions. The reasons? PSP Secretary-General Blas Roca himself described them simply by references to "Mujalismo" in the unions (p. 145), a term derived from the name of the then Cuban trade union chief and descriptive of corrupt unionism subservient to Bastista.

This reviewer would add that, besides illustrating the link between the PSP and Bastista, the strike episode probably marked the beginning of Castro's cooperation with the Communists. After the collapse of the strike, Castro concluded that the PSP was strong enough in the unions to make or break the 26th of July movement, something the veteran Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez admitted he wanted to prove to the rebel leader (p. 166). Castro then concluded that he needed PSP support, especially with respect to the urban workers, and began collaborating with the Communists. Since Mr. Goldenberg clearly believes that the PSP had important links with Batista, he would have done well to devote a whole separate chapter to this subject, for if Castro did indeed find himself at one time in a vise between Batista and the PSP, the issue is central to an understanding of the Castro revolution.

In spite of some deficiencies such as the one just mentioned, Mr. Goldenberg's material dealing with Cuban internal developments, which constitutes the bulk of his book, is generally well developed. But when he reaches into Cuba's foreign relations, particularly Castro's attitude toward Moscow and Peking, Mr. Goldenberg's comments appear occasionally careless and less than well founded. Thus, for example, his report on Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1963: The author states that following this visit, "Castro accepted in the main the Russian as against the Chinese line. . . ." But this conclusion is borne out neither by the Soviet-Cuban communiqué concluding the visit, nor by Castro's comportment subsequent to the visit. The text of the communiqué shows little more than the amenities that could be expected from a supplicant for Soviet aid; it certainly fails to give convincing evidence of support against Peking. Moreover, in his televised report to the Cuban people after his return, Castro pointedly exonerated the Chinese from one of the main Soviet charges against them—namely, that Peking is more interested in promoting war than maintaining peace. Finally, barely two months after he left Moscow, Castro clearly asserted his independence by refusing to sign the Moscow-cosponsored test-ban treaty.

In another assertion, Mr. Goldenberg claims that "Cuba had to adapt itself more to the Eastern [Communist] countries than they did to her" (p. 200)—again an important judgment which the author fails to substantiate. In fact, neither the Soviets and their allies, nor the Chinese, have found working with the Cubans easy. The financial drain, especially on Moscow, has been heavy, even though the Cubans have often had to submit to disadvantageous terms of trade with the Communist countries.

Moreover, Castro's generally noncommittal stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute has at different times deeply annoyed both protagonists.

SEÑOR GILLY'S pamphlet is useful for several reasons. First, although written by an admitted sympathizer of the Cuban revolution and replete with excessive eulogies of the Castro regime, it is not altogether uncritical in approach. Second, it is the product of a Spanish-speaking observer (Señor Gilly is an Argentinian journalist) who recently visited Cuba for an extended period of time. Third, the author is reasonably well-informed about current trends in Marxist thought and political practice throughout the Communist world.

The pamphlet is therefore especially interesting in its treatment of problems such as the relationship between the PSP and the 26th of July movement and the effect of this relationship on the Cubans' attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute. Also of interest are Señor Gilly's evaluations of Cuban popular views of the Castro revolution and government, and his critique of such internal shortcomings as excessive press control and the unwillingness of certain leaders to accept honest criticism by the workers. Equally worthwhile is Gilly's description of Cuban reaction during the 1962 Cuban crisis, especially his impressions of popular response to Khrushchev's behavior at that time. One feels that one of the wiser decisions the deposed Soviet leader made was not to go to Cuba after Castro's first visit to the USSR. While Fidel Castro diplomatically attempted to soften Cuban hostility toward Khrushchev from June 1963 onward, Gilly gives the impression that the Cuban masses themselves have not forgotten Khrushchev's "capitulationism."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FORMER PRESIDENT URRUTIA'S book is disappointing because his term of office was too brief and his relations with Premier Castro self-admittedly too circumscribed to enable him to impart much of significance even about the first seven months of the Fidelista regime. His comments on post-1959 developments in Cuba are too tinged with rancor to be very helpful toward an understanding of recent Cuban history.

Since Dubois and Poppino are interested in communism in Latin America as a whole, it is a pity they do not discuss in their books the problems the Communist parties in the Americas have had to face over the past few years as well as the threat that communism poses there. It would have been useful, for example, to have described the effects of the Sino-Soviet rift upon the various Marxist parties. The authors could have also discussed the great difficulties Latin American Communists have had recently in defining their attitude toward the Cuban revolution and in evaluating its lessons with respect to their own internal struggle for power. These issues have been extremely divisive and have resulted in splits in the important Chilean and Brazilian parties as well as in some of the smaller parties.

Despite the shortcomings of Mr. Dubois' book, his report does produce interesting evidence of Cuban attempts at subversion in Latin America. Those who might feel that this volume is merely anti-Communist propaganda should turn to Señor Gilly, who produces unexpected support for Mr. Dubois. The Argentinian argues that the Cubans are emotionally involved with revolution in Latin America as a whole, which they conceive as necessary for the success of their own revolution. "Each advance of the forces of revolution in other countries, and especially in Latin America," says Señor Gilly, "is directly reflected in the island and is a direct support of the continuance of the Revolution" (78). Given this emotional involvement, the Cubans' efforts to translate their sentiments into reality are readily understandable.

In Professor Poppino's book some positive features are heavily mixed with weaknesses. His 40-page chapter, "The Rise of the Communist Parties," is a synthesis of parts of Robert Alexander's *Communism in Latin America.* Little new material is provided and there is an embarassing lack of documentation and source references. Mr. Poppino does not discuss the Cuban revolution at any length. Even Chapter 9, entitled "The Cuban Position and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," where one might expect to find material on Castroism, deals with such diverse matters as Chinese relations with Latin America; Sino-Soviet differences on policy toward Latin America; guerrilla warfare and Sino-Cuban relations; Cuban relations with Latin America; and Cuba's role in the "peaceful way" versus "armed struggle" debate—all compressed within sixteen pages. The reader cannot help but wish that more space had been devoted to those important subjects.

Nevertheless, there are several useful chapters in the book. One, entitled "The Political Heritage," is unusually well conceived and executed, and another on the "Organization of the Party" is most useful in that it explains the structure and terminology of Latin American Communist parties. The chapters reviewing Soviet relations with Latin American nations and Communist parties are also well-presented, desirable summaries. The book has two appendices, a bibliographical essay, and an adequate index.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews in Brief

Education in China

STEWART FRASER (compiler and editor): *Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade.* Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1965.

THIS BULKY BOOK put together by Dr. Fraser, currently Professor of International and Comparative Education at George Peabody College for Teachers in Nashville, Tennessee, is the outgrowth of doctoral research conducted several years ago at the University of Colorado. Its more than 500 pages are divided into three major parts: a 66-page introductory essay by Professor Fraser, devoted primarily to a review of educational developments in Communist China from 1950 through 1960; a 336-page collection of speeches, articles, and other Chinese source materials on education published mainly between 1949 and the end of 1960; and an 83-page bibliography of writings on Chinese education in the Communist and earlier periods.

Except for a few rather thin pages dealing with the pre-Communist Chinese educational system, Professor Fraser devotes the bulk of his introduction to a review of the highlights of educational development in Communist China during the first decade of the Mao regime. Unfortunately, this survey is marred by faulty organization, which makes the presentation difficult to follow either chronologically or topically. For example, a subsection entitled "Higher Education in the Communist-held areas, 1944-49" (pp. 6-10) ranges well beyond the topical scope of that heading and includes an abruptly interjected flashback paragraph recapitulating political developments since 1927. Similarly, under the heading "The Great Leap Forward," the author launches into a discursive and disproportionately lengthy treatment of the *hsia fang* movement (pp. 50-54), which he interrupts with a brief discussion of the fiscal advantages of part-time study programs and then picks up again for further examination in the succeeding subsection under a different heading.

Specialists on contemporary China will also be somewhat puzzled by Professor Fraser's account of the ideological remolding campaigns of the early 1950's and the "hundred flowers," rectification, and anti-rightist movements of 1956-57. For one thing, he includes the early campaigns under the label of *cheng feng* (rectification), although this term actually was not generally applied to the initial movements for the ideological remolding or thought reform (*ssu hsiang kai tsao*) of intellectuals. Also, he refers at one point to these early movements as taking place in 1950-51, and elsewhere as beginning only at the end of September 1951. Later on (p. 35) he gives the impression that a revived rectification campaign began in May 1956, simultaneously with the call for "blooming and contending" under the "hundred flowers" slogan. This chronology is somewhat confused. The author is closer to the mark when he says farther on (p. 39) that by June 1957 the new rectification movement was "submerged," within seven weeks of its launching, beneath an active "anti-rightist" drive.

If Professor Fraser's introduction is lacking in clarity and precision, the collection of Chinese Communist documents he offers is exceptionally rich and valuable, affording the reader the opportunity to familiarize himself with a wide variety of primary sources on Chinese Communist education. Most of the selections are accompanied by brief notes explaining the circumstances in which they originally appeared and their significance. One exception is an important article by Minister of Education Yang Hsiu-feng published on the tenth anniversary of the Communist regime in October 1959 (pp. 332-40), which appears without any comment whatever. Though generally comprehensive, Fraser's collection omits two important speeches by Yang Hsiu-feng and Lu Ting-yi in April 1960, perhaps because both were reproduced in an earlier study of Chinese Communist education.[1]

[1] Chang-tu Hu, ed., *Chinese Education under Communism,* New York, Columbia University Teachers College, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Professor Fraser's bibliography is also very extensive, listing several hundred books and articles dealing with education or related aspects of the cultural environment in Communist China. Although individual entries are not annotated, they are usefully arranged in 17 topical sections and include writings by non-Communist authors outside China as well as items from Chinese Communist sources. The compilation constitutes the most comprehensive bibliography on Chinese Communist education thus far published.

In sum, Professor Fraser's most important contribution lies in making available to Western students in easily accessible form a substantial collection of significant Chinese Communist educational documents and a voluminous bibliography on education under the Mao regime. His book is thus a valuable reference work for all those who are seriously interested in educational development in Communist China.

Robert D. Barendsen

Eastern Europe

DAVID FLOYD: *Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally.* New York, Praeger, 1965.

WHAT HAS BECOME known as the Rumanian "national deviation" has already been the subject of numerous articles. Of these, that by J. M. Montias in the April 1964 edition of *Soviet Studies* (Oxford) is certainly the most authoritative. It was only a question of time before books on the same topic began to roll from the presses.

The first of many that no doubt are still to come is by David Floyd, the Communist Affairs correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*. It is a good introduction to a subject which is becoming increasingly more complex the more it is studied. As additional evidence is made available—and this will depend on whether the Rumanian authorities continue to be as helpful to visiting observers as they have been up to now—much of the earlier analyses may have to be drastically revised. Mr. Floyd's book will, however, remain useful for some time to come. It is a well written, sober narrative which soundly analyzes the overt evidence and, with one or two exceptions, avoids giving too much credence to many of the doubtful rumors—some of them emanating from official circles in Bucharest—pointing to the bitterness of the Soviet-Rumanian disputes and the almost prehistoric date of their origins.

The book begins with a brief survey of Rumanian history and continues with two chapters on the early post-World War II period. These chapters are particularly important in that they provide the background against which the later tension with the Soviet Union developed. It is quite possible that further research will put back the origins of the Soviet-Rumanian dispute to this early postwar period or to the removal of the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu trio in 1952. Today's visitors to Bucharest are constantly being told that 1952 was indeed the turning point and that none other than Gheorghiu-Dej himself as much as admitted so (in his speech at the November-December 1961 plenum of the Rumanian Central Committee, which took place just after the 22nd CPSU Congress). But neither Gheorghiu-Dej nor Rumanian officialdom are particularly reliable sources and, though Mr. Floyd leaves open the possibility of the dispute having begun much earlier than originally thought, he wisely does not attempt to prove something which at present cannot be proved.

The parts of the book which deal with the period from 1950 to the death of Gheorghiu-Dej cover well trodden ground. The way the dispute continued even after the Rumanian case on Comecon integration had ended in victory in July 1963, how its political and intra-bloc ramifications began to predominate over the economic—all this is clearly described and well analyzed.

Mr. Floyd's book ends with the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. Yet it goes without saying that this is not the end of the story. The Rumanian party congress in July 1965 and the visit of a strong Rumanian delegation to Moscow in September, headed by the new party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, constitute further landmarks in Soviet-Rumanian relations which will have to be analyzed in terms of all that happened before. In the meantime, Mr. Floyd's book will be an informative guide to the turbulent events of the Gheorghiu-Dej era.

HEINRICH KUHN: *Der Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei.* Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965.

IF MR. FLOYDS' book was intended more for the general reader, that by Dr. Kuhn on communism in Czechoslovakia is very much for the specialist. Dr. Kuhn is Director of the Sudeten-Deutsches Archiv in Munich and is known as one of the most diligent researchers on Czechoslovak affairs in Western Europe. This book consists mainly of a collection of 17 key documents relating to the organization and regulations of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The first is the organizational statute of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party (left) of September 1920, and the last document is the new party statute, approved at the 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in December 1962.

The two most important dates in the history of the Czechoslovak CP are 1929 and 1948. The first saw the ascension to power inside the party of Klement Gottwald and his group, and marked the beginning of the party's "bolsheviza-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion"; the second marked the ascension of the party to power with Gottwald still at its head. The three historical phases which are delineated by these two dates are apparent from the documents which Dr. Kuhn has selected, although the contrast between pre-and post-1929 is much more striking than that between pre- and post-1948. The real turning point in the history of the party as far as character and attitudes are concerned was definitely 1929 and not 1948. Whether the changes since 1962 in the policy and personnel of the top regime leadership will be sufficiently important and lasting to be considered another turning point, and whether these changes will be reflected in the party's organizational and statutory documents, remains to be seen.

Dr. Kuhn has written an introduction of some 70 pages which is a model of conciseness. It is well balanced, objective and thoroughly documented. All in all, both author and publisher should be congratulated on what specialists will find a most valuable volume for their reference shelves.

F. J. Brown

The Left in Africa and Asia

WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND AND CARL G. ROSBERG, JR., eds.: *African Socialism.* Stanford University Press, 1964.

THESE ANALYSTS of an elusive subject have done their work both well and fairly. Anyone previously inclined to run African socialism down, as precept or practice, will find material for this in most of the chapters of the book. The sympathetic reader, on the other hand, will appreciate the sensitive way in which the essential idealism of the subject has been handled.

This is not to say that the idealism is not contrasted with the reality. Indeed, the contrast between what Chandler Morse calls (in no defamatory sense) "socialist rhetoric" and the actual policies and actions of African socialists provides the unifying theme of the book. Colin Legum tells us that "Dr. Nkrumah is both a convinced idealist and a practical realist". The lawgiver is his own philosopher. If he only legislates part of his own philosophy, the reproach of inconsistency can have at best only an academic foundation. What is interesting is not the exposure of inconsistencies, but the hesitations, compromises and "agonizing reappraisals" that lie between idea and action. The most animated chapters in this book are those which describe the actual working out, in West and East African countries, of the antithesis between the inner credo of the select few and the prosaic requirements of their human and economic environment.

There are two questions which are not directly asked in this book (perhaps out of an excess of sensitivity) but which most people taking a long look at African socialism can scarcely avoid asking themselves. The answers to these questions, however, can be reconstructed from the material here provided and the various writers' comments on it.

First, is African socialism to be taken seriously? That is to say, is it an authentic political philosophy; has it ideological coherence; and is there behind it an effective body of opinion? For the candid inquirer, the book provides ample substance for affirmative answers to these queries. It is true that the mythical, rhetorical, eclectic and contradictory aspects of African socialism or socialisms are emphasized by many of the contributors. But the underlying intellectual attitudes are well brought out (particularly by Margaret Roberts in her judicious study, "A Socialist Looks at African Socialism") and are such as to merit the attention and respect of all but the most anti-socialist of non-socialists.

Secondly, can the West live with African socialism? If the "vanguardists" to the Left of authority in Ghana were indeed typical of the Africa of today or tomorrow, this question would have to be asked in a very somber tone of voice. As it is, today's African socialists have established a *modus vivendi* with the non-socialist establishments in the West which at best reflects an aversion to dogmatism, and at worst amounts to a provisional compromise in their own best interests.

As political analysis, *African Socialism* is first-rate. Repetition of arguments and material, in a work where each chapter gives a different writer's view on the same subject, is not too obtrusive—though one six-line quotation from Nkrumah appears three times. On a wider plane, what may be questioned is whether political analysis really gets to the heart of what is in many respects more a product of the spirit than of the intellect. African socialists are given their say in the texts of the appendix, but this is necessarily a dry and arbitrary section. Some relaxed interviews with Africa's socialist statesmen would have rounded off this discussion of a humanist philosophy on a suitably human note.

HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE AND STUART SCHRAM: *Le Marxisme et l'Asie 1853-1964.* Paris, Armand Colin, 1965.

THIS VOLUME is a collection of texts illustrating Marxist thinking on the problems of revolution in Asia. With the exception of Marx, Engels and a few less important figures, the revolutionaries in these pages are, with a few important exceptions, either Russians or Chinese. A number of the texts—some 70 of them—cover the post-1917 period. What gives the book its coherence and immediate relevance is that its texts deal with issues which perennially agitate the Communists of

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia and their European Communist mentors.

The texts are prefaced by a cogent and well-rounded historical sketch, in 135 pages, of the debate within the Communist movement on the tactics, strategy and what the authors call "the cultural aspect" of the revolution in Asia. This "cultural aspect" is, above all, Asia's rejection of Europe in the name of a European doctrine—the Communist-world variant of the anti-colonial struggle.

As the authors admit, nothing very conclusive emerges from the writings of Marx and Engels about the strategy or even the prospects of revolution in Asia. The value of the Marx and Engels documents included in the book may be simply that they clearly illustrate this point. Indeed, a Soviet commentator recently sought to justify a pragmatic attitude towards revolutions in Asian and African countries by the fact that a virtual *carte blanche* on this subject was bequeathed by the founding fathers. He quoted from the letter of Engels to Kautsky of September 12, 1882 (reprinted in this collection): "As to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organization, I think today we can advance only rather idle hypotheses." [1]

If Marx's interest in Asia was peripheral, Lenin's was profound and abiding. After 1917, the texts and their exegesis move from the realm of theory into that of revolutionary strategy. Transferred to the Russian milieu, Communist thinking had already altered radically; but could this new orthodoxy permit the inevitable innovations which went with the continuously eastward displacement and adaptation of the doctrine? From the Second Comintern Congress onwards, a single thread runs through this book: the resolve of eastern nations to make their own revolutions in their own way, and the anxiety of one nation, which in this context at least is a western one, to preside over the process.

For this reason, the authors are quite right in saying that this, which they call "the cultural problem," is often the most fundamental and the most difficult to resolve. Often submerged in the arguments about strategy and tactics, this theme provides the underlying and unifying interest of the collection. As for the debates about ends and means—the relative roles of workers and peasants, the proper class composition of national fronts, and so forth—they give good grounds for supposing that, if 45 years have not blunted the appetite of Communists for these exercises, or greatly enlarged their conceptual scope, they are likely to continue on more or less familiar lines for many years to come. But, more importantly, the two Sovietologist and Sinologist collaborators, with their extended view over a whole cycle of inter-Communist debate, are able to suggest in the light of history that Peking's stalwart Leninists of today will go the Trotskyite way of Moscow tomorrow, when "the ideologists of Peking denounce the heresy of those who claim to be creating Communist Parties in the African bush." *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

David Morison

[1] K. Ivanov, "The National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs*, No. 12, 1964, p. 9.

Youth and Communism

RICHARD CORNELL: *Youth and Communism.* New York, Walker and Company, 1965.

YOUTH AND STUDENTS have traditionally had close connections with leftwing political movements. Students helped to create the ferment that led to the Russian Revolution of 1917. Recently, students have toppled governments in Turkey and Korea and have caused political crises in Japan, Vietnam, and other countries. Professor Richard Cornell has written a valuable book in that it traces, perhaps for the first time, the history of the Communist youth movement. Because the book attempts to cover the entire development of the movement, discussing both the international youth organizations and individual national groups, it is more of a survey than an exhaustive analytical study.

When viewed in historical context, the world-wide mobilization of Communist youth has been quite remarkable. In less than a half a century a movement has been established which encompasses many millions of young people in almost all nations. Equally remarkable is the fact that, prior to the break-up of the Communist monolith, the Soviet Union was able to exercise substantial control over youth and student organizations in diverse parts of the world. Yet in this same fact lay the weakness of the movement. While the Russian revolution provided a powerful impetus to the early growth of the movement, when the fervor of revolutionary intensity wore thin and Stalinist authoritarianism made itself felt, the movement lost much of its vitality. During the ideological twists and turns of the 1930's and 40's, communist youth organizations passively followed the lead of the Comintern.

In the post-World-War II period, attempts were made to unite world youth under the Communist banner. Though the International Union of Students and World Federation of Democratic Youth were originally formed by young people of differing political backgrounds, they were taken over by the Communists in short order and thereafter used for political purposes. Since then, despite such embarrassments and difficulties as the events in Hungary in 1956 and the more recent Sino-Soviet split, the Communist youth movement has man-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aged to stay alive mainly through a continuing stress on anti-colonialism and world peace.

Professor Cornell also considers the development of youth organizations within the Communist bloc, showing that they have ceased to play the militant political and educational role they once enjoyed and have become part of the Communist "Establishment," thereby losing the loyalty of many of the youth.

The author has made one serious omission in his otherwise comprehensive book. He has neglected almost entirely the role of Communist youth organizations in the developing areas. It is precisely in the new states that the Communist and other leftist student movements have their chief strength, for it is in these areas that a student movement can still overthrow a government or cause severe political dislocation. While in the industrially advanced nations, student groups remain a key factor in educational and propaganda efforts, and are occasionally of peripheral political use, in the Third World they are of critical importance in the Communists' quest for power.

The author has also paid only scant attention to the reasons behind the rise of the Communist youth movement, and to the underlying factors which explain youth's attraction to extreme revolutionary causes.

Possibly the author considered this a subject too complex to investigate within the scope of his survey; in any event he has at least provided a starting point for a thorough consideration of the role and function of youth movements in the 20th century and it is to be hoped that someone will take up the challenge.

The dependence of the Communist youth movement on the dictates of the adult Communist apparatus should provide a warning to youth groups which proclaim their desire to maintain independence from all elements in the Cold War. The fact that the Russians have practiced "neo-colonialism" within their own international youth movement and have used the movement for their own political ends is perhaps the most important lesson which this book provides.

Philip C. Altbach

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zimmerwald: Some Contemporary Echoes

By William Korey

Reflecting the curiously perverse manner in which the Muse of History works her will, the international Communist movement is celebrating a half-century of its existence by recapitulating the polemics which raged at its founding and which today threaten to rend it asunder. The 38 delegates from 11 countries who assembled, under a blanket of tight secrecy, in the obscure Swiss mountain town of Zimmerwald, on September 5-8, 1915, wrote a manifesto and created a movement that were to constitute the cornerstone of the Communist International, established four years later. In the process, the conferees had to resolve, at least temporarily, sharp differences over strategy and tactics—differences that find a clear echo in the current Soviet-Chinese dispute.

Among the issues that were debated at Zimmerwald, while "hot" war gripped most of Europe, were: What type of strategy should the left wing follow to succeed in its effort to end the war? Was peace —or revolution—the transcendent objective of socialists? Had the old organizational form of international struggle become outdated and was a new one needed? Were compromise and the unity of the left wing essential for the conduct of an effective international struggle, or would splitting be more appropriate? Strikingly, even today's throbbing issue of "wars of national liberation" was fleetingly touched upon in the preliminaries to the conference.

The background to Zimmerwald was the collapse of the Second International upon the outbreak of World War I. When the major constituent socialist parties of the International rallied to the support of their respective national "bourgeois" governments by voting war credits, participating in coalition cabinets, and demonstrating other forms of active patriotism, the fundamental socialist assumption that class allegiance transcended national allegiance was violently shattered. Destroyed, too, was the basic socialist principle that had been adopted at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907 (and restated at later prewar international meetings): that a new general war must be the occasion for the socialist parties to rally the working class against capitalism in general.

The patriotism of leading socialists of the West at first stunned Lenin and other militants of the international working class movement. But the

Mr. Korey is a long-time student of Soviet affairs whose articles have appeared in various American scholarly journals.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

initial shock soon turned to bitter anger, and in September 1914 Lenin gathered a few of his supporters in Berne to denounce "the treason to socialism of the majority of the Second International."[1] Two months later he called for "the transformation of the present imperialist war into a civil war" and demanded the establishment of a new Third International which would undertake "the task of organizing the forces of the proletariat . . . for civil war against the bourgeoisie of all countries. . . ."

Other anti-war socialists, far greater in number than the small group that surrounded Lenin, were less violent in their demands and hopes. Basically, they sought to restore the torn fabric of international socialism with the object of promoting an immediate peace without annexations and indemnities. The Italian Socialist Party provided the biggest bulwark of support for this viewpoint. In April 1915 the Italian party, with the concurrence of the Swiss Socialist Party, sent its popular parliamentary deputy, Odino Morgari, to England, where he proposed to E. Vandervelde, the Belgian Chairman of the Executive Committee of the non-functioning International Socialist Bureau, that a full session of the Bureau be called. The Bureau "should have been convoked the day after war was declared, in spite of the dissensions in the camp of the International," Morgari chided the Executive Committee Chairman. But the latter told the Italian that "as long as German soldiers are billeted in the homes of Belgian workers, there can be no talk of convening the Executive." When Morgari asked whether "the International was a hostage in the hands of the Entente," Vandervelde replied, "Yes, a hostage!" The Italian warned that his party would proceed without the Bureau to call an international conference of all parties and groups faithful to socialism.

Thus profound dissatisfaction with the war policy of the belligerent governments and with the collaborationist actions of the patriotic socialists provided the common ground for the Zimmerwald Conference. It was reflected in the enthusiasm which greeted the reading of a joint declaration of the French and German delegations at the opening session. The war is "not our war," the joint declaration said, and a "struggle among our countrymen against this horrible calamity" must commence. "Prolonged cheers" followed at the emotion-packed session.

But almost immediately a note of sharp discord erupted in the proceedings when a letter sent to the conference by the militant German leftist, Karl Liebknecht, was read. "Civil war, not civil peace," Liebknecht demanded. Instead of "class harmony," socialists must demand "class war" and "social revolution." For Lenin and his supporters comprising the so-called Zimmerwald Left (which numbered eight delegates), the letter provided an effective device for promoting the objective of violent revolution. Over and over again he repeated the passage—"civil war and not civil peace."

Prior to the conference Lenin had made clear, in a note to Alexandra Kollontai, that the "slogan of peace" must be denounced as "superconfused, pacifist, philistine, and an aid to governments. . . ." What was needed was a "program of revolutionary actions." His advocacy of civil war followed logically from his characterization of the "epoch" of imperialism: wars inevitably result from the competition of capitalist monopolies for markets and sources of raw materials. Thus, "the idea that democratic peace is possible without a number of revolutions is profoundly erroneous," he said.

Consequently, Lenin argued at Zimmerwald that socialists must not only withdraw their ministers from war cabinets and vote against war credits; they must engage in a multi-faceted class struggle—the organization of economic strikes and demonstrations, the transformation of these strikes into political strikes, fraternization at the front lines and in the trenches, and finally, all-out revolutionary struggle for political power.

The majority of the delegates at Zimmerwald (some 20 comprised the right wing of the conference while a group of five or six straddled the center) found Lenin's arguments anathema to their orientation and philosophy. If peace was the fundamental objective, it could hardly be achieved through advocacy of further (albeit a different kind of) war. Morgari, himself the principal organizer of the conference, argued that violence had been rejected by the Second International as alien to the socialist tradition. It was hardly surprising that Zinoviev would later caustically observe that the conference was composed of too many "comrades who had not settled accounts with pacifism."

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia,* 3rd ed., Vol. XVIII, Moscow, 1935, pp. 44-46. Other sources upon which this article draws are O. H. Gankin and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War,* Stanford University Press, pp. 309-70; M. Fainsod, *International Socialism and the World War,* Harvard University Press, 1935, pp. 61-74; A. Balabanoff, *My Life as a Rebel,* London, 1938, pp. 152-56; J. Maxe, *De Zimmerwald au Bolchévisme,* Paris, 1920; G. Shklovsky, "Tsimmervald," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia,* Moscow, No. 9 (44), 1925, pp. 73-106; and "Liebknecht and die III Internationale," *Die Rote Fahne* (Berlin), Jan. 15, 1925. pp. 1-2.

For Lenin's views concerning Zimmerwald, see *Leninskii sbornik,* Vol. II, Leningrad, 1924, pp. 231-36, Vol. XIV, Moscow, 1930, pp. 161-87. The views of G. Zinoviev are in his *Sochineniia,* Vol. V, Leningrad, 1924, pp. 218-25, pp. 463-65. Lenin's post-conference evaluation is in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Geneva), Oct. 11-13, 1915.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By a curious irony, the successors of the Zimmerwald Left now in power in the Kremlin reject the Leninist notion that wars are "fatalistically inevitable" under imperialism. Today they hold that wars may be "eliminated from the life of mankind" even before imperialism passes from the historical scene. The latter-day emphasis from Moscow has been upon "peaceful coexistence," with the classical conflict between capitalism and socialism reinterpreted in terms of economic competition. The international duty of the socialist countries is not immediate revolution but the building up of their domestic economies, with the end of establishing models that will attract—and thereby "revolutionize"—the working classes abroad. In the meantime, the "fight against war" must remain a basic objective, for "the nature of modern weapons" would make a world war "a monstrous calamity" (as *Pravda* observed, interestingly enough in an anniversary article on Zimmerwald.[2])

The stress on "peaceful coexistence" has been accompanied by a downgrading of the role of violence as a means to achieve social revolution. Since 1956, the Soviets have accepted the formula that fundamental changes in class and power relations can be achieved in individual countries by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" roads, not only by the resort to violence.

In Peking, the views of the Zimmerwald Left still hold validity; the pronouncements from Moscow are considered "erroneous" and a "clear revision of Marxist-Leninist teachings." As once the Zimmerwald Left characterized the moderate socialists, so today China charges that Soviet policy is but "compromise and capitulation" before "imperialism." In a recent article the Chinese Defense Minister called support of revolutionary war the "touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries" and characterized war as "a great school" to "temper the people and push history forward." [3]

In their militant ideological posture, the Chinese have focused particularly upon urging maximum support for "wars of national liberation." Since the "storm center of world revolution" and the "main focus of global contradictions" is no longer to be found in the capitalist world but rather in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where "wars of national liberation" are emerging, support of such wars must be a "primary concern."

Interestingly, Lenin had initially wanted to have the issue of "national wars of liberation" raised at Zimmerwald. To a colleague he wrote, just prior to the conference, that it was essential to distinguish between various types of wars, adding that "national wars of liberation" should be supported: "And in case of war in India, Persia, China against England and Russia? Would we not be *in favor* of India against England, etc.?" [4] Those who "reject war in general" are "not Marxians," he emphasized. Lenin proceeded to include reference to the national liberation struggles in the draft manifesto that he offered to the Zimmerwald Left caucus, but the caucus decided to replace his draft with one prepared by Karl Radek that carried no such reference.

Lenin's reluctance to press the issue no doubt reflected the lower priority which he attached to revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Not until the Second Congress of the Comintern in July 1920 did "national wars of liberation" become an important item on the agenda of the international Communist movement, and even then primary concern was focused upon the revolutionary activity of the Western proletariat.

Moscow continues to give national-liberation wars a secondary priority, all the more so since it recognizes that the risks of escalation of such wars might not only jeopardize "peaceful coexistence" but unleash thermonuclear war. A single spark in any part of the globe might touch off the nuclear conflagration that could bring mankind's destruction. In contrast, Peking, in its April 1960 documents, stressed that national-liberation wars must be supported without regard to the risks of escalation. And the Soviet view is said to have "completely betrayed the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory of war." [5]

Once the majority at Zimmerwald had concluded that the struggle for peace—and not civil war—was the principal objective of international socialism, its members were determined to embrace as broad a movement as possible, so that maximum public pressures might be exerted upon governments to bring them to the peace table. Consequently the majority of delegates were reluctant to advocate steps that might cause a further splintering of existing socialist parties and organizations. Even a proposal that the conference go on record demanding that socialists vote against war credits was rejected (at the urging especially of the German delegation, since such a demand would have immediately split the socialist parliamentary bloc as well as the party). Moreover, logic was buttressed by a sentiment that continued to cling to the traditions and institutions of the Second International.

[2] *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1965.
[3] The text of Marshal Lin Piao's article is in the *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1965, p. 21.
[4] *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. II, pp. 235-36.
[5] *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The postulates of Lenin concerning the need for social revolution led ineluctably in another direction. Commenting upon the slogan of unity, he wrote: "Frankly, I am more afraid at the present time of such indiscriminate unity than of anything else." He demanded a "ruthless struggle" against "social chauvinism," an uncompromising split away from the patriotic socialists and centrists, and the creation of a new, Third International.[6]

Today, it is Moscow that clamors for the unity of the international revolutionary movement which once the Zimmerwald majority championed. Rejecting the tactics of splitting, the Soviets have even been willing to forego the role of doctrinal "leadership" in the world Communist movement in order to maintain a pragmatic unity of the contending national elements that comprise the movement. In a key editorial in *Pravda* last June, entitled appropriately "Unity of Action Is an Imperative Requirement of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," the Soviets appealed anxiously and repeatedly for a halt to ideological attacks by the Chinese and for a united effort, "even given the existence of disagreements concerning the political line and many important problems in theory and tactics. . . ."[7] In *Pravda's* anniversary article on Zimmerwald, "unity of action" was again underscored, lest "atom bombs begin to fall."[8]

But the appeal has fallen on deaf ears, as the Chinese have pursued a policy that does not stop at criticizing Soviet "revisionism" but attempts to lay the actual groundwork for a separate international. Since 1963, as the July "Open Letter" of the Soviet party then charged, the Chinese have been encouraging the splitting of Communist parties and the formation of anti-revisionist splinter groups in various countries.[9] Translations of the *Peking Review* in various languages and the appearance of a new monthly, *Revolution*, established in Paris with Chinese funds for mass distribution in underdeveloped areas, have accompanied the use of Chinese diplomatic offices to foster the Chinese "line" among revolutionaries in underdeveloped countries as well as among established parties in the West. In October 1963 the deputy head of the Chinese party's propaganda department declared in a speech in Peking (published two months later) that the splitting of revisionist-led parties is an "inexorable law" of Marxism.[10]

A seven-man commission set up by the Zimmerwald Conference to prepare a manifesto expressing the consensus considered three separate drafts—one prepared by Radek, on behalf of the Zimmerwald Left, another by Leon Trotsky, and a third by the German delegation. After examining the various draft manifestos, the commission requested Robert Grimm, the Swiss Social Democrat, and Leon Trotsky to prepare a final text. This text turned out to be almost identical with Trotsky's draft.

Trotsky's centrist position, prior to and during the conference, uniquely qualified him for the assignment. While agreeing with the Left on many points, he refused to endorse Lenin's revolutionary defeatism, as it was in the interest of socialism, he said, that the war should end "without victors or vanquished." More pertinently, he maintained that the differences at the conference should be transcended so as to enable it to condemn the war unanimously. At the same time, however, he would have liked the final text to demand a vote against war credits, and he and Mme. H. Roland-Holst submitted a proposal along these lines. But when it became evident to him that this proposal "might endanger to some extent the success of the conference," he and his Dutch colleague withdrew their proposal "under protest."[11]

The Zimmerwald manifesto accepted the Leninist thesis that the war was the result of "imperialism, of the endeavors of the capitalist classes of every nation to satisfy the greed for profit by the exploitation of human labor." When the capitalist governments say that "the war is for national defense, democracy and the liberty of oppressed nationalities, they lie!" The socialist international had "disregarded the obligations" that followed from its prewar congresses in Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle. Instead, the socialist parties had "invited the workers to suspend the working class struggle," voted "the ruling classes the credits for carrying on war," and offered their governments socialist ministers "as hostages for the observance of the national truce. . . ."

The solution offered by the manifesto was a mild one mirroring the majority view. The fundamental objective of the working class was to be the "fight for peace . . . a peace without annexations or war indemnities." No radical proposals were suggested, and the manifesto said nothing about civil war or intensified class struggle, in terms of either parliamentary action or strikes. And there was no reference to the creation of a new international; indeed, the manifesto spoke of the need "to join anew the broken ties" that had linked the workers together.

[6] *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. II, pp. 231-32, 235-37; Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. XXIX, Moscow, 1937, p. 189.
[7] *Pravda*, June 20, 1965.
[8] *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1965.
[9] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1965.
[10] The details are presented in R. Lowenthal, "The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism," *Dissent* (New York), Winter 1965, p. 116.
[11] Gankin and Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Still, important concessions had been made to the Left. Aside from the adoption of Lenin's characterization of the war, the manifesto made it clear that the socialist international had shirked its responsibility, and it further specified the forms of irresponsible action taken by the various socialist parties (*i.e.*, on war credits, coalition ministries, etc.). With this biting criticism, the manifesto paved the way for the later establishment of a more militant international movement. Finally, by implication, if not explicitly, it rejected civil peace in favor of an active struggle for the cessation of hostilities.

If the Zimmerwald Left was partially appeased, it was far from completely satisfied. In a declaration, the group pointed out that the manifesto was marked by "opportunism covered up by radical phrases." And, more significantly, it contained "no clear characterization of the means of combatting the war." [12] Nonetheless, the Left agreed to support the manifesto, making the vote for it unanimous (except for an abstention by the Socialist Revolutionary V. Chernov on the ground that it made no reference to his favorite subject, agrarian socialism).

Lenin's explanation for the favorable vote of the Zimmerwald Left makes instructive reading. Aware that his group was yet in a minority, it would be, he said, "bad military tactics to refuse to move together with the growing international movement of protest against social chauvinism because this movement is slow. . . ." Clearly, he was anxious to avoid becoming isolated from a peace movement just beginning to develop. The manifesto, he observed, with all its weaknesses, is nonetheless a "step forward," and it would be "sectarianism for us to refuse to take this step forward *together*" with the other delegates, especially since "we retain full freedom . . . of criticizing inconsistency and of endeavoring to achieve greater results." [13] Given this freedom, the Left would work "patiently," his alter ego Zinoviev explained, until "all honest socialists will exclaim with us: *The Second International has died, riddled by opportunism. Hail the Third International purged of opportunism.*" [14]

The Chinese, too, have thus far avoided the formal establishment of a new Maoist International. Like the Zimmerwald Left, they have accepted the present common framework of the international Communist movement, noting that they themselves are at present a "temporary minority." [15] But that they intend to continue their challenge to Soviet "revisionism" until their views acquire majority acceptance has been made crystal clear. The Soviet-dominated Communist movement has responded by characterizing as "radically fallacious" the Chinese view that the majority of the world Communist movement is wrong and that there exists a minority who are the bearers of Marxist-Leninist truth who eventually will become the majority.

The vigor of the reaction no doubt reflects Moscow's recollection that representatives of the minority Zimmerwald Left would ultimately—in March 1919—declare that the Zimmerwald alliance had "outlived itself," and therewith permit its dissolution and absorption into the Third International. Hints that Peking is striving to become the new doctrinal center of world revolution strike the chords of memory ever more resoundingly.

[12] *Sotsial-Demokrat,* Oct. 13, 1915, p. 2.

[13] *Ibid.,* Oct. 11, 1915. p. 2.

[14] G. Zinoviev, *Sochineniia,* Vol. V, p. 225.

[15] The concept is elaborated in *People's Daily* (Peking), Dec. 15, 1962. The pro-Soviet criticism of the concept is in *World Marxist Review* (Prague) No. 2, 1963, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTES & VIEWS

A Traveler in China

By Michael Futrell

I left London on Tuesday morning and arrived Thursday afternoon in Moscow where I had to spend one night in a hotel. Memories of my stay in Moscow several years earlier immediately became vivid when I entered the cathedral-like hall of the Ukraina Hotel, filled with hundreds of foreigners in different stages of frenzy, all struggling to get some sense out of officials of the hotel and of Intourist. To sort out a minor uncertainty in my arrangements took me one hour's strenuous arguing. By then I was hungry. Entering the dining room, I inquired where I might sit. With dreadful glee, a lugubrious waiter deigned to tell me that just then the vast room was entirely reserved for groups. Appealing to the seemingly most effective of the officials with whom I had been dealing, I was advised to outflank the dining room by means of one of the snack-bars on the upper floors. The attendant on the floor where my room was located promised that the snack-bar there would open soon.

Time passed. Eventually the door was opened by a waitress. Was the snack-bar open now, I asked. Yes, she replied. I went in and sat down. The waitress stared at me. I stared back. Could I please have something to eat, I asked. No, she replied. But you are open, I pointed out. Yes, she agreed. But you have no food to serve, I asked again. No, no food at all, she repeated. When might the food be delivered, I asked. She really couldn't say, but of course, she insisted brightly, the snack-bar was open.

By now I felt I was indeed in Russia. Leaving the waitress with a merry quip, I eventually succeeded in tracking down a snack-bar on another floor that not only was open but even had some food. Perhaps I was unlucky. The hotel was exceptionally crowded. Enormous groups of Italian sports fans had just arrived for some international match; they could be seen wandering everywhere with enthusiasm and incredulity, and the hotel organization was under heavy strain.

However, a good deal of the clumsiness and improvisation of former years persists. For example, the absurd system of coupons for meals, each coupon worth an arbitrary sum, so that one always has to be adding up the cost of what one eats and fiddling with money as well as coupons. Then, just before leaving for the station, as a final check I showed my train ticket to a girl who seemed one of the more efficient of the lot. She was horrified. "But that's not a ticket at all!" she exclaimed. This was too much, and as the only alternative to saying something rude I burst out laughing. But this was serious, for the

---

Mr. Futrell, who teaches at St. Antony's, Oxford University, is the author of Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transportation Through Scandinavia and Finland, 1853-1917 (*New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963*). *He recently spent a few months traveling through Russia and the Far East, including a visit to Communist China.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peking train would leave in an hour. So I made a scene, denouncing bureaucracy and appealing with emotion to the wisdom and initiative of the Intourist staff present (eight or ten young women). They swung into vigorous action, pooling their experience as a kind of committee to elucidate the matter of my ticket (or non-ticket), and ignoring the imminent apoplexy of several urgent Italians. It took only a few minutes to establish that certain details of ticket-issuing procedure and ticket format had recently been changed. My ticket was indeed a ticket, and soon I was on the platform of the Yaroslav station, noting with approval and anticipation the MOSCOW-PEKING sign outside my car and the loudspeaker announcements of the train's impending departure successively in Russian, Chinese and Korean.

The train journey from Moscow to Peking takes one week, Friday afternoon to Friday afternoon. The cars are air-conditioned. Besides first and second class, there is a superior first class called SV, which I had and recommend. An SV compartment has two berths (I had a compartment to myself), a table and an armchair, and—between every two compartments—a washroom with large washbasin, hot water, and shower. The fare is about $120, cheap compared with the air fare. This does not include food. One can pay for meals beforehand, but it is probably simpler to pay as one eats. The dining-car functions all day, and though there is not much choice of dishes, as Soviet Russian food goes I thought it very reasonable in both edibility and price, a substantial meal costing one to one and a half roubles. The service is certainly far better than in Moscow hotels. And tea is provided by the sleeping-car attendant at any hour.

For anyone interested in Russia, the journey is fascinating. Many of us who are not expert geographers probably imagine it as passing through dense monotonous fir forests. but it is not so. The country along the line consists more of mixed fir and birch woods, scattered rather than dense, and of plains or hills either open or with intermittent woodland. The traveller's impression must be made up to a large extent of the natural scene, as even in the larger cities the train stops usually only for 15 minutes, time just to stroll up and down the platform a few times.

Over the thousands of miles of Siberia, I felt monotony more in the human than in the natural scene. Towns and settlements as seen from the train are higgledy-piggledy, with grey wooden cottages and shacks (to the Western eye drearily unpainted except for occasional blue window-frames) and gaunt barrack-like blocks. I remember noticing village boys skating in one place, a file of smartly trousered and jerseyed teen-age girls on skis in another place; but at most stations the same sights are repeated: local youths and often women throng excitedly into the dining-car to buy delicacies (such as apples, even at a price equivalent to more than a dollar a pound), while a truck drives down the platform, stopping by each car, and a couple of women, round like she-bears in padded winter working clothes, stand on the truck and toss up to the attendants in the doorways of the cars large square buckets of coal for the stoves.

Such a sight often surprises and even distresses foreigners. Many, probably most, Russian women must become used to the heaviest physical labor from early life. Squads of laborers are often composed entirely of women. The scene at one small station remains in my mind. A dozen women swinging picks and shovels were smashing and scraping out the hard frozen mixture of ice and dirt packed between line and platform. Chattering and grinning, blowing their noses with their fingers, waddling in their layers of clothing, they were as stout a gang of navvies as can be imagined. On the station building behind them were slogans: ON LENIN'S COURSE—FORWARD TO COMMUNISM! and ONLY ONE WHO BOUNDLESSLY LOVES LABOR IS WORTHY OF COMMUNISM. And somewhere, no doubt, the finest brains of the Soviet Union were devoting themselves to preparing even more extraordinary antics in space.

The weather in the third week of March was favorable, with frosty nights and sunny days, and much of the journey was unforgettably beautiful, with the snow sparkling beneath a bright sun in the blue sky, as when, approaching Omsk on the Sunday morning, we rolled for hours across a plain of birch woods dazzlingly silver between snow and sky.

As the train, after crossing the Kama, drew into Perm, I noticed on the platform an imposing figure: a tall man, powerfully built but stooping, with a flowing graying beard, in black ecclesiastical dress. Accompanied by a young man in a neat lounge suit, he boarded the train and occupied the compartment next to mine. He proved to be the Archbishop of Perm, going with his deacon to Omsk to visit his friend the Archbishop of Omsk. It soon emerged that he and I had met several years before when I visited the great monastery at Zagorsk, where he then was.

The Archbishop of Perm is a remarkable man, and it was a distinct pleasure to spend the evening and following morning in his company. Now in his early fifties, he had graduated as a doctor in the late 1930's and had served during the war as a military surgeon. He had been in Leningrad throughout the German siege. Only after the war had he entered the Church. His reading for his journey was a large volume of a Russian theological journal of the 1890's, but our conversation ranged far as he generously shared with me his Lenten food, a delicious homemade mushroom pie and home-grown apples.

He gave an absorbing account of his flourishing province and its

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

churches filled with believers. Religion was weak among young people—"They're all at the sports stadium," he explained—but strong among the middle-aged.

Most striking to me were stories about his travels through the vast area of the province, about country repasts with the local clergy, and particularly about idyllic summer journeys along the forest-lined Kama on a steamship called (if I remember rightly) the "Meteor". All these were precious glimpses of a little-known aspect of contemporary Russian life.

* *
*

We reached the frontier on Wednesday evening. The stations are Zabaikalsk on the Soviet side, Manchouli on the Chinese. At Zabaikalsk, a girl interpreter led us from the train into the station building for various formalities. They took a long time; the style of work of the money-changing official (remaining Soviet money has to be changed into foreign currency) could only be described as geological. At last they were over, and we were led back into the train, hopeful that soon we should cross into China. But the show was just beginning.

In marched the chief customs official and the commander of the frontier guards and carried out the most rigorous search I have ever experienced—evidently routine, as the few other foreigners underwent the same. They did not search the body or examine buttons, but short of this it was thorough. Every object I had was carefully scrutinized. The dozen books with me were all Japanese dictionaries and grammars, and these were just glanced through. But every scrap of written paper was taken away for examination. Personal letters, notebooks, my pocket diary, as well as a file of teaching and research notes on Russian literature—all were taken. I was thankful that, envisaging such a situation, I had not brought my file of notes on Soviet history. The papers were returned after about an hour.

The customs chief seemed to enjoy his work. Before, in the station building, a French-Swiss woman had suffered an unpleasant time with him. There was some slight discrepancy in the form recording her foreign moneys. She knew but little English; the English-speaking girl interpreter knew no French; the customs chief had roared in Russian and banged the table with his ham-like fist. I had tried to help but had been unable to refrain from observing to the boss that when another person did not understand one's language, banging and shouting was not helpful. He had scowled and banged and roared some more. So now, while he rummaged and prodded in my shirts and slippers beneath the appreciative eye of the guard commander, appraising knowledgeably the thick soles of my ski-boots, they began asking if I had not been thrilled by the wonderful Soviet achievements in space, and I forced myself to make polite replies.

In retrospect, however, it must be said that though this man's bluster was unnecessary and a disappointing send-off from the Soviet Union, his job on the Soviet-Chinese frontier might have worn anyone's nerves very thin during the last few years.

Both Soviet and Chinese frontier officials inquired with particular care about photographic and sound-recording equipment. At some stations I had regretted not having a camera to photograph the gangs of splendid female navvies; now at the frontier I was thankful to be able to say that I had no photographic or recording apparatus or materials. In other respects the Chinese frontier examination differed from the Russian, being short and comparatively superficial.

Then I went into the hall of the Chinese station to change checks into Chinese currency. Waiting while the clerk calculated, I glanced round the hall. A large bronze bust of Mao stood in one corner. I turned and looked in the other direction. In real life as distinct from novels, people scarcely ever gasp or reel in horror. I don't know, but I think I must have shown most symptoms of shock at the moment. Just a few yards from me, smiling sinisterly, was an enormous, glittering bronze bust of Stalin.

In the thousands of miles I had travelled through Eastern Europe and Siberia, I had seen no representation of Stalin, neither seen nor heard his name. This sharp warning that China was different was reinforced by the headlines of the propaganda magazines in many languages displayed in the hall: "Worldwide protests against Soviet persecution of anti-American student demonstrations. Injured Chinese students flown to Peking."

* *
*

The extreme flatness and bareness of the Manchurian plain through which the next day's journey lay, to Harbin and beyond, provided the only scenically dull day of the journey. Yet at the stations one felt that, compared with the Soviet Union, as the Swiss woman said: "C'est un peu plus animé"—despite the roughly equivalent starkness of the settlements (here largely treeless, with buildings of brick or other non-timber construction). Obviously the appearance and manner of the Chinese (gravely or smilingly attentive) and their clothing (usually blue tunics and trousers for both sexes) are different. But a chief reason for the aptness of the Swiss woman's remark was simply the lavish use of red and other bright-colored paint at the stations, supported by attempts at decoration with stones and plants.

The last morning, the train approaches Peking through an intricately irrigated, intensively cultivated landscape; a few trees line the tracks, otherwise every scrap of flat land is utilized. Early in the afternoon, two hours short of a week after leaving Moscow, I was met on the platform at Peking by a Chinese

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guide of Luxingshe (the Chinese equivalent of Intourist).

The arrangements for my six days in Peking and two in Canton were efficient. The guide, not a student but a full-time employee of Luxingshe, is concerned not merely with sightseeing but with the entire welfare of the tourist, in and out of the hotel.

The cost is high, but indeed inclusive. Hotel and restaurant service is competent. Instead of tedious transactions with meal tickets, one orders what one wants, either a European or a Chinese meal (or the hotel may have two restaurants, one European and one Chinese), and whether one chooses two courses or five, it is necessary only to sign the bill—one has paid for the meal in the inclusive charge beforehand. This covers also drinks such as tea, coffee and beer; only spirits must be paid for extra. Also without extra payment, I attended three theatrical performances and had a special dinner at the famous Peking Roast Duck Restaurant. The tourist and his guide are driven everywhere by car.

It was spring in Peking, cool but sunny. On anyone with a taste for art history, the direct impact of the palaces and temples of Peking and its surroundings must be powerful, like the first impact of Italy or Greece. The effect is of course different, but may be stronger; the remoteness (to a European) of the Chinese cultural tradition may be more than counterbalanced by the realization of its length and continuity. And I cannot imagine anyone, with or without special interest or knowledge, failing to be profoundly impressed by such a building as the Hall of Prayer of Good Harvests in the Temple of Heaven. Against a blue sky, this triple-tiered blue-roofed cone on a triple-tiered circular stone terrace seemed to me a pinnacle of achievement comparable to the Parthenon.

Prodigies abound. The moated, labyrinthine Imperial Palace (or Forbidden City), with 9,000 rooms and courtyards, now a series of museums, in the very center of Peking; the Great Wall, winding over the mountains some 40 miles to the northwest, with an accessible section recently repaired, an extraordinary spectacle as thousands of Chinese on Sunday excursions scrambled up and down its sometimes extremely steep stone-paved top—all these are memorable. But more impressive to many Europeans may be places distinguished by balance and harmony, such as the previously mentioned Temple of Heaven and a number of temples in the Western Hills. Particularly delightful, I thought, was the Temple of Azure Clouds, in a grove of cypresses where a gentle valley steepened into the bare hills. My guide, too, liked the quiet of the countryside, and we spent a happy hour resting in the sunshine on the temple's topmost platform, with only an occasional sound from a nearby farm in the still air. The sculptures were Buddhist, but of high quality, and somehow they did not destroy but rather heightened the feeling created by the landscape that I was in Greece.

* *
*

After a few days of this, I turned my attention to the other aspect of China that interested me—Chinese communism, not so much the actual economic and social condition of China, but rather the general view of the world and international relations propagated there. (I do not mean that the gradual replacement of tiny huts and overcrowded boats by modern apartment blocks, for example, does not interest me. It was merely that I lacked previous experience of China as a basis for comparison. Naturally, I was glad to see the people of Peking looking reasonably well-fed, and to be shown a considerable variety of goods in the shops, remembering that only a few years ago, at the end of the 1950's, China was ravaged by economic insanity and near-starvation; but overcoming that phase seems to have had more to do with common sense than with communism).

If the monuments of past Chinese culture exceeded my expectations, so did the manifestations of present Chinese Communist ideology. For several years I have been concerned with the Soviet Union, have some knowledge of communism in general, and before this journey had read a good deal of varied literature about both old and new China. Nevertheless the realization on the spot and in person of the dynamic massiveness, of the global time-and-space scale, and in the last resort (as regards the survival of humanity, or at any rate of civilization) of the ghastly irresponsibility of the Chinese Communist concept of world revolution, was a shock.

Among Peking's huge new buildings (architecturally just huge, though without the Gothic aberrations of Stalin's last public works), the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the Cultural Palace of Nationalities focus a good deal of this ideology. The Museum of the Chinese Revolution covers the period from 1840 to the present. The chief themes are resistance to foreign interference and the struggle of the poor against the rich. With the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920's, the national and social themes are fused.

The last 40 years are demonstrated on a mammoth scale, with hall after hall of enormous photographs, maps and models, covering decades of guerrilla warfare and peasant organization, stemming from the titanic genius and dedication of Chairman Mao and his lieutenants (but principally from Mao).

Always, political and military principles and policy are developed jointly, inseparably. Slowly, patiently, inexorably, the peasant armies grind to pieces the enemies of nation and class. They defeat the Japanese ("Oh yes," said my guide in answer to my question, "of course, Soviet Russia defeated the Japanese, too, and maybe even the Americans also defeated them some

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

place else. . . . Atom bombs? But that was just a couple of towns, wasn't it!"). They defeat Chiang Kai-shek and his American helpers and masters. . . .

The museum ends at last, but the ideology goes on. With the example of the Chinese Communist Party, above all with the political and military thought of Chairman Mao, explains my guide, the oppressed peoples all over the world will defeat imperialism, reaction and revisionism (by the last is meant the more flexible policy of the Soviet Union in recent years). In other words, by inflaming and, when possible, directing any national or social resentment anywhere, every state not accepting Chinese leadership will be eroded from without and within.

All this is the common stuff of Chinese Communist propaganda, of which many people perhaps are more or less aware. What the Museum of the Chinese Revolution brought home to me was more than just this general conception of the world as a vast arena of actual or potential military and political guerrilla warfare; above all, it brought home to me the significance of the time scale. Where the Communist guerrilla war in China took two decades, the global guerrilla struggle can be envisaged in terms of many decades.

Ultimately, the belief is presumably that expressed by Mao in a famous interview in 1946: "the outcome of a war is decided by the people . . . the atom bomb is a paper tiger used by the American reactionaries to scare people." But in the course of time, China is likely to develop industrially, and a morning's traffic of the Chinese Air Line at Peking airport will no longer consist merely of an aged Viscount and an aged Ilyushin.

The purpose of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities is to show the former suffering and present well-being of Communist China's many national minorities, for each of which the Palace has a separate exhibit hall. I asked to be shown the hall of Tibet. The theme was a travesty of recent Tibetan history; but from the technical standpoint the selection and presentation of the exhibits, as in the Museum of the Revolution, were excellent. I noticed a letter from Nehru conveying friendly platitudes to the government of independent Tibet, displayed as proof of diabolical Indian machinations. The last section of the Tibetan hall was devoted to denunciation of what was labelled the recent Indian attack on China. All in all, the attacks on Nehru and India were quite repellent.

The exhibits of torture filled me with sad recollections of the Korean War and so-called brainwashing. What I saw in the museum, however, was trivial in comparison with the events I was to witness later that day.

With my guide I went to one of the modern Chinese operas which —as he said—"help to educate the people." It was called "Raid on the White Tiger Regiment". According to the plot of the play, the Korean cease-fire in 1953 was treacherously broken by the South Koreans, so in retaliation a band of Chinese volunteers in disguise, called the Sharp Knife Squad, with the support of the Korean people, courageously penetrated the enemy forces and destroyed the headquarters of the crack White Tiger Regiment, occupied by a group of American officers.

Technically, the opera was superb. Brilliant exploitation of a great variety of percussion instruments, the use of both dance movements and acrobatics (breathtaking multiple somersaults, with cloaks, helmets, and weapons, over barbed wire fences), startling lighting effects, faultless pace and timing—all helped to create mounting tension. The fights were masterpieces of judo-like virtuosity. The atrocities performed by the Americans—the execution of a nobly defiant old man, the throwing of a baby onto a bonfire[1]—were truly terrifying.

The only parts I found dull were the longer solo passages, for example the oft-repeated declaration of the leader of the Sharp Knife Squad before setting out on his dangerous mission that "I am a member of the Chinese Communist Party and I fear no difficulties. Under the guidance of the military thought of Chairman Mao, we shall accomplish the task."

The audience of about one thousand people was spellbound. Despite the exciting action on stage, I had to keep peeping in all directions; I could not tear my eyes from the entranced faces of the people being educated.

I asked my guide to tell me more about the Korean war. At that time he had been a student of English. Like all his friends, he had volunteered to help the Koreans, who were resisting American aggression. He had poor eyesight and had not been accepted (he felt this keenly, but was proud of now being a squad-leader in the people's militia, to which everyone belongs; any "imperialist aggression" against China would, he solemnly informed me, be met instantaneously by 650,000,000 Chinese in arms). However, from many friends, students of English, who had been accepted and served as interpreters and intelligence officers, he had heard all about the Korean war and was happy to tell me what he knew.

Many, many Chinese had been tortured by the Americans, he assured me (I omit the repulsive details; to what extent my guide's insensitivity—as it seemed to me—was individual or typically Chinese, I cannot say; when I told him I was interested in Chinese food, he gave me such disturbing descriptions of its preparation, while at the same

[1]This theme is not new in the Chinese response to the impact of the outside world. In the late 19th century, it was sometimes believed by Chinese that European missionary nuns boiled babies, and that a steam locomotive would not operate unless a living child was fed into it each day. Robert S. Elegant, *The Center of the World,* New York, 1964, pp. 74, 94.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time chortling "delicious!", that I succeeded in enjoying my Peking roast duck only by logically convincing myself that when eating a steak we do not brood on what may have happened previously in the slaughterhouse). The Chinese had been especially incensed and outraged by these bestialities, he declared, because on their side, they had always taken the most scrupulous care of American, British and all other prisoners, pampered them, and gone to great lengths to provide for them, even when the Chinese and North Koreans had nothing to eat. . .

So, on the flight to Canton, I had plenty to think about besides the artistic and historical monuments of Peking, the decorous and courteous behavior of its citizens, and the roly-poly charm of many of their children. Moreover, I began to feel deep respect for the majority of prisoners in Korea who had resisted Chinese brainwashing, and compassion for the few who had succumbed. Living in comfort for a few days in Peking, I had found distasteful, even at times harrowing, the sustained insistence that certain falsehoods were truths.

Many elements in the Chinese Communist accounts of the Korean war, the conquest of Tibet, and the attack on India are utterly false. But when these falsities are patterned into a comprehensive web spun with a careful blend of vaguely positive ("freedom," "the people", etc.) and specifically Marxist words, angled towards the particular resentments or weaknesses (or, in other cases, the ideals) of the victim, with the insistence that it is for his and everyone's good to believe and belong—all this accompanied, if necessary and if possible, by starvation, ill-treatment and degradation—it is not hard to understand that many people might in the end succumb.

Expert psychologists have recently criticized some earlier accounts of brainwashing, pointing out that the fundamentals of personality are formed very early in life, and that only essentially unstable persons are likely to undergo transformation. This is comforting, but it again seems to ignore the time-scale of which the Chinese Communists are so conscious. After several years of appropriate treatment, it seems to me that even a very skeptical psychologist might be persuaded to embrace certain beliefs he would now reject.

Comforting, too, is the observation by many writers on Communist China that the very frequency of convulsive internal campaigns against error proves the lack of success of thought control. My concern, however, is with the Chinese propagation of a distorted myth of international affairs—and here I see little to be sanguine about.

* *
*

After the bright spring weather of Peking, Canton was oppressive. The temperature was nearly 80° F., and the humidity terrific. The climates in the two cities are, of course, quite different —Canton is about 1200 miles south of Peking. The natural scenery is radically different, too. After the dry barrenness of the Peking area, the lush greenery around Canton and the Pearl River seemed like the bottom of an aquarium.

Architecturally, however, Canton is much more like a European city. In the past, it was one of the chief entrances for foreign trade, and the river-front district of the former foreign concessions, with large balconied houses and shady promenades, reminded me of several Mediterranean water-fronts.

Two excursions were arranged in the neighborhood: to a commune and to a university. The commune, consisting of 45,000 people living and working together in various forms of cooperative organization, spread over a large area just outside the city, provided a pleasant afternoon's ramble through its irrigated fields and orchards. It was clearly prosperous, as indeed it should be, with richly fertile land producing a great variety of crops, fruits and vegetables for the nearby city, with its own workshop for making tools (mostly of a simple kind, as agricultural mechanization is only just beginning), its own boat-building yard, and its own profitable craft industry consisting of extensive embroidery workshops. Given the abundance of labor and shortage of machinery in China, it is perhaps good economic sense at present to make tools in this local do-it-yourself way.

This whole area, I was told, had formerly belonged to a high Kuomintang official. In a secluded spot heavily screened by trees and shrubs stood a large moated villa, said to have been the residence of one of the tyrant landowner's concubines. A dainty summer-house standing in the moat was pointed out as her retreat for smoking opium. I half expected this story to be followed by an invitation to inspect some hair-raising museum of wickedness installed in the villa or summer-house, but it turned out that they were simply being used as living quarters for the workers.

Finally we visited the commune hospital. I had the good fortune to be there at the same time as a couple of visiting German doctors, who confirmed my impression that the place, though cramped, was well-equipped with modern dental, X-ray and other apparatus. I was struck, and so were the Germans, by the extremely matter-of-fact and down-to-earth attitude evident throughout. In the maternity ward, for example, one wall was hung with gigantic colored illustrations of the womb at each stage of pregnancy, and another with large, detailed diagrams of various contraceptive procedures. We were told that people are encouraged to have just one or two children. Posters proclaiming the benefits of family limitation are widely displayed, and in the Canton Park of Culture there was a special exihibition of contraceptives.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Altogether the commune was an agreeable place. It was good to see people carefully tending fruit trees and building stout boats (used mainly for transporting manure from the city and around the irrigation canals and ditches). The nightmare of the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, of the fantastic horrors of the first months of the communes, of the famine of 1960, seemed remote. But obviously this commune, with its advantageous situation, is hardly more likely to be typical of Chinese communes generally than the well-known "show" farms in the Soviet Union are typical of Soviet collective farms.

Near the commune is Sun Yat-sen University. Founded in 1924, it is a general university of about 3,500 students and boasts a spacious campus laid out a few years ago, handy to the city with a bus terminus at the front and the Pearl River at the back. My visit was mainly to the department of foreign languages, which has 400 students, half of them studying English, the rest French or German. Russian is no longer taught as a principal subject.

Students majoring in a foreign language take a five-year course which concentrates largely on intensive training in the contemporary language so as to give the student practical command of it. Besides, every student undergoes rigorous training in Marxism-Leninism, not merely studying the writings of Lenin, Stalin and particularly of Chairman Mao, but also learning how to apply their teachings in the collective body to which he belongs. As seems common in contemporary China, emphasis is also placed on physical culture, such as a brisk run to start the day.

A little foreign literature is read in the more advanced courses. A look at the English library showed a reasonably comprehensive collection of books and a fair range of scholarly journals. The only newspapers in English, however, were organs of Communist groups in Australia, New Zealand and North America which support the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute. I asked if any students were doing research in English. One, I was told. He had thought of doing some research on English literature, but had accepted the advice of his teacher to study contemporary English usage instead.

I listened in on several English classes, spending the most time in a class where a tape-recorder was being used. The tape being played was a recorded outline of a mutual criticism and self-criticism session. The students in the class were drilled through the outline section by section, filling in the gaps in the tape discussion with the correct Marxist-Leninist links, sharpening and deepening the criticisms, and pouncing on evidence of inadequate repentance. For example, a certain girl student's ideological virtues and shortcomings were dissected by her fellow students as follows:

She is always cheerful and lively and full of revolutionary optimism; but I have one criticism—she tends to work alone rather than in the collective. . . I move that she be asked to explain. . . During the last few months she has made a lot of progress. She has shortcomings, but she is working hard to overcome them, and her explanation is sincere and self-critical.

This fragment of the discussion fortunately had a happy ending. The suspicion of rotten individualism about this girl was dispelled, and the collective gathered her to its Marxist-Leninist bosom. I thought again of Korea and shuddered.

On my last evening in China, I visited the Canton Park of Culture. There I found exhibits of photographs; of plants and flowers; of fish and marine creatures, alive and dead; roller-skating; net-ball; a film about astronomy; a storyteller reading from a revolutionary novel; puppets performing a revolutionary drama. A little was entertaining, much was instructive, and all was eminently hygienic and respectable. Only the contraceptive exhibit was closed: it was open only during daylight hours.

My guide in Canton was cleverer but younger than the one in Peking, and I did succeed in rattling him once. In general, these products of five years' concentrated training in practical English and Marxism-Leninism are ideologically imperturbable, with every facet cut, ground and polished. Out of curiosity, I frequently reconnoitered their line—sometimes, for example, with a semantic analysis of their Marxist jargon, sometimes with a factual rebuttal of Chinese Communist untruths about India. As I expected, they would always trot out the stock Marxist replies, but with a practiced dexterity and conviction of being right that showed the thoroughness of their training.

When the young man in Canton referred to Stalin, I asked him to tell me the Chinese Communist version of the last 30 years of Stalin's career in detail. The Chinese stubbornly cling to a good deal of nonsense about Stalin. The past decade of Soviet revaluation of Stalin they dismiss as pernicious revisionism. But having made a rather close study of some aspects of Stalin's policy in the 1920's, often from original contemporary Soviet publications, I was able to demolish my guide's twisted version and insist on the authenticity of my facts. When he retorted that I was implying that Chairman Mao was a liar, I stood firm on the Soviet documents, pointing out that he was implying that the highest Soviet authorities of that time, including Stalin himself, were liars. In the end he became quite heated and took refuge in a purely emotional defense of what the Chinese believe about Stalin.

The Chinese viewpoint is readily comprehensible. For Stalin's successors, it was probably necessary, for their own survival, to admit and reveal some of the truth about

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the hated autocrat after his death; but however politically necessary, this admission of fallibility at the highest level and on the grandest scale was an ideological disaster for communism—a disaster which the Chinese campaign to capture the world Communist movement aims at transcending. And while many people in Europe remember Stalin only too well, to many in other parts of the world his name means little, or can be made to mean what the Chinese would have it mean.

My two guides were models of efficiency—knowledgeable, tireless, painstaking, and scrupulously polite (except in the Stalin episode, which must have been extreme provocation). I am deeply grateful for their conscientious efforts. I am also grateful in another way for the experience of spending a few days with two such formidable products of recent Chinese education. It seems to me regrettable that Americans, both ordinary citizens and specialist students of China, are unable to share this stimulating and instructive experience.

* *
*

So that was China—a quiet hour in the sunshine on the Temple of Azure Clouds as my guide and I told each other about our children, shared enjoyment of the peace of the countryside, and rested with the Buddhas; and, on the other hand, the messianic, apocalyptic scowls of the Sharp Knife Squad as they advanced to carve up the American baby-burners. The memories seem to come in pairs: the sublime blue skyward cone in the Temple of Heaven; the university classroom with its tape-recorded drill and its well-indoctrinated young men and women, amid wet greenery like the bottom of a breeding-tank.

I do not imply a contrast of old and new, for I did not feel that. On the contrary, I felt a continuity. But I am not a historian of China and will not attempt to justify this feeling.

From Canton to the frontier of the territory of Hong Kong is a train journey of three hours. The formalities there are not excessive. In due course, one is led to the famous bridge and walks across it; a British police officer checks one's passport; and the traveller boards another train for about an hour's journey across British territory to Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. The businessmen of many countries who have come from Canton relax, swap yarns about their experiences in Red China, and eye with appreciation the girls and women who, one suddenly notices with surprise, all seem to have different clothes and, indeed, different shapes, in contrast to the universal blue tunic and trousers of mainland China.

My thoughts were still on the other side of the frontier, and only gradually did they catch up with me. For some time I felt dazed amidst the booming, kaleidoscopic capitalism of Hong Kong, bewildered by the air-conditioned luxury of my hotel, ill at ease in the restaurant nearly thirty floors up (with what the brochure called "an intimate à la carte for gourmets, with soft music"), where I sat gazing down at the rainbow of lights around the bay. Back in my room, I turned on the radio to hear a barking salesman urging me to buy the brand of cigarettes smoked by successful people, after which a voice began to croon: *"I cried like a baby all night, baby, because you said goodbye."* I went out to look at the shops stuffed with the goods of the world, but the first thing that caught my eye was a news vendor's poster announcing "HONG KONG FOOTBALL CLUB ADMITS ASIANS."

This unease came not from any moralistic or puritanical notions, but partly from the realization—commonplace, but now vivid after my visit to China—of what ready material the motley non-Communist world provides for Communist propaganda. More disturbing was the realization of the widespread ignorance in much of the world about Chinese thought control and historical falsification, and the dangerous implications of this ignorance in the present and probable future state of world affairs. I wished that a true account of what had happened in Korea, in Tibet, on the Indian frontier, could be provided in every language to every person in every country of Asia, Africa and Latin America. And then the same with other topics.

In Hong Kong at least, I had expected people to be well-informed about Communist China. No doubt many are, but I was unlucky in those I met. To my amazement, some asked me what the Chinese people I had met really thought about Viet-Nam—as though there could be in China at present any expression of political opinion other than the line of the party and Chairman Mao. I answered this strange question each time with my favorite quotation from Mao's writings, taken from his fascinating pre-Marxist article of 1917, "A Study of Physical Culture":

Today's exercise is a continuation of yesterday's exercise and thus leads to tomorrow's exercise. . . Perseverance in exercise can create pleasure. Exercise over a long time can produce great results and give rise to a feeling of personal value. As a result, we will be able to study with joy, and every day will see some progress in our virtue. Our heart is filled with boundless joy because we have persevered and obtained a result.[2]

I was not joking. I had seen many joyful people in China, virtuous people, very well-exercised people.

[2] For text of this article, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung,* New York and London, 1963, p. 101.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC, 20547. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

On Law and Peace

To THE EDITORS: Your splendid Special Issue (March-April 1965) on "Law and Legality in the USSR" raises anew the need for a re-evaluation of the relation between a Communist country's domestic and foreign policies.

There has been a relaxation of international tensions since 1962 between the Soviet Union and the United States. Russia's leaders seem genuinely afraid of a nuclear holocaust. There is a genuine desire for peace on the part of the Soviet people.

Yet, as one article summarizes a significant Soviet domestic problem, "the main obstacle to the development of the rule of law is . . . the vested interest of the party apparatus in arbitrary illegality" ("Prospects for the Rule of Law," by Leonard Schapiro, page 7). How much of this obstacle is related to international attitudes, present and future? Will Russia have to be more militant in the international Communist movement to compete with the romantic, revolutionary appeal of Red China? Or, is the Soviet Union going to be considered a kind of social fascist state because it is considered to be run by a political party interested in keeping the peace and raising domestic living standards?

As an amateur in the field of Communist studies, the undersigned has no answer. Perhaps some experts will discuss this in a future issue.

WALTER R. STOREY
Philadelphia, Pa.

Bibliographic Issues

To THE EDITORS: Perhaps I can clarify some of the points raised by the review in your journal (July-August 1965) of the volume which I edited, *Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism—a Selected, Annotated Bibliography of 7,000 Books in 30 Languages.*

The reviewer mistakenly asserts that the contributing editors, almost without exception, gave their own works "A" ratings and described them in flattering terms. Maybe he overlooked the statement in the preface that the editor of a particular section did not necessarily annotate all of the works in his section. Many of the editors either refused to evaluate their own books or displayed excessive modesty in doing so, which meant that someone else had to add the ratings or write the annotations. It seemed to me foolish and misleading to give a book a lower rating than it deserved simply because the author was the editor of that particular section.

Wherever possible I selected editors who had written works of distinction on the topic with which they would be dealing. It should be no cause for surprise to find high ratings given to works by such editors as Robert J. Alexander, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Robert P. Browder, R. V. Burks, David T. Cattell, Raymond L. Garthoff, George F. Kennan, C. A. Macartney, Robert M. Slusser, or Gerhard L. Weinberg—to name just a few. While many of the other contributors are not as well known, they are in many instances the authors of the best (or the only) scholarly studies of the subjects covered in their sections.

The reviewer also questions the value of the system of ranking the most valuable works in each section with an "A" or a "B." But many of the sections are quite long; for example, "China Since 1949" contains 209 titles. A student wishing to read (or a librarian wishing to buy) a few general works on Communist China might find this section overwhelming unless there were some quick and easy way to identify those works deserving top priority. The "A" and "B" rating system (although necessarily somewhat arbitrary) was designed to make the bibliography easier to use, and several persons have informed me that they have found this to be the case.

I made no attempt to include books on Soviet *internal* affairs for a reason which seemed to me so obvious that I did not bother to mention it in the preface—it would

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have made the book twice as large and twice as costly. The volume is already fat (1240 pages) and expensive ($25). A bibliography of similar scope on Soviet internal developments since 1917, even if it were limited to Russian and other major European languages, would comprise several thousand entries. Such a work would be tremendously valuable, and I very much hope that someone else will undertake the formidable task of compiling it.

THOMAS T. HAMMOND
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

MR. LARSON REPLIES: Leaving aside Professor Hammond's other objections, I must point out that he seems to have completely misunderstood my remarks on the coverage of internal affairs. The decision to exclude books on internal affairs is perfectly justifiable, but important works touching on both foreign and domestic affairs should have been included. Thus the writings of Lenin and Stalin and certain other general histories of the USSR were mentioned, but the reports of Communist Party meetings, the Bolshaia encyclopedia, and similar publications were not. The logic of this escapes me.

More on Khrushchev

TO THE EDITORS: In his review of my book, *Political Succession in the USSR* (September-October, 1965), Mr. Richard T. Davies criticizes me on a point of history. While it is not crucial for the argument of my book (it appears in a footnote), the question has sufficient historical significance to warrant comment.

Mr. Davies attributes to me the view that the group opposed to Khrushchev in 1957 "intended only 'to restrict' or 'to pare' the First Secretary's power." But I did not say that they "intended only" this; I said that in June 1957 this was what they *attempted* to bring about. There is no reason to doubt that they hoped ultimately to be rid of him. What is in question, however, is not what Khrushchev's opponents aspired to, but whether in June 1957 they believed they had the power to realize their aspiration and attempted to do so.

My footnote reads: "While it has generally been assumed in the West that the so-called 'anti-party group' attempted to remove Khrushchev as First Secretary in June 1957, this has never been asserted in the Soviet press. It is contradicted by the testimony of those of its members who have been allowed to express themselves publicly." Now, this is *literally* true. It might be argued, of course, that there is more to it, that available evidence permits the conclusion that Khrushchev's opponents, having "succeeded in throwing together an arithmetical majority in the Presidium" (Khrushchev, *Report to the 22nd Party Congress*), actually convened a meeting of the Presidium in order to oust Khrushchev. It might further be maintained, and frequently has been in the West, that the Presidium actually voted by a seven to four majority to remove Khrushchev as First Secretary. Let me indicate briefly why I question these inferences.

First, it is surely significant that the Soviet press never accused the opposition of having attempted to oust Khrushchev as First Secretary, despite its numerous revelations about the June days during subsequent years and the many new charges leveled against Khrushchev's opponents. Second, some members of the alleged majority of seven have denied that they conspired to remove Khrushchev. For example, in his statement to the 21st Party Congress, M. Z. Saburov said that in the June meeting of the Presidium he broke with the "anti-party group" when he perceived its "real aim" (*Vneocherednoi XXI Sezd: Stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow, 1959, II, 291). M. G. Pervukhin stated that "when the anti-party group openly put the question of changing the Central Committee leadership, I disagreed and did not support this demand" (*Pravda*, Feb. 4, 1959). I do not think these men would have been permitted to exculpate themselves in this way if what they asserted was false. Moreover, the 1959 edition of the *Istoriia KPSS* (History of the CPSU, p. 656) seems to bear them out. It does not accuse Pervukhin and Saburov of trying to oust Khrushchev, but only of taking "vacillating positions" during the struggle. Yet if they did not participate in a conspiracy to oust Khrushchev at the June meeting, then the Presidium could not have voted him out seven to four. One might conjecture that it was Khrushchev who raised the question of his continued tenure as First Secretary; this is suggested by a remark of N. G. Ignatov to the 22nd Party Congress, in which he speaks of Khrushchev's "having seen what this group was driving at. . . ." (*Pravda*, Oct. 25, 1961). If Khrushchev did raise this issue, it was probably in order to split his opponents in the Presidium, which in fact he succeeded in doing.

The historical question as to whether "the anti-party group" actually conspired in June 1957 to remove Khrushchev as First Secretary at that time cannot be wholly resolved on the basis of the evidence now available. However, it would be a mistake to suppose, as Mr. Davies does, that there is no difficulty in the version which the West has too readily credited.

There are other errors in Mr. Davies' review, some of which bear on the substance of my book. Let me mention one. I did not say that Khrushchev's rule gave stability to the Soviet "polity," and in fact argued the contrary throughout my book; what I said was that his rule gave a stability to Soviet *politics* that had not been present in the period of succession following Stalin's death.

A final remark. Mr. Davies believes my characterization of Soviet leadership politics is "purely theoretical." Not so; however, does not

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his contention that Presidium members after 1957 were not Khrushchev's "subordinates" but his "colleagues" smack of the theoretical? Yet Mr. Davies' commonsense understanding of Khrushchev's great powers in those years cannot wholly be obscured by his speculations; he speaks of "the Khrushchev era." And so it was.

MYRON RUSH
Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York.

MR. DAVIES REPLIES: Professor Rush and I are in full agreement that the period 1953-64 was the Khrushchev era. We differ on what happened during that period and how to interpret those events.

A Correction

TO THE EDITORS: I should like to draw your attention to a mistake in the article by Laszlo M. Tikos, "In Russia's Insane Asylums" (September-October 1965). On p. 67, f.n. 3, the author writes: ". . . Rosa Yakovlevna Alksins, whose brother, a Soviet air force officer, had been shot in the 1937 purges," referring to *Grani* No. 57, 1965. The correct translation of the passage in *Grani* is as follows: ". . . Rosa Yakovlevna Alksnis [not Alksins]. Her father Yakov Alksnis, a Latvian, party member since 1903, whose brother was a commander of Soviet aviation and was shot in 1937 on the order of Stalin".

ALEKSANDRS KANBERGS
Toronto, Canada

A Matter of Disagreement

TO THE EDITORS: May I suggest that your reviewer of *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (May-June 1965) missed the forest for the trees. In view of your magazine's usually declarative articles on the role of "the leader" in the USSR, it is notable that D. Gale Johnson, Dean, Division of Social Sciences, University of Chicago, has written about this volume: "This is a good book and, in many respects, an important book. I commend it to anyone who has an interest in the Soviet Union, whether that interest is in politics or economics or in steel or wheat. The book has many merits. It is well-written and very informative. It shows, in advance of Khrushchev's demise, that Khrushchev was subjected to continuous criticism and, on occasion, political defeat. The author indicates that on numerous issues Khrushchev was forced to compromise in order to obtain a decision" (*The Annals*, New York, September 1965). Similar comment was made by Arthur W. Wright of Oberlin College in a review written for *Soviet Studies*. Moreover, Herbert J. Ellison of the University of Kansas wrote for *The Journal of Modern History* that "This book is an important contribution to the literature of Soviet studies."

SIDNEY I. PLOSS
Swarthmore, Penna.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN FUTURE ISSUES—

Economic Reforms in East Germany, *by Harry Trend and Dorothy Miller*
Economic Reforms in Hungary, *by Janos Horvath*
Economic Reforms in Bulgaria, *by J. F. Brown*
The Marxism of Simone de Beauvoir, *by Adam Ulam*
Russia's Literary "Conservatives," *by Sidney Monas*
Maoism: Two Views, *by Stuart R. Schram and Arthur A. Cohen*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED